Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Volume X

275. Letter From the President’s Consultant (Anderson) to the President¹

Houston, Texas, August 9, 1957.

Dear Mr. President: I appreciate your generous comments about my recent work on the subject of oil and national security. Your letter of July 30² would have had an earlier response except that I have been away from my office most of the time since I saw you in Washington late last month.

The point of our apparent disagreement to which you advert appears to me to expose the heart of the issue to be resolved in long term policy formulation, viz. the nature and the degree of dependence on Middle East oil which we as a nation can afford.

I am afraid I failed to express adequately the particular concept which you question, but I believe in it so strongly that I should like to lay it before you again and attempt to show how it is reconcilable with the proposition that in case of a real showdown we would have to use force to retain access to Middle East oil.

I ask in the beginning that it be borne in mind that “access” in such context may vary in meaning, depending on related circumstances, all the way from the full and virtually unrestricted access which we enjoy now to an even more severely restricted access than that which we had last fall for a relatively short period. The latter one triggered action by two of our Allies; I assume that a most material subject of our inquiry would be the degree of denial of access which would trigger similar action by us. This I respectfully submit will depend upon the circumstances existing at the time the issue arises, and my point is that in the meantime and before the issue is presented in U.S. affairs, we can have a great deal to do with the shape and form of those circumstances.

In my humble view, history discloses that any nation, whatever its form of government, may have to initiate the use of force when it becomes checkmated in the areas of diplomacy, economics and military preparedness. The decision which actually induced such war may have been made long before in policy formulation, with the result that when such policies produced or permitted the circumstances going to make up the checkmate, no real choice would be left and but one decision could be made.

We are considering, in advance, I believe the critical question that will arise down the line after surrounding circumstances have crystalized—the one which we would hope to answer in terms of continued peaceable methods. It is whether at a given stage our dependence and that of our Allies on this oil is so great that events at such stage present a threat to our own vital security interests. The question then will contain many elements and many related circumstances, the right analysis of each of which will have to go into the answer. Such elements are:

(a) The role of Russia in bringing about such events;

(b) The number of Middle East States involved and likely to be involved in any such shutdown;

(c) The availability of oil and transport from the United States, Canada, the Caribbean, Sumatra (a vast lode), and elsewhere; and

(d) The likelihood that oil from other sources on a temporary or even a prolonged basis would be sufficient to “sweat out” the nation or nations which threaten to cut off the supply, or interrupt transportation.

When that time of decision comes, the more we have done and encouraged our nationals to do, in the way of developing alternative sources of oil and in keeping all outside sources more dependent on us than we are on them, the better will be the opportunity to ride it out and avoid either (a) resort to force to retain access to the source, or (b) suffer the crippling effect of its loss.

There are various ways, by tax incentives and otherwise, in which our Government can encourage the already active search by American companies for oil in other parts of the world.

There are likewise various ways in which we can ensure that such producing areas are dependent on our (and our Allies’) taking their oil. By our tax and tariff policies we can encourage the building of refining and processing plants outside the area of production and in the consuming countries. (A handful of Russian technicians could have operated the Iranian producing areas and the big refinery at Abadan; on the other hand Arabia with limited refining capacity at hand is greatly dependent for continued production upon consuming nations in the free world.)

I firmly believe that we can count on the flow of Middle East oil for a long time if we do not allow the degree of dependence (and that of our Allies) on that single source to become too great. Then we can probably ride out all crises short of Russian intervention; and as to Russia’s intervention in the picture, we have a sound and settled doctrine.

I would strike my word “unacceptable” from the paragraph you questioned and cause it to read as follows:

“At the same time our object should be to ensure that our economic and military strength do not become so dependent on the continued flow of Middle East oil that in time of crisis we would face the unacceptable alternatives of (a) resort to force to hold the source, or (b) suffer the crippling effect of its loss.”

I do not contend that the foregoing comments more than scratch the surface of the subject. They may be sound, or they may not; but they do appear clearly to indicate that here is a most fertile field for study and policy formulation in the National Security Council.³

Faithfully,⁴

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up. Confidential.
2. Document 272.
3. In a letter to Anderson, August 13, Eisenhower wrote: “I agree with your paragraph as re-written. Thank you for giving me your further thoughts on this important and complex subject.” (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up)
4. Printed from an unsigned copy.