145. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State1

Dear Herb: I have carefully reviewed the messages you sent me yesterday with regard to the “Package” plan for the admission of new UN members. I addressed myself particularly to the consequences of admitting the four European Soviet satellites, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, and to the Outer Mongolia question.

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Before he left FOSTER spoke to me about the satellite admission problem. I told him that I thought the effect, at least initially, would be unfavorable as regards the efforts we are making to build up morale and maintain the hope of eventual liberation in these countries. I added that I did not think this effect would be disastrous over the long run and that I realized that on the political side the State Department had to weigh the great advantages to be derived from bringing in a substantial group of Western oriented states against the disadvantages of taking in the satellites.

On further consideration I see no reason to change that position.

If it is decided to proceed, I think it would be possible to strengthen the portion of Cabot Lodge’s proposed statement which deals with the satellites, and I have submitted in the enclosure a suggested rephrasing. You may find parts of it too stiff, but I felt we should put in all our thoughts and leave it to you and Cabot to apply the scissors.

Furthermore, I feel that it is most important that both VOA and Radio Free Europe be given a brief time to prepare for this announcement, naturally on a highly confidential basis, so that they can immediately explain in vigorous terms the reasons for our action along the lines of the attached memorandum.

. . . . . . .

I am getting together some material on Outer Mongolia in case you need more ammunition on this particular subject.2

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles

[Enclosure]

Suggested changes in Ambassador Lodge’s draft statement for the Press—Delga 217, November 4, 1 PM—beginning with third full paragraph page 2, through end of statement.

It is reported that the Soviet Union will withhold its veto and that these free nations can become members of the United Nations, if the free world is willing not to block the admission of the [regimes]3 of four countries from behind the Iron Curtain—Albania, [Page 331] Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.

The peoples of these countries, as distinct from the regimes presently imposed upon them, have proud national heritages. Their history is full of examples of courageous devotion to the cause of national freedom and independence. We have not forgotten that about a century ago the Hungarian patriot, Kossuth, came to this free country to gain our support for his brave struggle to free his native land.

Citizens of these countries have also in the past made great contributions in nearly every field of human endeavor. If represented by governments of their own choosing, they would have much to offer the UN. Then they would be in a position to send as delegates to this organization those who could speak for their real aspirations and defend their true national interests. Under these conditions we could all welcome their election to membership.

But the governments of those four countries, as they are constituted today, are neither representative of the majority will of their peoples nor free in their relation with other states to advance their own national interests and objectives. Those governments were initially imposed by naked military force, and it is force not free consent that keeps them in power—force exercised by concentration camps, secret police and foreign troops. In international affairs, these governments are not free agents but are completely under the control of the Soviet Union, whose foreign policy and economic needs determine their every decision.

For these reasons, the United States has never been in favor of the admission of these four regimes.4 It has seemed to us, however, that the addition to UN membership of 13 free nations with all the understanding and support they can give to the cause of the free world more than outweighs the disadvantages of permitting the four satellites to join.

In no sense does the abstention of the U.S. on the issue of satellite membership indicate that we accept as permanent the present situation in these four countries in Eastern Europe. As President Eisenhower stated at the Geneva Conference in July: “On a broader plane, there is the problem of respecting the right of peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and of restoring sovereign rights and self-government to those who have been deprived of them. The American people feel strongly that certain peoples of Eastern Europe, many with a long and proud record of national existence, have not yet been given the benefit of [Page 332] this pledge of our United Nations wartime declaration, reinforced by other wartime agreements.”

Again, as President Eisenhower stated in August when speaking in Philadelphia before the American Bar Association: “The domination of captive countries cannot longer be justified by any claim that this is needed for purposes of security. …5 Very probably the reason for these and other violations of the rights of men and of nations is a compound of suspicions and fear. That explains. It cannot excuse. In justice to others and to ourselves we can never accept these wrongs as a part of the peace that we desire and we seek. …”

The satellite regimes of Poland and Czechoslovakia have long enjoyed UN membership. Unfortunately this fact has neither helped them to win popular support at home nor to advance their interests abroad. The convinced Communists who will largely make up the UN delegations of these four new members will obtain only the ritualistic satisfaction of having followed Kremlin instructions on how to vote and what to say. But there may be some members of these delegations who will learn much in the UN and whose contacts here may widen the possibilities for freedom of their people.

The determined opposition of the majority of the people of these countries to Communist rule and Soviet economic exploitation will eventually win them freedom and the strength of this opposition at home and in exile will not be affected by this temporary representation in the UN through alien regimes.

Meanwhile, it is not too much to urge that as part performance of the obligations which the satellite governments will undertake as UN members, they will do away with iron curtains and other barriers to normal decent relations with other nations.

For all these reasons, the United States intends to vote for the admission of the thirteen and to refrain from voting against the four mentioned above.

Our warm and friendly feelings for the Republic of Korea and the Republic of South Vietnam whose allies and supporters we are, is well known. Because their territory is unfortunately divided, they are not now being presented for membership.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–655. Secret.
  2. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “P.S. I understand there is a … cable on this subject—but I have not had a chance to study it. AWD”
  3. The word “governments” was in brackets and the word “regimes” handwritten in above.
  4. The phrase “governments, and we propose to abstain on the vote if their names are presented.” was deleted from the text and the word “regimes” added by hand.
  5. Ellipses in this paragraph are in the source text.