Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Volume X

262. Memorandum of Discussion at the 330th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 11, 1957¹

Washington, July 11, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and item 1.]

2. Basic National Security Policy: Stockpiling (NSC 5707/8, paragraph 48;²NSC Action No. 1728–b–(6);³ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 25, 1957;⁴ NSC 5414/1)⁵

Mr. Cutler reminded the Council that when the basic NSC policy paper (NSC 5707/8) was approved six weeks ago, action on paragraph 48 (Stockpiling) was deferred to allow the various departments and agencies better to develop their views. The stockpiling policy approved in 1956 (paragraph 47 of NSC 5602/1)⁶ allowed stockpile planning to be done on the basis of a five-year war, but provided for procurement on a priority basis only for objectives based on three years.

In the proposed new paragraph 48 which was now before the Council, the majority Planning Board recommendation would restrict all stockpile procurement to the three-year basis; except in those limited cases where procurement, within the long-term objectives described in the President’s April 1954 directive, is necessary to maintain the vital domestic production component of the materials mobilization base. The Director of ODM, continued Mr. Cutler, had noted at the bottom of the page that in FY 1958 procurement under this policy could include lead, zinc, and battery-grade manganese.

The Defense, Treasury and Budget members of the Planning Board proposed deleting the exception clause and noting that through FY 1959 there may be limited procurement of antimony, lead, zinc, and battery-grade manganese. These members feel that the majority language might be interpreted as approval, from a national security viewpoint, of the long-term objectives.

The President commented that he supposed that these members wished to continue this minerals component of a vital mobilization base, but they wished to do so by means of tariffs to protect domestic production of these minerals rather than to achieve the protection through stockpile procurement of these minerals.

Mr. Gray observed that actually at the present time there were only three such items to be procured—namely, lead, zinc, and battery-grade manganese. He went on to point out that if the Council adopted paragraph 48 without the exception clause, as advocated by Defense, Treasury and Budget, such a proposal would appear to override the President’s directive of April 1954. He therefore hoped that the exception clause could remain in the new paragraph. In any event, he could assure the Council that we would be out of the business of procuring lead and zinc for the stockpile in a year or two.

The President first suggested the addition of the three specified materials to the exception clause. Secretary Wilson, however, said he would stop the whole procurement of materials for the stockpiles. He had absolutely no confidence in the validity of the stockpile requirements, which he believed were based on concepts of fighting a war along the lines of World War II. He realized that this was rather an extreme position, but he advocated that we quit stockpiling as something that was past in this country.

The President replied that he was not so sure that stockpiling was a thing of the past, in view of what we had been hearing in the discussion of Plan D-Minus. Secretary Wilson, however, warned the President that if we continued to stockpile, the President would have these materials hanging around his neck just as he now had agricultural surpluses. Stockpiling of these minerals was merely a means of supporting domestic production that we do not need in this country.

The President replied that either we have to continue to stockpile these minerals or else we should have to protect domestic production by raising the tariffs on them. Moreover, he was very much afraid of losing friends like Mexico. This consideration was quite apart from the political realities which we were facing in the mining states.

Secretary Wilson replied that he certainly had no objection to recognizing the political aspects which required stockpiling. But it was important not to disguise these political considerations as requirements of national security. The President again stated his opposition to a resort to raising tariffs around the world. If we did so, we were bound to lose our friends.

Asked for his views, Secretary Burgess said that he found himself in agreement with Secretary Wilson. While he did not oppose the purchase of these minerals for the stockpile, he did not wish to have such purchases made in the name of the national security. Mr. Gray noted that battery-grade manganese, at least, did have national security implications.

After further discussion of this matter, the President stated that he would accept paragraph 48 as formulated by the majority, together with the footnotes.

The National Security Council:⁷

a. Noted and discussed the draft paragraph on “Stockpiling” (transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 25, 1957), prepared by the NSC Planning Board on the basis of a draft by the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, concurred in by the Defense Mobilization Board, as a proposed paragraph 48 of NSC 5707/8; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as presented orally at the meeting.

b. Noted the President’s approval of the following paragraph and footnotes thereto, for insertion as paragraph 48 in NSC 5707/8:

“48. Stockpiling. The United States should not authorize further procurement* for additions to the Strategic Stockpile authorized under P.L. 520,⁸ 79th Congress, beyond the 3-year procurement priority levels, except in those limited cases where procurement, within the long-term objectives described in the Presidential directive of April 14, 1954, is necessary to maintain the vital domestic production component of the materials mobilization base.**

“*This limitation would not apply in those cases where commitments have already been made to purchase or otherwise acquire materials for the Strategic Stockpile or for transfer to it under the Defense Production Act or Commodity Credit Corporation programs, unless any such commitments can be cancelled with advantage to the Government.

“**Through FY 1958 new mobilization base procurement could include lead, zinc, and battery-grade manganese (synthetic dioxide). At the current rate of purchase in accordance with the Presidential directive of April 14, 1954, the long-term objective for zinc would be reached in almost a year and the long-term objective for lead would be reached in almost two years. New purchases of zinc and lead for the Strategic Stockpile will end on the implementation of the long-range minerals program now before the Congress, even if this date precedes the attainment of the long-term objectives.”

Note: Paragraph 48 of NSC 5707/8, as approved by the President in b above, subsequently circulated to all holders of NSC 5707/8, and to all holders of NSC 5414/1, “Defense Mobilization Planning Assumptions”, as superseding the last two sentences of paragraph 4 of NSC 5414/1.

[Here follows discussion of the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on July 12.
2. NSC 5707/8, “Basic National Security Policy,” June 3, 1957, is scheduled for publication in volume XIX.
3. NSC Action No. 1728 was taken at the 325th meeting of the National Security Council, May 27, 1957. The memorandum of discussion is scheduled for publication ibid.
4. This memorandum from Gleason enclosed a draft paragraph on “stockpiling” prepared by the NSC Planning Board. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda)
5. For text of NSC 5414/1, “Defense Mobilization Planning Assumptions,” April 30, 1954, see ibid., S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5414 Series.
6. NSC 5602/1, “Basic National Security Policy,” March 15, 1956, is scheduled for publication in volume XIX.
7. Paragraphs a–b that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1747. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Miscellaneous Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1957)
8. Reference is to the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act of 1946, enacted July 23, 1946; for text, see 60 Stat. 596.