Office of the Historian

235. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1

New York, July 16, 1956—4 p.m.

51. Re Chinese representation. Various conversations recently have given me cause for concern everything necessary is not being done for handling Chinese representation at forthcoming GA.

In addition conversations with Nunez-Portuondo (Cuba) and earlier with Urquia (El Salvador) (mytel No. 40, July 122), I have distinct impression British feel they can temporize on reaching decision re moratorium until elections. I am further convinced there are many among British and others who feel U.S. can be forced into changing its position subsequent to elections.

. . . . . . .

I feel we must seek capitalize this … opinion of [name deleted] soonest, taking advantage at same time of reported stand of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, in order reach earliest decision on moratorium covering entire session. Suggest Secretary consider early letter to Lloyd requesting decision in favor of moratorium for entire 11th session.3

Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/7–1656. Confidential; Priority.↩
  2. Not printed. (Ibid., 310.2/7–1256) Emilio Nunez Portuondo, Permanent Representative to the United Nations from Cuba. Miguel Rafael Urqúia, Permanent Representative to the United Nations from El Salvador.↩

  3. Dulles replied in telegram 28 to USUN, July 20, as follows: “Agree on necessity obtaining UK agreement to moratorium formula covering whole of 11th GA at earliest practicable time. However I do not believe that letter from me to Lloyd would be most effective tactic at this juncture. At my request Murphy, Robertson and Wilcox discussed matter with Makins on June 22 recalling President’s conversation with Eden last January and requesting early affirmative reply by UK. There are indications from Embassy in London and from UK Embassy here that reply may be forthcoming shortly. If reply should be unduly delayed however, or in negative, additional steps will have to be considered. In meantime I believe most effective tactic is to assume UK agreement and avoid impression undue concern.” (Ibid., 310.2/7–2056)

    At the Secretary’s Staff Meeting on July 24, Robertson noted that the Senate voted 86 to 0 and the House 391 to 0 against the admission of “Red China” to the United Nations. The Assistant Secretary “said it was his impression that diplomatic circles in Washington and at the UN expected that following US elections there would be an accommodation worked out which would eventually permit the admission of Red China to the UN.” Robertson went on to say we should notify the posts of these Congressional actions. Acting Secretary Hoover, who was presiding, agreed, and on August 14, the Department in CA–1391 transmitted to 78 missions abroad the text of H. Con. Res. 265 of July 16 opposing the admission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations together with a lengthy Report by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. (Notes of the Secretary’s Staff Meeting, July 25; ibid., 310.2/7–2556;CA–1391, August 14; USUN Files, IO, Dels, China)

    ↩