Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

194. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 1, 1955—10 p.m.

Delga 400. For Secretary and Wilcox. Re membership. After great deal of hard thinking on membership question I have come to following conclusions:

1. The sentiment on membership has grown to such proportions that an 18 applicant solution seems like the least objectionable outcome in view of the fact that events since my last wire have moved so fast that we cannot either shelve the membership question or have it fail without serious consequences which would include a great share of the blame for US and a determined effort by numerous delegations to expel the Chinese should they use their veto. The possibility of the 17 package proposal which would have been so effective is now, I fear, outdistanced by events.

2. We should continue to use every effort we can to convince the Chinese that they should not veto. If this is unsuccessful, the procedure which might make it most possible for them to refrain from the veto is to see that an 18 state resolution without division is voted in the Security Council. I feel that voting on the candidates separately may well open a Pandora’s box and produce all the worst aspects of a failure in the membership question. If the Chinese should insist and veto an 18 state resolution, which I think will be very difficult for them to do, it will indicate that they have deliberately thwarted the will of the great majority of the UN members. If this should happen, despite our strong representations, we would not have to bear the full onus both for a failure on the membership problem and for what subsequently might happen to the Chinese in the UN. This means that we should, whatever the Chinese do, vote for an 18 state resolution in the Security Council. We can also make clear that we are voting for a total solution of the membership problem without affirmatively supporting the individual satellites.

3. Since this appears to be the best way to deal with the dangers to US in the membership question, our position on the Canadian resolution in the ad hoc committee should be reasonably consistent with our vote in the Security Council. The essential thing is that we not be prevented, by our action in the ad hoc committee, from supporting an 18 state resolution in the Security Council.

I appreciate the validity of the legal arguments, which the Department had in mind, particularly the advisory opinion of the court, but it does seem to me that we are faced with a condition and not a theory and that political considerations here are overwhelming and would seem to dictate the course I am recommending.²

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–155. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

2. In a memorandum to Barco and Sisco, December 1, Irwin sent “some thoughts spoken aloud” by Lodge today while returning from the airport:

   “Mr. Lodge feels that at the proper moment in the Ad Hoc debate on membership, he would like to say that it is evident that there are two arbitrary positions on this question, both of them apparently irreconcilable—one, the USSR position and two, the Chinese Nationalist position. In view of this situation, it would seem to him that there is no use in calling a Security Council meeting on membership.

   “Mr. Lodge feels that the effect of such a statement would be to put off until after the U.S. elections the whole question of membership. He also feels that the majority of the delegations in the UN would gang up to kick the Chinese Nationalists out. We would continue to stand by them, of course, but we would expect them to lose in the end.” (USUN Files, IO, Membership)