214. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Trade and Resources (Thibodeaux) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie)1

SUBJECT

  • Middle East Oil Situation Under Certain Changed Conditions

Attached is a preliminary memorandum showing the effects on the world oil situation of the inability to deliver Middle East petroleum to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal and the existing pipe lines. It contains the information you requested from Mr. Eakens yesterday.

The memorandum was prepared by a small working group consisting of representatives of Interior, Defense and State, under the chairmanship of Mr. Hugh A. Stewart, Director, Office of Oil and Gas, Interior. When Mr. Eakens called on Mr. Stewart yesterday afternoon to discuss the matter, Mr. Stewart already was in conference with petroleum officials of Defense on the same general subject. The attached memorandum represents a unified Interior–Defense–State view at the oil-staff level.

The memorandum at this stage is brief and preliminary. A more thorough analysis would require several days. The group that prepared the memorandum could prepare a more complete memorandum if one is required. If the problem is to be considered on more formal basis interdepartmentally, it is believed that the appropriate body before which to lay the problem is the National Security Council.

[Page 590]

[Attachment]

Memorandum for the Record, Prepared in the Oil and Gas Division, Department of the Interior2

SUBJECT

  • Effects on the Free World petroleum economy under certain assumed conditions in the Middle East area

This memorandum will cover the following three cases:

  • Case 1: Suez Canal closed, Trans Arabian Pipeline closed, Iraq Petroleum Company’s pipelines closed.
  • Case 2: The same transportation facilities closed and no availability of either products or crude oil from Saudi Arabia.
  • Case 3: Same as Case 2 with the added provision that no products or crude oil would be available from the Middle East area.

General—The current Free World demand is approximately 14.2 million barrels per day. About 3.4 million barrels per day of crude is supplied from the Middle East. Europe’s consumption of 2.6 million barrels per day is supplied almost wholly from the Middle East. European consumption is increasing at the rate of about 15 percent per year.

The current Free World available tanker average is 2,211 ships. The current average demand is 2,100 ships. These figures exclude MSTS’s tankers and the 50 tankers in the Maritime reserve fleet.

A portion of these tankers are now being used to pick up in the Eastern Mediterranean the 300,000 barrels per day delivered by Trans Arabian Pipeline and the 500,000 barrels per day delivered by Iraq Petroleum Pipeline, and to move these quantities to Western and Southern Europe and North America. Tankers are also being used on the run from the Persian Gulf through the Suez Canal to Western Europe to move 1,200,000 barrels per day.

This study does not take into account the far-reaching political and economic effects which would result under any of the three cases.

[Page 591]

Conclusions

1)
If any of the above three cases should occur, far-reaching adjustments would have to be made to continue to supply the current demands.
2)
Both national and international controls would have to be introduced.
3)
An appreciable amount of time would be required to make the changes.
4)
In Case 1 and Case 2, because of insufficient tankers to move crude oil around the Cape of Good Hope, a major shift would have to be made in crude production substantially reducing production in the Middle East and increasing production in the Western Hemisphere. During winter months production shortages would necessitate rationing.
5)
In Case 3, in addition, current demands could not be met and rationing would be required, particularly in the United States and Europe.
6)
In all cases, because of the time required to make the changes, free world petroleum stocks would be reduced to dangerously low levels.

Discussion

  • Case 1—In order to transport the 2,000,000 barrels per day formerly supplied by the Middle East through Suez and from the Trans Arabian and Iraq Pipelines terminating on the Eastern Mediterranean, major shifts in sources of crude oil would be necessary to create shorter tanker runs. Crude oil production in the U.S. and Canada would have to be increased 1.3 million barrels per day, production in the Caribbean would be increased 200,000 barrels per day, and 500,000 barrels per day would continue to be lifted from the Persian Gulf. The increases in crude oil production in the U.S. and Caribbean are believed to be possible for 90 days if extraordinary measures are employed. Beyond the 90-day period, grave doubts exist whether this production could be maintained. U.S. production for an extended period might fall far short of requirements. Considering the new sources of crude, approximately 160 more tankers would be required.

    Since there is only an average excess of 110 tankers in the commercial fleet, the balance of 50 tankers would have to be withdrawn from the reserve “mothball” fleet. During winter months, the period of peak tanker demands, there will be a tanker shortage.

    Under Case 1 conditions assuming extraordinary operations and controls, it appears that during a 90-day summer period, petroleum could be produced and moved to approximate free world demands. [Page 592] Over a long period, or in the winter, production shortages would necessitate rationing.

  • Case 2—Under Case 2 the situation would not be radically different from Case 1, since Saudi Arabian production and refining capacity utilized under Case 1 could be replaced by other Persian Gulf sources.
  • Case 3—Approximately 3.4 million barrels per day of petroleum are produced in the Middle East, of which approximately 0.3 million barrels per day are consumed locally. Therefore, 3.1 million barrels per day from the Middle East would no longer be available.

Considering a summer period of 90 days and assuming extraordinary operations and controls, it is believed that the following additional production could be obtained from the sources indicated:

U.S. 1.5 million barrels per day
Caribbean 0.3 million barrels per day
Indonesia 0.1 million barrels per day
Canada 0.2 million barrels per day
Total 2.1 million barrels per day

This indicates that there would be a shortage of at least a million barrels per day of crude oil to the free world and consequently a similar amount of petroleum products. Expressed as a percentage, this means that the free world demand would have to be reduced 7 percent by rationing. Such rationing, in peacetime, would create serious domestic and international problems.

If the denial of Middle East oil were to be extended to one year, the additional crude oil production that could be obtained from the sources indicated above would drop to 1.5 million barrels per day. This would require rationing of about 12 percent. This corresponds roughly with the degree of rationing experienced in the U.S. in World War II.

Due to the above shortage of crude oil, it is considered that the current tanker fleet could handle the transportation involved for this Case.

  1. Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487, Strategic Materials—Oil. Secret. Drafted by Eakens.
  2. Secret. A note at the end of the source text indicates the memorandum was prepared as a “quick evaluation by representatives of the Office of Oil and Gas, Department of the Interior, Petroleum Logistics Division, Department of Defense, and Fuels Division, Department of State”.