Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Volume X

68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Permanent Representative at the North Atlantic Council ¹

Washington , October 1, 1955—2:05 p.m.

Topol 351. Excon. Confirm USDel at Oct. 3 meeting should follow Barnett–DeLany London presentation re maintenance China controls (Polto 461, London Polto 29²), i.e.

1. CG meeting should not be held until first week December or ten days after adjournment Foreign Ministers Meeting, whichever later. This would permit assessing not only Geneva discussions of Experts but also progress, if any, in Chinese-US Ambassadorial talks. (UK accepted ad referendum.)

2. US–UK–France should continue be bound by July Trilateral Agreements on handling East-West trade problems with USSR, i.e. no retreat from security trade control system except in return for substantial Soviet concessions in other fields, e.g., disarmament and security. (UK indicated their understanding this position remained so far as quadrilateral discussions at Geneva concerned.)

3. Re elimination China differential, US strongly opposes because

(a) UN has named Communist China an aggressor and adopted resolution calling for selective embargo. Therefore legal obligation treat Communist China differently from remainder Soviet Bloc;

(b) While some Europeans tend to regard aggression as over, US feels Korean armistice violations, arms and air build-up opposite Formosa, Chinese aid to Vietminh and increase defense budget for coming year indicate Chinese Communist aggressive intentions have not been abandoned;

(c) China embargo, even though somewhat frustrated by transshipments through remainder Bloc, still has measurable and important impact. It causes China expend additional cost for transportation and to Bloc middlemen (thus reducing total amount strategic goods China can afford), and hampers Chinese procurement thru delays and inconveniences. More importantly, controls are tangible indication that large group countries continue agree treat China as a pariah in family of nations. Continuation of this affront to their amour propre constitutes an effective form of pressure.

(d) US bears by far largest share military load, on behalf of Free World, in defense its security in Pacific area. Our views as to security requirements of area should be accorded special respect by countries bearing less responsibilities. We regard perpetuation of differential as essential for security reasons. Most promising means of relaxing tensions between US and China lie in current bilateral US-Communist China talks at Geneva. We believe minor concessions being made there by Communist Chinese are result of Free World firmness and pressure. To lessen firmness and relax pressure prematurely might well frustrate the prolonged and painstaking attempt now being made to move toward understandings and arrangements which might diminish danger of Chinese Communist resort to force. Europe as well as US would have much to lose from failure these talks which could result from Chinese belief that it can divide West without meeting US terms.

(e) US Congressional and public opinion. Believe our case convincing without adding this very important factor. But both France and UK aware our Congress has been uncompromising, hitherto, in its rejection of proposals to treat Communist China even on same basis as US treats USSR.

Re reduction European Communist Bloc controls, USDel should state US feels CG discussion these controls should be deferred until results Foreign Ministers deliberations demonstrate substantial quid pro quo performance in disarmament or security fields by USSR. No objection however use CG meeting as occasion for report to PC’s on FonMin experts Geneva discussions.

[Here follows an instruction relating to national security.]

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.509/9–2855. Confidential; Niact Drafted by Barnett and Buckle and approved by Barnett who signed for Dulles. Pouched to Bonn, London, and Tokyo.
2. Polto 461, September 28, concerned the upcoming pre-Consultative Group tripartite talks between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, scheduled to begin on October 3. It asked whether the U.S. Delegation should follow the same line regarding the maintenance of China controls as presented to the British in London recently by Barnett and DeLany. (Ibid.) Telegram 1267 from London, September 28, summarized the Barnett-DeLany conversations with British officials on September 26. (Ibid.) Polto 29 is not printed.