Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Volume X

91. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 24, 1956¹

Washington, January 24, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Belgian Views on CHINCOM Controls

PARTICIPANTS

• Belgian Ambassador
• Mr. Carlier
• The Secretary
• WE—Mr. Dunham

The Belgian Ambassador recalled the many frank and useful conversations between the Secretary and the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Spaak, and said that, in view of their past discussions, Mr. Spaak had asked him to call on the Secretary to convey the Belgian Government’s views on the question of controls over trade with the Communist area. The Belgian Government had decided to seek our reaction first before approaching other governments.

Ambassador Silvercruys said that the problem of restrictions applying to export of non-strategic items to Communist China has recently been under review in Brussels. The situation was studied in relation to the limitations agreed upon within CHINCOM. As a result of their study of the question—while maintaining their position in regard to the necessities of keeping an embargo on all strategic materials and arms deliveries in various forms—the interdepartmental Committee which conducted the Belgian study strongly recommended that the matter be given a new look.

Under present conditions, the Ambassador continued, there is a double standard of controls—one applying to the Communist bloc in Europe, the other to Communist China. Under COCOM regulations, while all items on the atomic list and the arms and ammunitions list are entirely prohibited, a limited embargo is applied in regard to non-strategic goods. This embargo operates within the frame-work of three different lists—one list authorizing minor agreed exceptions, another list authorizing certain exceptions within agreed quotas, the third list authorizing certain deliveries under monthly control and check-up. Under the regulations set up by CHINCOM, however, all these lists are merged in a single embargo which permits only limited and agreed exceptions. Furthermore, there is a supplementary list which aims at reinforcing the restrictive measures that are applied.

The discrepancies between these two sets of regulations—COCOM and CHINCOM—are causing a disturbing situation, the Ambassador said. Some of the items embargoed by CHINCOM, in fact go to the Communist bloc in Europe, within the regulations of COCOM, and ultimately filter to China. Furthermore, advantage is taken by nationals of other countries whose Governments observe less scrupulously the obligations which they have assumed. While they have meticulously honored their commitments and taken effective measures to enforce the decisions agreed upon in CHINCOM, the Belgian authorities are of the opinion that present discrepancies are confusing and embarrassing and that the continuance of the CHINCOM embargo—in its present form—may result in penalizing Belgian industry and commerce.

For these reasons, Ambassador Silvercruys stated, his Government has reached the conclusion that the time has come for an up-to-date study of the operation of COCOM and the operation of CHINCOM with a view to seeking an adjustment of the respective embargoes. The China embargo would thus be adjusted within the general frame-work of the embargo against the Communist bloc in Europe, while preserving the principle that the arrangement would apply only to items, the nature, utilization and destination of which have a clearly civilian character and to quantities that are reasonable under the circumstances.

The Ambassador concluded by stating that his approach to the Secretary was made in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and with the desire to keep the closest contact with the United States on this matter as well as on other matters of mutual concern and interest. To this end his Government wished to explain this situation to the US Government and to seek its views prior to initiating consultations with the members of the Consultative Group and to having this Group entrusted formally with the matter.

The Secretary informed Ambassador Silvercruys that we have been giving fresh study to this matter and, as Mr. Eden had expressed a desire to discuss it with him during his visit to Washington, we expect to review the subject thoroughly with the British next week. Secretary Dulles went on to say that our conclusion is that it would be wiser to hold to the present controls even though it may seem unreasonable to keep the back door shut when the front door is open, allowing goods to go through the Soviet Union to Communist China. He emphasized, however, that this movement of goods involves the Communist bloc in a heavy strain on its financial and transportation capacities at a time when the Communist bloc is carrying on an economic war against us. We doubt that this is the time to ease this strain on their economies.

The Secretary remarked that we have discussed this subject with the Japanese, who are anxious to trade with China. The Japanese have a serious problem and we must endeavor to help them find means for making their economic livelihood. It may therefore prove to be in our common interest to ease these restrictions in some small degree. However, the probablities for trade are not likely to be large as the Chinese Communists do not have the financial resources to cover any considerable volume of imports from the West.

The Secretary concluded by stating that the CHINCOM list probably deserves reconsideration from time to time like the COCOM list. He feels it would be desirable for us to reach some preliminary agreement with the UK and Japanese Governments. However, the views of the Belgian Government deserve equal consideration, which they will receive. He thought, however, that he should defer giving the Ambassador any definite reply pending the conversations with Prime Minister Eden. The Secretary stated that he would welcome any specific suggestions the Belgian Government might care to give him on this subject before the meetings with Prime Minister Eden. He thought it would be useful to have specific examples for their discussions.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Dunham.