211. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Agriculture (Morse) to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy1
Washington, November 17,
1955.
SUBJECT
- International Sugar Agreement
Attached is a statement on the International Sugar Agreement prepared jointly
by the Departments of State and Agriculture. It is expected that the
recommendations will have the full support of the Department of State as
soon as there is time for the necessary consideration within that
Department.2 In view of the urgency, however, we wish to present
the matter at this time.
The International Sugar Agreement runs for five years with provision for
review and amendment during 1956, the third year of the Agreement.
Naturally, the individual member nations will be free to accept or reject
any amended Agreement. The proposed amendments may be considered at a
meeting called by either the International Sugar Council or the United
Nations.
Preparations for studying the effects of the Agreement and procedures for the
1956 conference will be discussed at the meeting of the Council which will
begin in London November 28, 1955. It will be necessary for the United
States Delegation to participate in these arrangements and in the 1956
conference. The recommendations in the attached memorandum make it clear
that the United States Government will be free to consider and accept or
reject the amended Agreement.
For further information there are attached copies of President Eisenhower’s report3 to the Senate recommending the
adoption of the present International Sugar Agreement.
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[Attachment]
INTERNATIONAL SUGAR AGREEMENT
Problem
The International Sugar Council will hold its next meeting on November
28. Preparatory meetings of certain committees of the Council will begin
on November 23. The Council will establish a procedure to review the
workings of the International Sugar Agreement and to consider amendments
to the Agreement. As a result of this examination governments will
undoubtedly be asked to renegotiate the Agreement in 1956. Although
under the terms of the Agreement, governments are free to withdraw at
the close of 1956 without participating in the negotiations, it is
presumed they will participate and then decide whether to accept or
reject the revised agreement. Although the United States will not be
required to commit itself in any way at the November meeting, the extent
to which we express our views on procedure for prompt renegotiation of
the Agreement will be taken by other governments as indicative of our
interest in continued participation. The delegation to the meeting
should therefore be instructed as to whether this government is willing
to participate in the renegotiations next year and then to decide
whether or not to adhere to the revised terms of the Agreement.
Discussion
Early in 1953 the Departments of Agriculture and State were requested by
the domestic sugar industry to use their best efforts to secure a new
international sugar agreement. Cuba and the Dominican Republic
considered that an international sugar agreement could be of great value
to their sugar economies, and they requested the support of the United
States. At that time the International Sugar Agreement of 1937 was
inoperative, and a negotiating conference called by the United Nations
was scheduled for July 1953. The domestic industry and the foreign
producers in the Caribbean were assured of the Administration’s support,
and the United States subsequently played an active role in the
negotiations which resulted in the International Sugar Agreement of
1953. The Agreement was approved by the Senate by a vote of 60–16 and
ratified by the President on April 29, 1954. Twenty-three nations,
including fifteen exporters and eight importers, are now members of the
Agreement.
Although the Agreement was negotiated for a five year period, it is in
effect a three year agreement. Its terms provide that it will be open
for amendment in the third year, and any participant may
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withdraw from the Agreement at that time.
It is known that a number of countries are desirous of changes in the
Agreement and a conference to negotiate substantial amendments will
undoubtedly be held in 1956. At the meeting of the Council this month
preliminary steps will be taken to arrange for such a conference. It is
possible that the Council may decide to dispense with its own review of
the workings of the Agreement and ask the United Nations to call a
worldwide conference as soon as possible. This would have the additional
purpose of attracting countries not now members of the Agreement.
The International Sugar Agreement attempts to stabilize the world sugar
market within a specified price range by assigning each exporting
country a basic export quota and then adjusting these quotas to the
needs of the market whenever the world price falls below or rises above
the desired minimum and maximum price. The Sugar Agreement thus differs
substantially from the International Wheat Agreement. Whereas the Wheat
Agreement is a multilateral contract to buy and sell specified
quantities at minimum and maximum prices, the Sugar Agreement contains
no such obligations. It looks to balancing supplies with market
requirements in order to keep the world market price within a range
agreed as fair to both producers and consumers. While exporting
countries undertake substantial obligations under the terms of the
Agreement, the principal obligation of importing countries such as the
United States is to limit imports from non-participating countries from
gaining advantages at the expense of participating countries.
During its first two years the International Sugar Agreement has been
successful in stabilizing world market prices, but only at or slightly
below the minimum level sought by the Agreement. Many factors account
for this. It will suffice to say that despite the Agreement world
supplies of sugar have continued far in excess of consumption
requirements. The Agreement is however still regarded by most
participants as a desirable instrument through which countries can work
together to avoid chaos in the marketing of a commodity important in
world trade. Many countries are dependent on the export of sugar as a
principal means of livelihood. The International Sugar Agreement in its
exploratory stages has not accomplished all that was hoped for. It has
however come to be recognized in the marketplace as a constructive force
of substantial authority.
The United States has important interests in the world’s great sugar
producing and exporting areas in the Caribbean. The security of our
considerable trade and investment, our sources of necessary raw
materials and our military bases in that area depend upon the
maintenance of a reasonable degree of political stability and closely
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related economic
well-being. A sharp depression of prices and mounting world sugar
surpluses would cause extreme economic stress and severe political
unrest in this area. The United States, therefore, has a significant
stake in any international action which would help to eliminate the
recurring crisis which would upset this world-wide industry. An
important consideration for the United States is the fact that the
International Agreement does not change the pattern of our trade in
sugar. Our domestic sugar legislation will continue to regulate the
volume and source of our imports as it does at the present time. It is
the view of our domestic industry that an international sugar agreement
is important to their welfare as a means of preventing mounting surplus
in the Caribbean and resultant pressure on this market. The case for an
international sugar agreement is thus based on both domestic and foreign
policy considerations, and the Departments of Agriculture and State
cooperated closely to help bring the present Agreement about.
Recommendation
It is recommended that the delegation to the November meeting of the
International Sugar Council be authorized to take an active role in the
preparation for a negotiating conference next year, and secondly that
when such a conference is called the United States should plan to
participate and work toward a revised agreement which in the judgment of
the departments concerned can make the best contribution to the solution
of a problem in international trade which affects the livelihood of many
countries important to the United States and which, therefore, involves
directly the national interest of the United States.5