Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Volume X

25. Report to the Operations Coordinating Board¹

Washington, September 6, 1956.

SUPPLEMENTAL PROGRESS REPORT ON ACTIONS TAKEN PURSUANT TO NSC ACTION 1290–d

I. Introduction

The Board on July 11 “requested that a supplementary report be made by ICA to the Board within thirty days to:

a. Outline ICA organization, staff, and methods designed to carry out its responsibilities as set forth in NSC Action 1486–c, dated December 15, 1955.²

b. Give highlights of actions taken to expedite implementation of the NSC Action 1290–d program, giving sources of delay, if any, and measures taken to correct them.”³

With respect to a, ICA staff undertook a study of major difficulties underlying the problems of implementing the 1290–d action, emphasizing the organizational factors involved in the coordination of the several agencies concerned. Section II of this Report, “Interagency Arrangements”, beginning on page 2, contains a brief discussion of the history of the leadership function, providing a setting for the separate paper on the leadership role accompanying this report.⁴

ICA requested the other participating agencies and its own operating offices to prepare very brief responses to b above, indicating (1) accomplishments to date (August 1) and status of programs, including number of countries and officials involved, cases of success or failure, and specific examples if possible of accomplishments since May 1; and (2) actions taken to expedite implementation, particularly to overcome causes of delay, citing new organization, staff or methods. Section III of this Report, “Highlights of Accomplishments and Actions Taken to Expedite Action in 1290–d Programs”, beginning on page 4, contains brief statements prepared by State, Defense, and USIA… .

General Progress through July 31

As noted in the first progress report,⁵ each of the agencies concerned has taken appropriate steps to establish internal procedures for development of 1290–d programs, although in not all cases has personnel on a full-time basis been assigned responsibilities for central coordination of operations. All of the agencies have transmitted instructions to the field and otherwise informed operating personnel of the program.

Specific programs have been developed and approved for 21 countries. Funds were sought from the Congress to meet obligations in FY 1957, and although the over-all military assistance appropriation was cut substantially, there will in general be adequate funds available to meet presently contemplated program requirements. In the development of the FY 1958 program, much attention will be given to the future expansion of 1290–d programs.

II. Interagency Arrangements

History

NSC Action 1486–c of December 8, 1955 reads as follows:

“Noted the report and the President’s statement that he expected each responsible department or agency to implement its program of U.S. assistance to free world countries vulnerable to Communist subversion in developing and improving the effectiveness of their internal security forces:

(1) Along the lines indicated in the report;

(2) In accordance with approved policies;

(3) Under over-all leadership to be assumed by the Director, International Cooperation Administration, pursuant to his responsibility for the Mutual Security Program;

(4) In coordination with other responsible departments and agencies through the Operations Coordinating Board.”

Upon receiving the above assignment, the Director of ICA, on December 12, 1955, designated Mr. John H. Ohly, Deputy Director for Program and Planning, as his representative in this capacity. Mr. Ohly had already been performing for the Director a number of coordinating functions, as that concerning military and economic programs, for example, and his office was considered the logical location of the new 1486–c responsibility within ICA. In January 1956 Mr. Ohly proceeded to develop working relationships with designated contacts in the other agencies. Throughout most of the period covered by this report, Mr. Ohly has personally carried out the coordinating function, using his staff on occasion, and working through designated personnel in other agencies.

Difficulties

It soon became apparent that the implementation of 1290–d in its broader sense involved many activities of all of the major agencies of the U.S. government operating overseas. Of course these agencies have many other purposes than simply the preservation of internal security, and it becomes difficult to deal with the isolated problem with which Action 1486–c is concerned. It is also clear that there is not a simple, separately identifiable 1290–d program but rather a mixture of a great variety of things which, in some cases directly and in other cases only very indirectly are likely to make some contribution toward the improvement of internal security in another country.

Organizational Problem

The above problem called for the development of special procedures and mechanisms for inter-agency coordination under, to some degree, central direction. The OCB working groups for each country carry out certain responsibilities, but cannot perform adequately the necessary program planning, evaluation and reporting as well as the day-to-day resolution of conflicts, and general supervision. While the major organizational and leadership problem is as yet unresolved, interagency matters are being handled on an ad hoc basis with some success. Until decisions on these major questions are reached, however, NSC Action 1290–d will not be fully met.

III—A. International Cooperation Administration

Highlights of Accomplishments and Actions Taken To Expedite NSC Action 1290–d Programs

1. Accomplishments and Status of ICA Civil Police Program

Since the approval of Action 1290–d, ICA has:

(a) Initiated new civil police programs in eight countries (Laos, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Thailand, Philippines, Korea, Greece and Guatemala) and substantial expanded pre-1290–d programs in two countries (Indonesia and Iran).

(b) Completed detailed surveys of internal security forces in Bolivia, Guatemala, Greece, Laos and Cambodia, as a preliminary step to program initiation.

(c) Provided training to 620 foreign police officials in the U.S. or third countries.

(d) Assisted in arranging or participated in the training of about 11,800 indigenous personnel in their own countries.

(e) Delivered $2,402,418 worth of civil police commodity assistance. This includes such items as jeeps, radio communications equipment, weapons, identification and laboratory equipment and equipment for training schools, etc.

2. Sources of Delays and Steps to Overcome Them

(a) Acceptance of Program of Host Government

After OCB has approved the initiation of a 1290–d program, agreement must be secured between the host government and the United States concerning the nature and extent of the activities to be undertaken cooperatively. This usually involves both political and technical negotiations, which may require substantial time. Most of these delays are inherent in the governmental processes and internal problems of the host country. They sometimes also relate to the relative priority which the American Ambassador attributes to the 1290–d program and to other important negotiations which may be simultaneously involved in the relationship between the U.S. and the host country. Once the top political agreements are reached, technical negotiations usually proceed forthwith.

Overcoming these delays requires continuing interdepartmental review of the progress of negotiation of OCB approved programs, and where necessary, more specific State Department instructions to the Embassy involved.

(b) Recruitment of Police Experts

The supply of American civil police experts who are technically and personally qualified to serve as advisers to foreign police forces is very limited. Personnel shortages have delayed the full implementation of 1290–d programs in certain countries. Delay has also resulted from the mechanics of processing candidates for police positions. ICA now has 30 such technicians serving in civil police activities, but about 40 more are required within the next 90 days for existing vacancies and anticipated new positions.

ICA has taken the following steps to expedite its personnel recruitment:

(1) An intensive recruitment drive has been initiated, in cooperation with other U.S. Government agencies and various American professional organizations in the police field. Additional funds have been made available by ICA to finance recruitment travel and a substantial proportion of the time of the staff of ICA’s Civil Police Division is being devoted to recruitment. This intensive recruitment effort should increase the number of qualified experts who are available for overseas assignments.

(2) A small “civil police pool” has been established in ICA, which will be made up of police experts, already recruited and in training in Washington, available for dispatch to any country as soon as necessary negotiations are completed. The availability of this staff should very substantially shorten the delay between the completion of negotiations and the arrival of the U.S. staff.

(3) A “ready reserve” is also being established by ICA. This group will consist of police experts who have signified their general interest in the civil police program, but who are not immediately available for existing assignments. These individuals will be processed by ICA’s Personnel Division up to the point of actual employment, so as to minimize the time required to send them overseas when overseas assignments develop for which they are qualified and available.

(c) Administrative Processes

As is true in any large organization, certain paper work is necessary to authorize ICA funds for employment of staff, for financing of training and for procurement of commodities. Civil Police programs have, in general, followed the normal internal ICA documentation and authorization processes. This has sometimes delayed the implementation of 1290–d programs.

The Director of ICA has instructed all ICA staff to give priority treatment to all administrative actions involving 1290–d programs. This should speed up the internal processing of the necessary documentation.

3. Examples of Civil Police Programs

Laos—In Laos, the Gendarmérie and Police have been consolidated into a single police service. This force has increased in strength from 1021 to 2830; it has been uniformed and equipped and is currently undergoing training in facilities constructed from ICA funds. A police radio communications system has been installed. Remote areas are now receiving police coverage for the first time.

Indonesia—The pre-1290–d program in Indonesia has been expanded by increasing the personnel of the Police Advisory Group from 6 to 10, and by increasing the participants (trainees) from approximately 28 to 61 per year. The 1957 program amounts to $1,500,000 for commodities which includes arms, transportation, communications, and laboratory equipment. The strength of the Indonesian National Police Force is 105,000 men, including the Police Mobile Brigade of approximately 20,000 men, a para-military organization primarily concerned with guerrilla and other anti-resistance activities. ICA technicians are now advising the police in functions of communications, investigations, patrol, records and identification, logistics, training, maritime police and para-military activities. The National Police has had a stabilizing influence in the Indonesian political situation. The ICA Police Advisory Group has made a significant contribution to the efficiency of that force.

ICA Internal Organization and Staffing for Civil Police Programs

In September 1955, during the earlier OCB discussions of what subsequently became Action 1290–d, ICA established a Civil Police Branch in its Public Administration Division. With the approval of 1290–d this Branch was elevated to Divisional status and its staff substantially expanded. Organizationally, the Civil Police Division, which has a staffing pattern of 19 positions, has the same organizational status as the ICA divisions which have responsibility for such major ICA programs as public health, education and public administration.

In staffing its professional civil police positions in Washington and overseas, ICA attempts to recruit personnel who have:

(a) sound training and experience in police work, or related activity, with appropriate specialized skills;

(b) if possible, some experience overseas in police or related fields (e.g., military government, intelligence, etc.);

(c) personal qualifications which indicate probability of successful adjustment in overseas work;

(d) language facility.

Illustrative of the ICA staff in this field is the following summary of the qualifications of the three most senior members of the ICA Civil Police Division:

1. Byron Engle, GS–15, Chief of Division

Former Director of Personnel and Training of a large metropolitan police department; also, service in ranks and officer positions. Nine years’ service overseas in police advisory work in Middle East and Far East, including service as Chief, Police Administration, Far East Command, in charge of Japanese training under General MacArthur’s command. Graduate of FBI National Academy.

2. Charles C. Oldham, GS–14, Deputy Chief of Division

Former Chief, large state police organization. Also served in ranks and officer positions in municipal police department. Experienced as instructor, college level police training. Has LL.B. degree.

3. Arthur E. Kimberling, GS–14, Chief, Far East Branch

Former Chief, Louisville Police Department. Served overseas as Police Administrator, Far East Command, engaged in Japanese police reorganization. Last 5 years served as Chief, Police Service, Federal Civil Defense. 33 years police experience.

III—B. Department of State

Highlights of Accomplishments and Actions Taken To Expedite NSC Action 1290–d Programs

1. Accomplishments and Status

(a) The State Department is now concerned with the implementation of the 1290–d Program in 18 countries and initial steps are being taken in two additional countries. At the same time, missions in an additional eight countries have submitted or are submitting data to be used in preparing new 1290–d analyses.

(b) The State Department and American Missions in the field make use of their regular personnel in implementing the 1290–d Program. No new personnel has been engaged in connection with the program. However, the burden of work resulting from the program is distributed fairly widely in both the Department and the field.

(c) The action responsibilities falling to the Department of State under the program are largely diplomatic in nature and require action in the field by our Ambassadors and his chief assistants. This type of activity may be called “personal diplomacy” and requires that the Ambassador and his assistants take advantage of every opportunity to persuade foreign officials in 1290–d countries of the necessity and desirability of their countries undertaking activities of the nature specified in the recommendations in the 1290–d papers. Examples of this are (a) Ambassador Cannon⁶ at Athens was most active with Greek political personalities in connection with 1290–d recommendations during and after the elections, (b) Ambassador Muccio⁷ and his staff in Iceland have been constantly concerned with the 1290–d matters during the present situation, and (c) Ambassador Bishop⁸ in Thailand has been active in support of the 1290–d objective there as have been our Ambassadors in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. To cite only two more, Ambassadors Chapin⁹ in Iran and Cumming¹⁰ in Indonesia have likewise been alert in their diplomatic activities to further 1290–d objectives. In the Department of State, similar activities have been carried on in all political areas with Assistant Secretaries and their staffs including 1290–d problems in their consideration of political relations with the countries under their charge. An example of this has been the continuous efforts of Mr. Holland, his ARA staff, and Mr. Barnes of U/MSA to find appropriate ways and means of financing 1290–d objectives in Bolivia.

(d) Substantive accomplishments since May 1 are hard to delineate since personal diplomacy of the type involved does not readily lend itself to evaluation as to substantive results. However, it is indicated that the 1290–d program is being explained and promoted by our diplomatic establishments in the countries concerned to a greater degree with every passing week.

2. Action Taken to Expedite Implementation

The following actions have been taken by the State Department to expedite implementation of the 1290–d Program:

(a) Ambassadors visiting Washington or stopping in Washington en route to a new post in a 1290–d country have been briefed thoroughly on the 1290–d Program and informed of the importance that the Government ascribes to its implementation. Senior officers of Missions in 1290–d countries, when in Washington have been similarly briefed. The Missions in the field have been kept alert on 1290–d programs by cables, surface instructions and informal letters. Departmental officers visiting the field have discussed 1290–d problems with officers at missions in 1290–d countries.

(b) Sources of delay. The chief source of delay was in the beginning the time required for top secret communications to reach certain 1290–d countries and similarly the time required for communications to get to Washington from the field. This delay is being met by using lower classifications when possible for communications other than cables. There have been delays arising out of difficulties in arriving at agreement in Washington between 1290–d agencies (Bolivia funding question). Efforts have been made to eliminate such delays in the future by taking the problems immediately to the OCB luncheon meeting for resolution.

(1) No new organization in the Department of State is contemplated. The implementation of 1290–d Programs is vested in the area Assistant Secretaries and their chief assistants.

(2) Procedures in the field are determined by the Chief of Mission in accordance with his standing instructions.

(3) Departmental officials are aware of the importance which the Government attaches to the 1290–d Program.

(c) The Under Secretary of State has stressed to Departmental officials the necessity to expedite implementation of the 1290–d Program.

III—C. Department of Defense

Highlights of Accomplishments and Actions Taken To Expedite NSC Action 1290–d Programs

1. Accomplishments and Status

a. Progress at the Country Level

(1) Of the 21 OCB approved programs DOD has a primary but not sole, responsibility in 18. Discussions have been undertaken in these 18 countries leading to proposals for legislative changes, establishment of government agencies and development of military and civil attitudes which strengthen internal security. It is too early to assess the actual accomplishments of these efforts.

(2) From these 18, two (2) programs requiring funding have been submitted for inclusion in available FY ’56 monies; however, these two (2), arriving late, have been merged with funding programs of FY ’57. To date there are eight (8) programs submitted for funding from FY ’57 money, however, none have yet been cleared by the DOD, ISA Comptroller.

(3) DOD responsibilities also require the inclusion with the MDAP of certain training and weapons in furtherance of some of the country 1290–d courses of actions. Data available has not yet been sufficiently scrutinized to ascertain compliance with the 1290–d aspects to be included in the MDAP. However, it is a reasonable assumption that in these respects 1290–d DOD/MDAP actions are going forward in at least five (5) countries.

(4) DOD responsibilities also require actions not necessarily needing money. Such actions run the gamut from planning for a contingency, to reexamining force levels, to development of attitudes in foreign civil and military, to encouraging the South Vietnamese to pay their own way. No data is available on the status of these actions.

b. Personnel Included

(1) DOD personnel at home and abroad handle 1290–d matters as additional duties, therefore no added personnel costs are involved. Programs submitted so far for payment in FY ’57, though not yet screened and approved by the DOD comptroller, total as of 15 July approximately $4,015,000.

2. Actions Taken to Expedite Implementation

a. Sources of Delay, If Any, and Measures Taken to Correct Them

Delay for DOD responsible action is chiefly due to:

(1) Time required to formulate requirements and secure approval along the arduous path from local country agency representatives, to country (Ambassadorial) team, to coordinating at unified command level, to executive agent (D/A), to ISA.

(2) Time lost in waiting for Washington leadership (i.e. follow-up on all actions to determine hold-ups).

b. Measures Taken to Correct Delays

(1) Since 3 July 1956 one officer in OSD has been devoting full time to 1290–d programs; he has been assisted by the part time services of designated 1290–d points of contact in the Services, the JCS and ISA. In the field and in Unified Command Headquarters personnel have been designated to follow 1290–d affairs specifically.

(2) On 14 March DOD issued an instruction on the implementation and coordination of the 1290-d program in which the Secretary of Defense directed that once such programs are approved the military departments in coordination with other interested agencies and offices will without regard to existing priorities provide military equipment to military and selected para-military or police forces.

c. Agency’s Plan to Further Expedite Implementation

The DOD plans to further expedite implementation when the ICA leadership mechanism is determined and announced.

III—D. United States Information Agency

Highlights of Accomplishments and Actions Taken To Expedite NSC Action 1290–d Programs

1. Accomplishments and Status

(a) USIA is carrying out assigned tasks in 15 countries. It is not feasible to specify the number of officials involved in carrying out 1290–d activities as such or the cost of activities underway, because virtually all USIA activities in support of 1290–d programs are part of the Agency regular, continuing program.

(b) The Agency is conducting information activities designed to increase awareness of the Communist threat among leaders, intellectuals, the security forces or the public at large in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Guatemala, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Japan and Iceland. In Afghanistan, because of the attitude of Afghan officials, USIA is limited to personal contact work in trying to influence leaders, but has had some success recently in using “calculated leaks” of anti-communist Embassy materials to high Afghan officials. The Agency is also handicapped in Cambodia by the government’s neutrality policy. In Iran, however, the Agency has the cooperation of the Iranians in a rather extensive special program for indoctrination of the Armed Forces, using films, local military radio, and printed matter. In Japan the Agency’s entire regular program is heavily keyed to the 1290–d objective of countering communist influence among intellectuals and labor. A vigorous but discreet campaign to promote 1290–d objectives is underway in Iceland.

(c) In Laos and Vietnam the Agency is assigned responsibility for increasing public support for the internal security forces. In these countries the Agency furnishes the military forces and propaganda agencies with posters, pamphlets and other anti-Pathet Lao materials regularly, reaching the public as well as the army, but the present political situation in Laos has necessitated a review of Agency methods and objectives which is now underway. Similar activities are conducted in Vietnam, where 1,000 army personnel have completed an anti-communist English-language training course. In Bolivia the Agency has found it undesirable to take direct action to increase public support for the unpopular security forces, because to do so would reduce USIS effectiveness in supporting other policy objectives. A general anti-communist program directed to the public is carried out.

(d) Since May 1, 1956 the following significant, and illustrative, actions have been undertaken by the Agency:

(1) Assignment of an experienced officer to USIS Teheran to supervise the special program for indoctrination of Iranian armed forces.

(2) Intensified the Iranian indoctrination program by extending use of local military radio stations, production of indoctrination films, and pamphlets for large-scale military distribution. (Initiated)

(3) In Iraq, commissioned the writing of anti-communist books for intellectuals; established English-teaching courses for Iraqi military and policy personnel, using anti-communist materials; presentation of anti-communist book collection to 200 libraries. (Initiated)

(4) In Guatemala, initiated weekly film programs at military bases.

(5) In Thailand, completed final phase of indoctrination program for Thai armed forces; continued monthly packaged follow-up in all provinces.

2. Actions Taken to Expedite Implementation

(a) Because USIA activities in support of 1290–d programs are part of the Agency’s regular program, and are not separable from normal Agency activities, there are no special causes of delay or administrative problems in implementation.

(b) Since May 1, Agency field posts have been informed of the program by circular despatch, and instructed to coordinate their implementation of 1290–d actions with the Chief of Mission and other agencies in the field. Also since May 1 the Agency has designated its Deputy Chief of Policy as responsible for over-all cognizance of Agency 1290–d activities. A problem exists with respect to implementation of action assigned to the Agency in Bolivia, as noted in paragraph 1. c.

(c) The Agency’s Board Assistant advises policy and program officers with regard to the purpose and intention of the 1290–d program, for their guidance in giving direction to Agency activities in appropriate countries.

(d) Country desk officers responsible for country policies and programs take account of 1290–d objectives and tasks in the Agency’s backstopping of field programs.

(e) Budgetary provision for activities in support of the 1290–d program is integrated with budgets for regular programs.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Overseas Personnel III. Secret. Submitted under cover of a memorandum to the Operations Coordinating Board from OCB Executive Officer Staats, September 7. No drafting information is given on the source text.
2. See footnote 14, Document 13.
3. The July 11 request has not been found in Department of State files.
4. Not printed.
5. Not printed.
6. Cavendish W. Cannon.
7. John J. Muccio.
8. Max W. Bishop.
9. Selden Chapin.
10. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr.