110. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key) to the Secretary of State1
- Admission of New Members to the United Nations
USUN reports renewed discussion of the UN membership problem. We are being asked whether the pending Four Power conversations will affect our views on the UN membership deadlock, and we are likely to be further pressed on the point in private discussions at San Francisco or by the Russians in Four Power negotiations at some stage. (List of applicants attached. Tab A)
In the circumstances, we can:
- stand on our present position that each candidate must be judged on its merits and only qualified (i.e., non-Communist) candidates admitted. Unless the Soviet position should spontaneously change on Austria, Japan, or other non-Communist applicants, this would mean all 19 candidates continue to be excluded.
- be prepared to consider a suitable blanket arrangement. The optimum negotiable package would include all non-Communist applicants plus Spain, and all Communist applicants except Outer Mongolia. If necessary, we might defer action on the divided states (Korea and Vietnam, plus Germany if it applies). Any smaller package would risk offending friendly applicants who were excluded. Any effort to link the Chinese representation problem to the membership issue would have to be firmly resisted.
- revive your idea of having Turkey propose in the Security Council the admission of the seven Asian states specifically endorsed by the Bandung Conference. This might possibly result in admitting seven non-Communist states; alternatively, it would produce an unpopular Soviet veto.
The second alternative has definite advantages. We will gain credit among the friendly applicants, as well as a majority of the General Assembly; increase the stature, effectiveness, and moral authority of the UN; and be in a position to use UN machinery more effectively in getting at the Soviet satellites. It would seem to be an appropriate subject for negotiation in any broad Four Power talks. If it arises there, action on the Bandung Conference candidates alone would clearly be inappropriate.[Page 281]
FE opposes the second alternative and favors the third. FE believes a blanket deal means a surrender of principle by consenting to admission of unqualified (satellite) states, and fears a deal would increase pressure for seating the Chinese Communists. (Separate memorandum attached.Tab B)2
That we prepare to consider the matter in the Four Power negotiations, and that consequently USUN be instructed not to take any action on membership for the time being.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/6–755. Confidential. Drafted by Popper. Cleared by EUR, NEA, ARA, L, and USUN. The Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs wrote a dissenting memorandum that is printed infra.↩
- Printed as a separate document infra, with the stamped date June 9, 1955.↩
- A “unified Viet-Nam” was also included in the Bandung statement, but as it does not now exist, it would be excluded. [Footnote in the source text.]↩