Office of the Historian

151. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1

New York November 9, 1955—11 a.m.

Delga 243. For Hoover and Phillips (IO) from Lodge. Re: Membership.

1.
The fundamental tactical fact concerning our relationship to the Soviet Union on the membership question is this: the only way we can get an answer from the Soviet Union is to tell them what we are willing to do. Therefore the question is: When does the news of our position come out?
2.
If it comes out as the result of a Soviet leak, following a supposedly private talk between me and Kuznetsov, our position will not be properly presented to the world, which includes the American public.
3.
If, on the other hand, we release our statement first and talk to the Russians thereafter, we will:
a.
Be in a much stronger position to deal with Outer Mongolia because we will have begun to mobilize sentiment against her;
b.
We will have brought our advocacy of Japan and Spain into the open, thereby increasing the difficulty from the Soviet viewpoint of blocking Japan and Spain;
c.
We will have gone far to meet the Canadian res, which, with UK support, is in the open now and which we must at some time meet in the open;
d.
We will look the least like making a deal with the Soviets.
4.
I have talked three times with Kuznetsov on membership and it is simply inconceivable to me that I could get any further information out of him unless I tell him precisely what we are willing to do. Frankly, I would rather tell the world before I tell him.
5.
I am quite sure it has not been Dept policy at any time that I should tell the Soviets what we propose to do. Has this policy changed?
6.
Regarding your Tedul 68:2
a.
Your phrase “without assurance on the veto matter” is different from what Dulles said in his number 37.3 He uses the language “until you have had an answer”, and does not speak of an assurance. Frankly, I think an advance assurance before they know our position is inconceivable.
b.
I do not think we would be “placed in a most awkward position if the public statement is made”. The fact that we are willing not to block the admission of 4 satellites if we obtain the admission of 13 friendly countries will become public eventually. It is merely a question of whether it becomes public as a result of a leak from the Soviet Union or whether it becomes public as a result of our own initiative and our own timing.
c.
Our ultimate assurance against being put in an awkward position is in proceeding in the SC after our public statement and after a discussion with the Soviets, in such a way that we will not vote on the satellites unless the Soviets already or simultaneously have voted for the 13. This is a question of procedural tactics which I feel we can work out. In the GA the Latin Americans, for example, would not support satellites unless Soviets have permitted Spain to be OK’d by the SC. In fact US can easily block a two-thirds vote in GA if there is any double cross by the Soviets in SC of any kind.
d.
Your assumption that “Soviet assurance on the veto is a condition precedent to application of the present membership plan” is quite correct. But publicity is not the same thing as application. Release of the statement is one phase in getting to a point where the present membership plan can be applied. This is a very different matter.
7.
I will do nothing without further word from you as we agreed in our telecon last night.
Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–955. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Subsequently repeated to Geneva for Secretary Dulles as Tosec 233.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. Document 149.↩