107. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Minister of the Japanese Embassy (Shima) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Economic Affairs (Jones), Department of State, Washington, April 10, 19561
SUBJECT
- China Trade Control Discussions with the Japanese
Minister Shima was requested to come to the Department for the purpose of discussing the feasibility of reopening the conversations dealing with Japan’s several requests for reductions in the Communist China trade control program. It had been planned to have a discussion with Minister Shima and his two experts who have recently arrived in Washington from Tokyo during the afternoon of April 10.
Mr. Jones explained that we would be unable to have the afternoon meeting since the Congressional presentation on the 1957 Mutual Security Program had been moved forward to Wednesday, April 11, thus necessitating preparations for an earlier presentation than had been anticipated. He assured Minister Shima that the inability to meet as scheduled in no way indicated a diminution in the United States Government’s interest in obtaining a full understanding of the Japanese desires in connection with the trade control [Page 336] program. He expressed full appreciation of the cooperation and good faith which Japan had demonstrated during the recent weeks when conversations between the Department and the Japanese Embassy had been held. He specifically referred to Japan’s moderation in request for exceptions. He explained that the views which have been expressed to date by Minister Shima have been forwarded to the highest levels inside the United States Government and that these views, including the specific information about individual items, had been of benefit to the United States Government in the review of the items on the CHINCOM differential which was initiated following the visit of Prime Minister Eden.
Mr. Jones noted that the Japanese had depended exclusively upon commercial criteria in placing the various items on their list in order of priority. The U.S. review, however, must of necessity place priority interest upon strategic considerations. It had been thought that the review would have progressed to a point by now where further discussion with the Japanese on the items which they suggested for deletion would have been possible. However, with the new economic drive of the Communists in Asia there has developed some thinking inside the U.S. Government that relaxation at this time would constitute help to the Communists in keeping their promises for developmental assistance. In addition, there has been a very strong reaction in the United States to the 1954 COCOM reduction. The increase in copper shipments following that relaxation has caused alarm on the part of many people both in the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government.
These developments have precluded the finalization of the U.S. Government review at the present time. Our inability to discuss the matter in terms of specific commodities does not indicate any decline in our interest, and we would like to work the matter out with the Japanese. In this connection it would be most helpful to the U.S. Government if it were possible for the Japanese to indicate a minimum position on which they would be willing to support the U.S. in our objectives at the GC meeting.
Minister Shima was informed that throughout the entire U.S. Government there is understanding and appreciation of the position which the Japanese Government has been taking.
Minister Shima stated that he understood the position in which the U.S. Government finds itself at the present time on this subject and furthermore, he is certain that the Japanese Government appreciates the interest of the U.S. in trying to reach a settlement of the problem.
However, he doubted the validity of the argument that CHINCOM reductions would assist the Communists in their new drive into Asian countries. He thought that a reduction in the trade [Page 337] controls could be connected with the new Communist economic drive only in a very general way, namely, that increased trade could be beneficial in the over-all economy of Communist China. However, he failed to see how the delivery of some additional items could be helpful. Accordingly, he thought that it would be necessary to consider individual items in connection with this particular problem.
In connection with the question of additional copper shipments to the Soviet bloc, he expressed a belief that the list review in 1954 should be viewed in a different light from the reduction which the Japanese are currently requesting. He asserted that the original COCOM was established on strategic considerations. Consequently by definition the removal of copper in 1954 involved the elimination of a strategic item. However, he indicated that the Japanese are only requesting the deletion of items which are not strategic in the current situation. Consequently, the arguments which are currently circulating inside the U.S. Government should not be applied to the Japanese proposed list for deletion.
With respect to the possibility of Japan’s indicating a minimum position, Minister Shima expressed the conviction that his Government would be unable to present such a position. He explained that the fundamental position in Japan is essentially the same as that of the U.K., namely, that the CHINCOM–COCOM differential should be eliminated. Consequently, if a CG review were to cover the entire CHINCOM–COCOM differential, it would probably not be possible for Japan to abide by an agreement with the U.S. on a minimum position which was below that which the other participating countries were requesting. Also, he thought that the most recent list submitted by the Japanese represents the Japanese Government’s views of the situation. He explained that further delineation of priorities by the Japanese Government would be difficult. The absence of trade in the items makes it next to impossible to estimate how much trade would actually develop in each of the items.
Mr. Jones expressed the hope that it would be possible to discuss the individual items with Minister Shima within a short period of time. At the present juncture it is not clear how soon that can take place. However, he hoped that Japan could give us a clearer indication of the items which are bothering them the most.
Minister Shima expressed his appreciation for our kindness and efforts in connection with this problem. However, he stated that he is not sure that it will be possible to produce results from these conversations. He stated that they have two experts from the Foreign Office in Tokyo in Washington at the present time and expressed the opinion that it would be helpful if these experts could have the opportunity of discussion with U.S. experts. Such discussions could lead to a better understanding on the part of the [Page 338] Japanese experts of the U.S. position on individual items. Further information of this type would be most helpful to the experts, both of whom are representatives of the Foreign Ministry, when they go back to Tokyo and help to administer the Japanese Government’s side of the trade control program.
Mr. Jones agreed that this type of discussion might be beneficial and indicated that we would follow up to see whether and when such meetings could be initiated.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 493.009/4–1056. Secret. Drafted by Parsons.↩