Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Volume X

192. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Economic Minister of the British Embassy (Thorold) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann), Department of State, Washington, December 17, 1957¹

Washington, December 17, 1957

SUBJECT

• Discussion with British of COCOM Criteria

Mr. Thorold called to leave the attached memorandum entitled “Revision of the Strategic Criteria”.² He said he did not propose to discuss the substance of the memorandum but rather to deal with certain procedural suggestions. He said the British envisaged two stages in the bilateral discussions. The first stage would consist of a discussion of the criteria with a view to reaching agreement on them. After such agreement had been reached, the British assumed that there would be an interval of several weeks during which the two sides would apply the criteria to the lists. At the end of this period, there would be a second stage of bilateral discussion in which agreement would be sought on a specific list proposal which might be presented to the Consultative Group. As noted in the memorandum, the British were thinking in terms of one embargo list to replace the present International Lists I, II and III, and a separate examination of the munitions and atomic energy lists.

With respect to timing, Mr. Thorold suggested that the first stage of discussion on the criteria should be held as soon as the United States had had a chance to study the British proposals. He said that London has suggested that the first stage bilaterals take place here in Washington and the second stage of discussion on the lists in London. He said that the COCOM situation was likely to provide some pressure with respect to the timing problem. He referred to the COCOM discussion scheduled for January 3 on the French proposal for a List I review and said the United Kingdom intended to take the line that in principle the re-examination of the lists was in order, that the individual member countries should draw up proposals, and that the committee should think in terms of scheduling a subsequent discussion at a later stage. He hoped that the United States would take a similar line, and referred to his understanding from Paris that such a position had been suggested by the United States.

. . . . . . .

Mr. Mann said he would give Mr. Thorold a response to his two specific questions and would give him further reactions and suggestions on the procedural proposals early next week if possible. He referred to the strong military aspect involved in the sort of discussion which was foreshadowed in the British memorandum. Mr. Thorold said that the British recognized this fact, and themselves proposed to bring over a Defense Ministry official for the Washington discussions on criteria. It was understood that there would be a further discussion between Mr. Mann and Mr. Thorold to confirm procedural and tactical points before entering into substantive discussions on the British memorandum.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.509/12–1757. Secret. Drafted by Wright.
2. This memorandum, not printed, proposed that the United States and the United Kingdom undertake a review of the strategic criteria on which the embargo lists were based and recommended new criteria for determining strategic materials.

3. At the Secretary’s Staff Meeting, December 18, the subject of trade controls was raised:

   “Mr. Mann reported on a significant development in the form of a UK memorandum left with him, suggesting a radical revision in the criteria for trade controls … . Discussion turned upon the value of COCOM if there was such a widely differing view as to its operation and the current policy of the US to consult Lists 1 and 2, but not to limit it so severely. Mr. Robertson discussed the difference between CHINCOM and COCOM. Mr. Murphy felt that an attempt should be made, although not relied heavily upon, to have the UK military consult with our military on the requirements, recognizing that the British military would take orders from British civilian departments, notably the Board of Trade. Mr. Mann was not sure whether the development of this matter would be handled in the working group of Macmillan follow-up.” (Notes of the Secretary’s Staff Meeting; Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)