162. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon) to the Secretary of State1

SUBJECT

  • U.S. Counter-Proposal to SUNFED at General Assembly

In the absence of a constructive alternative, it is likely that the General Assembly will vote to establish SUNFED and that the U.S. will be isolated in opposition. From preliminary indications, many of the Western European countries, the Soviet Bloc, and practically all the underdeveloped countries will vote for SUNFED. Even the U.K. is presently considering only an abstention and appears to be prepared to participate in drafting the Charter of SUNFED.

If SUNFED were formally established, it would almost certainly have great difficulty in securing contributions. However, the U.S. would be subjected to continuing and increasing pressures to contribute. If SUNFED should begin operations with the meager funds it might receive initially from France, the Netherlands, some Scandinavian countries, and the Soviet Bloc, the pressure for the U.S. to participate might become very difficult to resist.

In the attached position paper a counter-proposal is put forward for a substantial enlargement of the UN Technical Assistance program to permit concentrated work in basic fields such as surveys of natural resources, technological institutes, and industrial research and productivity centers. The U.S. would state its willingness to support a doubling or tripling of the UNTA fund, now at an annual level of [Page 422] $30 million, it being understood that the U.S. percentage contribution would within the next 3 years be reduced to 33⅓%. The details and the rationale of the proposal are spelled out in the attached position paper (Tab A).

It is not unreasonable to believe that a U.S. initiative along these lines might carry. However, whether or not it defeats the anticipated SUNFED resolution, the proposal can stand on its own feet. The UNTA is doing a useful job well but it is strapped for funds. Its present $30 million annual level compares with annual appropriations for the U.S. bilateral technical assistance program of $125–$135 million. Moreover, the counter-proposal offers a practical and constructive way to promote economic development through UN machinery; it has the advantage over bilateral technical assistance that it enables us to tap experts from other countries; it offers a basis for eliciting contributions from other developed countries for an important U.S. objective; its dimensions are realistic in terms of what other countries can afford and what the UN can competently handle; and the job can be undertaken within the framework of existing UN machinery. Moreover, the response of other countries will give a telling indication of how much financial support there is for further development activity through the United Nations.

If countries respond to the U.S. initiative, the U.S. contribution would have to rise over the next several years from the present level of $15.5 million to perhaps as much as $33.3 million.

If you approve this counterproposal in principle, we will seek the concurrence of the White House and the Bureau of the Budget and will consult with key members of the Congressional authorizing and appropriations committees.

Recommendation:

That you approve the counterproposal in principle subject to the concurrence of the Bureau of the Budget and the White House and to your further review after consultation with Congressional leaders.2

[Page 423]

[Tab A]

PROPOSED POSITION PAPER ON SUNFED FOR TWELFTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY3

Problem:

In a resolution adopted 15 to 3 (U.S., U.K., Canada), the ECOSOC urged the General Assembly to establish a SUNFED and to set up a preparatory commission which would (a) prepare the necessary steps for its establishment and (b) select a limited number of projects to be financed through voluntary contributions pending the full operation of the fund.

U.S. Position:

1.
The U.S. delegation should state the U.S. position on SUNFED firmly and forcefully so as to leave no doubt where we stand: (a) The U.S. is fully alive to the needs of the less developed countries for external assistance; this is amply demonstrated by the record of U.S. aid for more than a decade, (b) However, the U.S. is not prepared to support the establishment of SUNFED at this time; will vote against any resolution authorizing its present establishment; and will not participate in any preparatory commission to set up SUNFED. The resources which SUNFED could now command would be totally inadequate to permit it to do the job intended for it. If established now, SUNFED would be structure without substance; it would raise hopes that could not be fulfilled; its limited resources would be dissipated among minor capital projects all over the world without real impact on the development process anywhere, (c) The U.S. stands by the pledge contained in General Assembly resolution 724 (VIII)4 to ask the American people, when sufficient progress has been made in internationally-supervised disarmament, to join with others in devoting a portion of the savings from such disarmament to an international fund, within the frame-work of the United Nations, for economic development. Only such disarmament will make possible contributions of sufficient size to establish an effective international economic development fund. Responsibility for preventing such disarmament rests squarely with the USSR which has rejected all attempts of the U.S. and other Western [Page 424] powers to attain a substantial measure of internationally controlled disarmament.
2.
The U.S. believes that a more constructive approach than the ECOSOC resolution to the problem of promoting economic development would be to use the additional resources that countries may be prepared to make available at this time to support a substantial enlargement of the UNTA program. The UNTA program needs substantial additional resources to enable it to do two important jobs: (a) to meet the pressing needs of the many newly independent nations while maintaining the momentum of its present activities within the existing scope of the program, and (b) to enlarge the scope of its activities to permit systematic and sustained work in certain basic pre-investment fields, such as intensive surveys of water, power and mineral resources; engineering surveys; the staffing and equipping of regional training institutes in technology, statistics, and public administration; industrial research and productivity centers. Surveys, research and training of this kind are of basic importance for successful economic planning and progress but for lack of funds the UNTA program has had to abstain from such projects or to undertake them only in the most limited and piecemeal fashion. They require a larger outlay for supplies and equipment and more sustained support than the present program can afford.
3.
More specifically, the U.S. delegation should state (a) that the U.S. stands ready, on a sharing basis, to see the financial scope of the UNTA program doubled or tripled, it being understood that the U.S. percentage contribution will, within the next 3 years be reduced to 33⅓%; (b) that within the total enlarged fund a special fund should be set aside and earmarked for concentrated work on special projects of the pre-investment type basic to economic growth.
4.
In support of this position, the U.S. delegation should submit a resolution as a substitute for the SUNFED resolution asking the General Assembly to appoint a preparatory committee (a) to define the basic fields and within these fields the types of special projects to be eligible for assistance from the special projects fund, giving special attention to the projects advanced in Chapter III of “The Forward Look” (E/2885); (b) to define the changes which may need to be made in the present administration and machinery of the UNTA program to assure speedy and effective use of the special projects fund; (c) to ascertain the extent to which governments would be willing to contribute to the enlarged UNTA fund with an indication of the amount they would be prepared to earmark for the special projects fund from their increased contributions; (d) to prepare the necessary amendments to the present UNTA legislation and procedure. The resolution should also request governments to assist the preparatory committee in its work and specifically to indicate the [Page 425] extent to which they would be willing to increase their contributions to enable the program to expand. It should invite the specialized agencies, the UNTAA, and the TAB to provide their views and suggestions to the preparatory committee through the Secretary-General. The Committee would be requested to submit its report and recommendations to the 26th session of ECOSOC (and through ECOSOC to the summer 1958 session of TAC); the ECOSOC would be requested to transmit the committee report together with the comments of ECOSOC to the 13th session of the General Assembly in 1958 for final action.

Several countries at ECOSOC stated or implied that the U.S. would be forced to participate once SUNFED were established. It is important, therefore, that the U.S. state its position on SUNFED unambiguously so that countries will not vote SUNFED into being on the assumption that the U.S. will reluctantly go along.

Nevertheless, from present indications it is likely that, notwithstanding the clearest statement of the U.S. position, a resolution to establish SUNFED will carry unless a positive and constructive alternative can be put forward.

The counter-proposal to enlarge the resources and scope of the UNTA program may succeed in postponing a showdown on SUNFED this year and might even take some of the pressure off for the next few years while the UNTA fund was being built up. Countries that would like to vote with the U.S. would find it easier to turn down SUNFED, and even some diehard supporters of SUNFED might be prepared to settle, for the time being, for something that promised additional resources even though the resources would not go into brick and mortar projects.

However, whether or not the counter-proposal defeats SUNFED, it is a proposal that can stand on its own feet. It offers a practical and constructive way to promote economic development through UN machinery; it has the advantage over bilateral technical assistance that it enables us to tap experts from other countries; it offers a basis for eliciting contributions from other developed countries for an important U.S. objective; its dimensions are realistic in terms of what other countries can afford and what the UN can competently handle; and the job can be undertaken within the framework of existing UN machinery. Moreover, the response of other countries will give a telling indication of how much financial support there is for further development activity through the United Nations.

The UN Technical Assistance program is now doing a useful job well. It is strapped for funds. The present level of $30 million a year compares with U.S. annual appropriations for bilateral technical assistance of $125–$135 million. The UNTA tries to be responsive to reasonable government requests over the whole range of economic [Page 426] and social activity. However, for lack of funds, it can give its experts practically no logistic support, and it has been quite unable to undertake survey, training, and demonstration projects where these involve relatively large equipment expenditures to be effective. Because it cannot commit too large a share of its limited funds to continuing projects if it is to meet new requests, it has been unable to give the sustained and systematic support to going projects that they deserve.

While specific dollar figures should not be discussed with other delegations in the absence of clear indications of the over-all extent of financial support from other UN Members, we would envisage a gradual buildup in the UNTA fund of perhaps as high as $50 million to enable the program to maintain its present momentum and to meet the needs of newcomers, and a target of perhaps as high as $50 million for the special projects fund. The special projects would be in basic fields essential to growth, e.g. surveys of water, power, and mineral resources; education, technological, vocational and basic literacy; industrial research in the use of local materials; agricultural research and demonstrations. While the UNTA operates in these fields in a piecemeal way, the special projects fund would enable it to concentrate in depth in these fields and to support projects that are more costly, require more sustained assistance, and are more operational in nature. Priority would be given to projects within the basic fields that would have the widest impact, e.g. regional institutes and training facilities of a permanent nature from which several neighboring countries could benefit; surveys of water resources affecting several countries, e.g. the Mekong River. Chapter III of the report of TAB entitled “The Forward Look” suggests several areas where more systematic research and training is needed as a foundation for economic growth.

The fund would not do the job envisaged for SUNFED. It would not build bridges, dams, roads, power plants, or houses; the capital required for that kind of job is completely out of line with the resources countries are prepared to make available. It would however do a job of significant and basic importance. In less developed countries there is a shortage of administrative, managerial and technical skills at every level. There is little data on natural resources, and little or no experimentation on new and productive ways to use the resources that are known. The enlarged technical assistance program would help countries train their manpower and assess and use their resources more productively.

Very few changes would need to be made in existing UNTA machinery to support the larger program. It might be advisable to appoint a Special Projects Director who would work together with a technical committee of the TAC to review projects and evaluate [Page 427] them. Project proposals could be submitted by governments, by specialized agencies and the UNTAA, and by the TAB. The TAC would review and approve the specific projects.

In presenting its counter-proposal, the U.S. delegation could elaborate U.S. views on organization, basic fields, and criteria for selection as set forth in this section, while recognizing that the full analysis and study of these questions would be a matter for the preparatory committee and the final decisions a matter for agreement among governments at the General Assembly.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–2657. Official Use Only. Drafted by Ruth S. Gold of the Economic Development Division, Bureau of Economic Affairs. Concurred in by John S. Hoghland, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; Fred W. Jandry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Gardner E. Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs; William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Kalijarvi; and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Affairs Hanes.

    C. Douglas Dillon succeeded Herbert V. Prochnow as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, March 15.

  2. The source text indicates that Dulles approved the recommendation on October 1.
  3. Drafted by Gold and Kotschnig.
  4. Resolution 724A (VIII), adopted by the General Assembly at its 468th plenary meeting, December 7, 1953. For text, see Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its Eighth Session during the period from 15 September to 9 December, 1953, Supplement No. 17 (A/2630), p. 10.