184. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
Delga 362. Re: Membership. Ramsbotham, U.K.,2 informed us this morning that the U.K. Delegation had talked at length yesterday with Martin of Canada concerning (a) a meeting between Canada, the U.K., and the U.S. and (b) interpretation of the Canadian resolution and the Soviet amendment.
Re (a) Ramsbotham said that they had been unable to arrange a meeting …. Re (b) he said that they had argued with little success in favor of Martin’s interpreting his resolution as meaning only the widest feasible membership as opposed to eighteen. Martin said that it did mean eighteen; that all the sponsors meant eighteen, [Page 399] and that a majority of the Assembly meant eighteen. The best that U.K. Delegation was able to get Martin to consider was a possible statement, on his part, to the effect that while his resolution meant eighteen to him, some of the co-sponsors might have different views, and that, some members of the Security Council having different views, it might be unwise to specify the number intended. Martin did not agree to make such a statement but only to think about it.
Ramsbotham reported also that Nutting and the U.K. Delegation had met for over an hour yesterday with Kuznetsov, U.S.S.R., going over much of the same ground previously covered at the four power luncheon. They found Kuznetsov convinced that almost the entire Assembly favored eighteen and unwilling to consider anything less. They had found Kuznetsov interested still in guarantees for the four satellites, but did not feel that this indicated any basic change in his position. U.K. Delegation felt that Kuznetsov was not worried that any blame would attach to the U.S.S.R. in the event that they vetoed seventeen new members because of the failure of Outer Mongolia.
Ramsbotham reported that later yesterday he attended a dinner given by Kase of Japan, where most of the new member candidates were present… .
It is becoming common knowledge that the Chinese veto of Outer Mongolia is holding up the solution of the membership problem. Chinese activity in various capitals has helped to foster this impression. At a Security Council luncheon yesterday, [name deleted] told Lodge he had spoken to Tsiang of China and informed him that if China vetoed Outer Mongolia in the Security Council, he himself would move to throw China out of the UN. Lodge asked [name deleted]if it would be possible for him to abstain in the voting on Outer Mongolia. He said that, as a co-sponsor of the Canadian resolution, this would not be possible. [Name deleted] attitude seems fairly typical of General Assembly sentiment. It is possible that Chinese activity in various capitals has been designed to elicit reactions; on the other hand, it may indicate a growing and firmer intention to use the veto. It looks more and more to us that a Chinese veto on Outer Mongolia will produce results of untold gravity.
If they persist in their intention to veto, we should try to bring about a voting situation in which their veto will not be necessary— and do it, if possible, without having it pinned onto us.
On the assumption that there will be enough abstentions to prevent Outer Mongolia from being elected, I still recommend that I be authorized to introduce as I requested on November 18 (Delga [Page 400] 3093), a motion in the Security Council for the admission of seventeen nations.
The purpose of this maneuver would be to have the seventeen-nation motion the first thing on the agenda. It would then be up to the Soviets to move affirmatively to elect Outer Mongolia.
Both Belgium and Turkey have flexible instructions which would permit them to abstain. Van Langenhove (Belgium) told me his instructions were to abstain on all five satellites plus Spain. [Name deleted] (Belgium) informed us yesterday that they want to be helpful to US, and, if necessary, they could even vote in favor of Outer Mongolia. Alphand assured me the French could abstain on Outer Mongolia. New Zealand, however, is non-committal. If Outer Mongolia is not elected, I think it unlikely that the Soviet Union will permit all of our thirteen free nations to be elected if we vote on a country-by-country basis. They are very likely to veto both Spain and Japan, and maybe others, if not all thirteen.
If on the other hand, they are confronted by a seventeen-nation motion which they would have to veto en bloc, they would be in a more difficult position.
It should be possible to manage matters so that the Soviets would get a very bad press for having vetoed the package deal, however much some governments might blame us. Thereafter we would still be free to accept eighteen nations if we felt it desirable to do so.
I realize there are legal objections to a package motion of this kind, but we can get around this by stating that while we are voting on the applicants as a group, nevertheless they have been considered individually. I have discussed this with Meeker whom Department should consult upon his return Monday.
A further consideration is that neither of the two listings which could be used—either chronological or alphabetical—is satisfactory to us. But all country by country voting is to our disadvantage.
Following is text of statement I would make if authorized to introduce this seventeen-nation motion:
“This is a resolution for favorable action on 17 applicants as a whole. The United States will be interested to get reactions of all concerned on this procedure and will take these reactions very much into account.
“The purpose of the resolution is to protect the interests of the 13 free nations mentioned in my statement of November 13 and to make sure that none of them are left out. It is also proof of the good faith of the United States in taking the position I announced. [Page 401] Furthermore, the resolution makes possible a clear-cut decision. It would therefore seem to be mutually advantageous to all parties.”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2655. Secret; Priority.↩
- Peter Edward Ramsbotham, member of the British Delegation to the Tenth Session of the General Assembly.↩
- Document 169.↩