Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Volume X

168. Letter From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower¹

London, May 21, 1957.

Dear Friend: I have thought a great deal about your message to me of the 18th [17] of May.² Of course I always want to work in the closest harmony with you. But this Chinese business has become almost as much an obsession with us as it appears to be with your Congress. Quite between ourselves as old friends I do not think there is much in it. You say that if we get what we want the Chinese will only switch their trade from one item to another. That may very likely prove true but traders never think like that. Each individual firm and industry believes that it can increase its own sales, and of course in our country, which only lives by exports, this is quite an important factor.

If there is any chance of a compromise that gives us the substance of what we want and you something to argue with Congress, then of course we will accept it. You will say that this is not much of a compromise, but that is the way of the world. Frankly I would much rather have an agreement with you than a disagreement. But if, as I assume, we cannot get a compromise of this kind, I am very sorry to tell you that I shall have to stick to the line shared by that large number of countries, including the great majority in Europe, who want to bring the Russian and Chinese List together.

I feel that this is not really a great issue compared to the immense problems that you and I have to face. It is just a matter of handling our people. It is very hard to persuade the English that the Chinese are more dangerous than the Russians but I realise that the reverse is the case with your people. I feel sure that it may be better to get this difference settled rather than let it go on and poison our relations. We have so many problems much more important than this which we have got to face together.³

As ever,

Harold⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower Corres. Confidential. Ambassador Caccia forwarded this letter to President Eisenhower. On May 21, Caccia also forwarded a letter from Macmillan to Dulles. That letter reads as follows:

   “In the absence of Selwyn with The Queen I am sending you a copy of a message I have sent to the President today. I know that you fully understand our point of view and I am grateful for all you have done to help. If, as I fear, a compromise solution proves unobtainable, it would seem better at least to get this thing out of the way and I hope you will feel the same. We have so many things that we must do together that it seems better to face this issue now. But I ought to say how grateful I am for the understanding you have shown throughout.” (Ibid.,Macmillan to Dulles)

2. See Document 164.
3. Telegram 6404 from London, May 22, reported that Embassy officers were informed by the Foreign Office of Macmillan’s reply to Dulles’ letter to Lloyd. “Foreign Office reiterated,” the telegram reads in part, “that while UK would prefer agreement rather than disagreement, domestic political pressures had brought ministerial decision that precluded acceptance any plan which did not effectively eliminate differential, including possibility trade in I/L–II goods on par with European Soviet bloc.” It stated further that in reply to an Embassy officer’s query, a Foreign Office official “stated that even if compromise accepted by majority other PCs but did not substantially meet UK goal elimination differential, UK would hold to present decision ‘even if isolated’ and would be forced to ‘go it alone’.” (Department of State, Central Files, 493.009/5–2257)
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.