Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Volume X

174. Letter From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower¹

London, May 29, 1957.

My Dear Friend: Many thanks for your letter of May 24.² I will write to you a little later about some of the other points you mentioned, but I should reply at once about the Russian-Chinese trade question. I am very glad that you understand our special difficulty about this matter. As you realise, the commercial interests of our two countries in this are not at all alike. We live by exports—and by exports alone. So I feel that we cannot any longer maintain the existing differential between Russian and Chinese trade and we shall be making a statement to this effect in Parliament tomorrow.

The Russian list is an extensive one, covering over 250 items, and so trade with China will still be severely limited. Indeed we believe that a common list will prove to be the right way of maintaining a viable system of control over trade with Communist countries. Most of the other countries concerned seem to think that what we propose is common sense.

Of course we shall stress that we mean to continue co-operating with you and our allies in controlling trade with both the Soviet bloc and China in the interests of our mutual security. I trust that this will be made clear also in the United States. There is no division of view on this and we shall emphasise this again. I agree that we must try to play down this difference of view between us and do all we can to prevent the misconception that we have different policies on strategic controls, or on the great issues that lie beneath all this.

I will write to you as soon as I can about the other points you mentioned.³

All good wishes,

Yours ever,

Harold

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret.

2. That letter reads in part:

   “I have been trying to follow in a general way negotiations going on between the several countries on the Russian-Chinese trade differential. As an individual I agree with you that there is very little of profit in the matter either for your country or for any other. Commercially, it affects this nation not at all, for the simple reason that we have a total embargo on Chinese trade. However, many of our people think that the free nations could make a terrific psychological blunder in this matter and possibly even lose all the areas of the Southeast that have strong Chinese minorities.

   “We understand your predicament and even though we may be compelled, in the final result, to differ sharply in our official positions, I think that each of our Governments should strive to prevent the possible popular conclusion in its own country that we are committed to going ‘separate ways’.” (Ibid., DDE Diaries)

3. On June 3, Eisenhower sent another letter to Macmillan. It reads in part: “I note that you have made your statement of policy on the China trade affair. While there was some unfavorable comment here in the States, both political and editorial, I am relieved to note that it has not caused the furor that could have taken place. I have heard nothing yet of the reaction in the South East Asian countries.” The letter was transmitted in telegram 8434 to London. (Department of State, Central Files, 493.419/6–357)