Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Volume X

109. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and the British Ambassador (Makins), Department of State, Washington, April 13, 1956, 8:30–9:10 a.m.¹

Washington, April 13, 1956, 8:30–9:10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Chincom Controls

In the course of a call on the Secretary about other subjects, the Secretary said to Sir Roger Makins that he wished to discuss briefly the problem relating to the Chincom lists. He said that in the US we were in a very bad bind over this, and he knew the strength of the feeling in Britain with respect to review of the Chincom lists. The Secretary said the British had been very patient. Mr. Macmillan had first brought this subject up at Geneva last autumn, and since then it had been discussed during the Eden–Eisenhower visit. The US had been rather remiss in handling this matter expeditiously. However, this entire question was charged with dynamite insofar as Congress was concerned. The Secretary said Congressional leaders had warned him in the most solemn way that if we tinkered with the China trade controls it would jeopardize the passage of the entire Mutual Security legislation this year. While some members of Congress had honest and strong feelings about the maintenance of all controls on China trade, some others were probably using the issue of controls on China trade as a pretext to attack the Mutual Security Program developed by the Administration.

The Secretary said he did not quite know how to deal with this matter. If we could drag it out and not deal with it until the Congress recessed, it would be extremely helpful. He did not know, however, whether this would be feasible insofar as the UK was concerned in view of the heavy pressures there. Another possibility was an informal loosening up of some of the control items and a tightening up of one or two others such as copper wire. The Secretary said he hoped Ambassador Makins would discuss this matter fully at London, explaining the domestic implications and the effect on our foreign aid program. He mentioned that last evening Senator Knowland, and the evening before Congressman Vorys, had both emphasized privately to him that any serious tinkering with the China trade controls would jeopardize the passage of the Mutual Security legislation.

With respect to the Mutual Security legislation, even without the China trade control element, we were in for rough sledding. The Secretary felt we would get support from the House Foreign Affairs Committee and from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but it would run into rough sledding in the Appropriations Committee. Therefore, the Secretary suggested that “we put our heads together to see if we cannot come up with a way to handle this problem, which is of the utmost gravity”.

Ambassador Makins said the trouble was that we had announced at the conclusion of the Eden–Eisenhower talks that a review would be made of the China trade control items. Thus far, nothing had happened, and tremendous pressures had built up in the UK. The Secretary agreed, and as he had mentioned earlier, we had been remiss in moving so slowly on it, but he wished Sir Roger to know that there was a problem with the Congress and also serious problems within the government as to what we should do. The Department of Defense opposed in almost an emotional way any relaxation of any of the trade controls, and had made known its opposition to members of Congress. Frequently their opposition was pitched on a highly emotional appeal relating back to the Americans who had died in the Korean war and the fact that we were giving strategic materials to the Chinese Communists, which, if hostilities occurred, would kill more American boys, etc.

Ambassador Makins said he had two personal suggestions to make. In the first place, couldn’t something be done about rubber? He said the UK had asked for a review of the China controls and that this had been agreed at the Eden–Eisenhower meeting. If we could only quickly say that the review was in process and that something had been done about rubber, the heat could be greatly taken off the British Government. The Secretary said this was an interesting idea. If we could announce something about rubber, could the British do something about putting quantitative limitations back on the shipment of copper wire?

Ambassador Makins said that we had not formally and officially yet asked the British to review the copper wire situation, and suggested that we ask them to do so. He knew there were heavy pressures in Britain not to limit the sale of copper wire, but he was not certain that something could not be done. He then reverted to the question of rubber and said an absurd situation existed where Ceylon sold rubber and Malaya did not, and it was creating problems … .

The Secretary said he had been reflecting on this matter, and although he had not spoken to other elements within the US Government, he now felt that instead of handling the COCOM review in the glare of the spotlight with high level negotiators, it was of the utmost importance to handle it very quietly. He said he felt there were possibilities of our doing something about rubber, and he hoped the British could do something about copper wire, since this was a very important item that everybody, including the Congress in this country, knew about, and they also knew that this copper wire was necessary for Soviet development and expansion in their atomic and guided missile capabilities… .

Sir Roger said that if the only result of a review was to put copper wire back on the list, it was a hopeless exercise, as the UK would never agree to this. If, on the other hand, the US would take some controls off rubber or some other items, something might be done about copper wire. He agreed that this problem should be dealt with quietly and not in the glare of the spotlight, and he would talk about the problem with his Government immediately following his return to London.

There was some brief discussion about the desirability of avoiding publicity. Sir Roger said that if some items were decontrolled, there would have to be public announcement in the UK so that shippers and exporters would know. The Secretary commented again that the less publicity given to all this, the better, although he understood that shippers and exporters would have to know.²

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 493.009/4–1356. Secret. Drafted by MacArthur.

2. On April 18, J.E. Coulson of the British Embassy delivered a message from Selwyn Lloyd to Dulles, indicating that Lloyd “would be most grateful to receive a very urgent reply”:

   “Roger Makins has told me of your talk with him last Friday about China Trade controls. I understand your problems, but I too am disturbed at the situation at this end and I am wondering if it will soon be possible for you to let me have a reply to the detailed proposals for reductions in the lists which the Prime Minister left with the President last January.

   “The situation is so difficult not only in Parliament but for the countries in Asia; I have in mind countries like Ceylon and Malaya who may be alienated by an attitude which they do not understand or accept.

   “Having been told to expect the results of your review this week, we told Parliament under strong pressure that we expected the China Committee to meet shortly. I am afraid that this is inevitable even if it results in disagreement. Please let me know what you think about that.”

   Dulles forwarded the message to President Eisenhower the following day. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda