Office of the Historian

155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva1

Washington, November 11, 1955–midnight.

Tedul 81. Eyes only Secretary from Acting Secretary. I have been attempting to work out procedure on UN membership within the Department and USUN, and I am also mindful of your Dulte 57 of November 82 in which you said in paragraph 2: “I assume you will not want to go ahead until you have had an answer from French and Russians on the veto matter.”

While the problem is primarily one of tactics it also involves substantive questions. The facts are briefly as follows:

1.
The Russians and the French apparently will not give any answer regarding use of the veto.
2.
It appears probable that Outer Mongolia will be presented to the SC in addition to the four other satellites. Assuming that the ChiNats veto Outer Mongolia, which they have stated they will do, it is possible that the Russians will veto one or more of the Western candidates such as Spain or Japan.
3.
In the event that Russia vetoed one or more Western countries, either (a) out of general cussedness, or (b) because of ChiNat veto of Outer Mongolia, we must be certain of receiving sufficient support in the GA to block admission of the four satellites.
4.
It was proposed to issue the statement without further consultation with other delegations, in view of the Russian refusal to answer.
5.
It seems to me that this procedure involves unnecessary risk. The fact is that at present we do not have a package deal at all, and the final outcome of the exercise is still in doubt. If we proceed with [Page 346] the proposed statement in the absence of an agreement we would have committed ourselves publicly to a policy of universality and undertaken a major shift in policy without first being assured of success in our primary objective. At the same time our negotiating position would be limited, as the proposed statement represents only the minimum terms which we could accept.
6.
I have therefore suggested to Lodge and he agrees, subject to your concurrence, that we not attempt to get an answer from the Russians or the French, but that instead we should obtain advance agreement to a package deal from a sufficient number of friendly countries so that our position, especially in the GA will be protected.
7.
To this end, Belaunde (Peru), chairman of the ad hoc committee, would be approached to the effect that we are disposed to make a package deal under certain conditions, and show him a draft of our statement as an indication of what we have in mind. The conditions would be along the following lines:
(a)
That every effort would be made to keep Outer Mongolia from being considered in the SC.
(b)
That in the unlikely event that Outer Mongolia was passed by the SC, a sufficient number of friendly countries would be committed in advance to assure blocking in the GA.
(c)
That in the event that Russia vetos one or more of the western nations in the SC, a sufficient number of friendly countries are committed in advance to block the admission of any of the four satellites.
8.
There is much feeling that, notwithstanding good reasons advanced to the contrary, the adoption by the US of the policy of universality will open the way for the eventual membership of Communist China. While it is doubtful if we should attempt to line up support now for opposition in future years, I strongly recommend that we include a strong statement regarding Communist China at the time our proposal is made public.
9.

At your press conference on July 8, 1954 you said:

“I recall from the days at San Francisco in 1945, when the Charter was drawn, that there was at that time a very considerable argument on whether the United Nations should be a universal body which would represent all the governments of the world, good, bad, or indifferent, or whether membership should be on a selective basis. That was strongly argued at San Francisco and the proponents of selectivity won. That is reflected by the provision in the Charter that members should be peace-loving and able and willing to discharge their obligations under the Charter. That is strengthened furthermore by the provision that any nation against which enforcement action was taken should be liable to suspension from membership in the United Nations. In other words, the United Nations was not set up to be a reformatory. It was assumed that you would be good before you got in and not that being in would make you good.”

[Page 347]

There may be some difficulty in reconciling the present proposal with the earlier statement of July 8th unless we say frankly that there has been a basic shift in policy.

10.
If Lodge is to maintain the initiative in New York he wishes to begin lining up the support outlined in paragraph 4 over this weekend. I would therefore appreciate your guidance by tomorrow if possible.

Hoover
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.393/11–1155. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hoover and Macomber.↩
  2. Printed as telegram 37, Document 149.↩