171. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
Delga 315. For Secretary and Wainhouse. I met with Dixon and Alphand at latter’s residence before our lunch with Soviets to work out line we would take at luncheon meeting with Soviets.
Dixon mentioned conversation which Eden and Macmillan had with Spaak regarding the difficulty that both UK and Belgium have with package idea in general. Moreover, Dixon underscored once again the UK difficulty with Albania and that using this as point of departure he could then emphasize with Soviets that there was real doubt that there would be seven votes for certain of the satellites.
Alphand said he would merely state that he had no instructions. …
It was agreed that we would state our position, listen to what the Soviets had to say, and if any proposal was made by them that we would merely state that we would consider it rather than agree to it at the luncheon itself. It was also agreed to reconvene at the French residence after the meeting.
At lunch Kuznetsov opened the discussion by emphasizing, as he had at our lunch last Wednesday, the difficulties the USSR has on the admission of certain states, particularly Spain and Japan. He said he made his position clear at last Thursday’s press conference and that it was 18 or nothing. He stressed that their soundings indicate great pressure for the 18.
The line taken by Dixon was helpful to us. He said UK could “acquiesce” in the 18, but like all of us they too have difficulties with certain governments. He said UK had great difficulty with the [Page 381] package idea as a whole, particularly in light of the ICJ decision that each applicant should be considered on its merits. Not only was there doubt concerning Outer Mongolia but Albania presented a particular problem for them since it had not abided by the ICJ decision. UK has serious doubts regarding Albania’s application and is not at all certain there would be sufficient votes to admit it. The realistic fact is, Dixon said, there just are not seven votes for some satellites.
In a very brief statement Alphand said that he had no instructions. He added, however, that he shared Dixon’s views regarding the difficulty of any package deal.
I noted that Kuznetsov had said that it was not easy for the Soviets to agree to the admission of Spain and Japan. I pointed out our difficulties with regard to the four Eastern European satellites, but despite this we were willing to help find the votes for the four if the Soviets were willing to drop Outer Mongolia. I said the UK and USSR were apparently agreed on the Bandung Powers less Japan and the West European group less Spain and that for them to let in two nations they didn’t like in exchange for four nations we didn’t like was not a bad deal. Once again I said we would be willing to help them get the votes for the four satellites if they would agree to postpone or set aside Outer Mongolia until some future date.
Conversation then focused on Outer Mongolia, with Kuznetsov having difficulty making a case for the independent status of Outer Mongolia. When Kuznetsov argued that the people of Eastern European origin in this country would welcome the entrance of the satellites to the UN, I disagreed strongly and indicated that the people of Eastern European origin in the U.S. disliked the Communist governments imposed and maintained on these people by force.
Kuznetsov replied that there are positive and negative factors in a deal for each of us and there was a question of balancing one against the other. He then went on to say that the USSR would not “consider” anything other than the 18. He said: “This is strong, definite, and firm”.
I said if the Soviet attitude was that they would not even “consider” then we might just as well conclude that we had a pleasant lunch and that there was nothing more to talk about. Kuznetsov backed down immediately.
Dixon said it would be nice if 18 could get in, but if the USSR attitude was 18 or nothing then there was no basis for discussion. The fact of the matter was that there was real doubt as to the votes on some of the satellites. He said the Soviets were working on a false assumption that votes would be forthcoming.
Kuznetsov was asked by me how he proposed to get the seven votes for the satellites. Only answer he could give was that we must [Page 382] help him get the seven votes. I pointed out to Kuznetsov that he cannot trade what he does not have. He does not have the seven votes, and we would be willing to help him get the seven votes on the four Eastern European countries if he is willing to drop Outer Mongolia. Kuznetsov said if we can agree to help on the 17, why shouldn’t we be able to agree to help on the 18.
The conversation then turned to the Canadian proposal with both Dixon and me pointing out that it was ambiguous on whether it meant 17 or 18. Both Kuznetsov and Malik said it meant 18. I pointed out that the Soviets must have shared our view that it was ambiguous otherwise they would not have submitted an amendment yesterday listing 18. Kuznetsov replied to this by saying it was submitted merely to emphasize the sentiment for the 18 and that there was no ambiguity regarding the Canadian proposal.
Kuznetsov suggested it might be desirable to have a non-official Security Council meeting where we would try to find out how the others would vote. He called this a practical approach and suggested that through this process we might ascertain just where we all stand. We said that we would think about this. Kuznetsov and Sobolev agreed, however, that there should be no Security Council meeting without prior Big Power agreement, saying that if there was no agreement between us then such an exercise would be wasted effort. (They would certainly have pressed for an official SC meeting if they realized that they could put us in an embarrassing position as a result of Chinese intention to veto Outer Mongolia.)
At the end of the luncheon Kuznetsov suggested that we should continue our consultations on this matter in order to try to arrive at a solution.
We reconvened at the French residence after the luncheon and it was agreed that we would tell the press that no agreement was reached but that consultations are continuing. I shall let them take the initiative.
I informed Tsiang, Belaunde, Trujillo and Martin of the general lines which our discussion took with the Soviets. When I called Trujillo it was arranged that I attend an early Latin American caucus to answer questions on the matter.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1955. Secret; Limited Distribution.↩