Office of the Historian

137. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Randall)1

Washington, October 22, 1956.

Dear Clarence: As I indicated to you on October 15,2 the Department considers it unwise to press forward now with a decision as to United States policy on the China trade control question. My reasons for this conclusion are as follows:

1.
The United States has not yet received answers from several CHINCOM participating countries as to their position on our proposals for an interim policy to be followed pending a Consultative Group meeting. Our willingness to participate in such a meeting by the end of the year was made contingent upon acceptance of our interim proposals by the other participating countries. The British position is not entirely clear; both the United Kingdom position and that of other participating countries may become clear only in practice.
2.
We probably have a little flexibility in the timing of a Consultative Group meeting provided we specify a firm date at some point in the near future. An informal report of October 12 indicated that the British might favor a date in February rather than December.3 It was subsequently confirmed from London that the United Kingdom official position is to favor a December meeting, although the Foreign Office was inclined to oppose a meeting date “if the results were likely to be unfruitful.” Under these circumstances the timing of a meeting is subject to some adjustment, and other countries seem inclined to look to the United States to take the lead in suggesting a specific date.
3.
As soon as possible and prior to a Consultative Group meeting, we should discuss with the British the possibility of adding copper wire to the quantitative control list.
4.
The Suez situation is in an indefinite stage; developments with respect to that situation might have a bearing upon the position we should adopt with respect to negotiations on China trade controls.

I am fully aware of the necessity for determining a position to be taken by the United States in sufficient time that we may enter into bilateral discussions with participating countries prior to a [Page 404] Consultative Group meeting. However, in light of the considerations outlined above, I think we may safely refrain from making a final decision on our negotiating policy for several weeks to permit some forward movement on the points I mentioned.4

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Hoover, Jr.5
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 493.009/10–2256. Confidential. Drafted by Wright and cleared by E, EUR, and FE.↩
  2. According to a memorandum for the record, drafted by Earl D. Sohm, Hoover’s Special Assistant, on October 15, Hoover suggested to Randall that day that the CFEP meeting be cancelled. The memorandum also noted that Dulles and Humphrey supported cancellation, and Randall agreed to cancel the meeting scheduled for October 16. (Ibid., Economic Defense Files: Lot 59 D 439, China Trade Controls 1956)↩
  3. This informal report was explained to the Department in Polto 796 from Paris, October 12. (Ibid., Central Files, 493.009/10–1256)↩
  4. In his reply, November 2, Randall wrote:

    “The cables dealing with the CHINCOM matter are quite disturbing. The situation seems to be falling apart rapidly, and I suppose the impact of current events may tend to make our relationships with some members of the Consultative Group more difficult.” (Ibid., 460.509/11–256)

    ↩
  5. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.↩