Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Volume X

135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, September 14, 1956—6:06 p.m.

1915. Excon. a) CA–2286,² b) Circular 191,³ c) Paris 1166.⁴ Kalijarvi informed Coulson US interim proposal along lines ref (a) September 12. Cited UK actions in recent tractor-Land Rover exception and pending tractor request as type cases causing erosion and deterioration multilateral controls thereby making difficult consideration satisfactory long-term solution problem. Stated US proposal made in effort check current trend during interim period. Coulson after restating briefly UK position China controls expressed interest US proposal which he transmitting HMG for consideration.

Department requests Ambassador his discretion and at appropriate time before firm HMG decision reached discuss US proposal with Foreign Minister. May refer French action reftel (c) and fact Japan has agreed … . US feels proposal will be acceptable other PC’s if UK agrees and in particular does not continue resort unjustified use Doc 471. (UK announcement it has decided not license or will defer decision license pending tractor case would be significant gesture on UK part indicating willingness cooperate.) Should point out other PC’s—e.g. Germany and Italy—have cited UK actions as basis for their making similar moves at variance with existing procedures, criteria and established precedents. Other PC’s such as Japan which have exercised restraint in making exceptions have complained UK actions have placed them at competitive disadvantage China trade.

US appreciates political and commercial pressures at work in UK and HMG desire avoid difficult domestic issue though possibly it less difficult while UK so preoccupied with critical Suez problem. However view vital interest and responsibility US in Far East security we consider complete breakdown CHINCOM and COCOM control system and damage to US position and prestige in Far East would be high price to be payed by western interests for marginal commercial value of strategic trade with Communist China by some nations.⁵

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 493.009/9–1056. Confidential. Drafted by Knoll; approved by Kalijarvi; and repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Tokyo.
2. Document 133.
3. Circular telegram 191, September 11, sent to the diplomatic missions in all of the Participating Countries, noted: “Department initiating bilateral discussions CHINCOM PC’s September 12 interim handling China exceptions pending definitive settlement problem at December CG meeting.” (Department of State, Central Files, 493.509/9–1156)
4. Dated September 10, it reported that the French Delegate to CHINCOM remarked that day that France, for the time being, would not follow the lead of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany in licensing prior consultation items to China. (Ibid., 493.009/9–1056)

5. In telegram 1529 from London, September 17, the Embassy reported that it discussed the points contained in telegram 1915 with a senior official in the British Foreign Office. The official noted that the “extreme political pressure” that was continually on British Ministers for expansion of the China trade “would make acceptance very difficult.” (Ibid., 493.009/9–1756)

   Telegram 2012 to London, September 18, reads in part: “While sympathetic political pressures in UK US cannot concur UK’s liberal interpretations various CHINCOM exceptions procedures. By such interpretations substance CHINCOM control would be removed completely leaving only empty and meaningless form and would also have adverse effect on COCOM procedures as well.” (Ibid.)