Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

55. Memorandum of Conversations Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) and President Castillo Armas, Guatemala City¹

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SUBJECT

• Meetings with President Carlos Castillo Armas of Guatemala on Various Subjects²

During the course of four meetings with President Carlos Castillo Armas, we covered the following points:

1. Guatemala Labor Situation³—I told President Castillo that we in the United States were very much concerned with the apparent differences which had arisen between the government and the CSG. I explained that I did not want to put myself in the position of defending everything that the CSG had done, and in fact I felt that it had been quite mistaken in some of its policies, but that, nevertheless, a rupture in relations between the CSG and the government might lead to very serious consequences insofar as public opinion toward Guatemala in the United States is concerned. The President said that he fully understood that this might happen and that he hoped that it could be avoided. He never made any reference to his personal feeling against Mencos⁴ nor did he refer to the criticism of his government by the CSG in its Manifesto on May 1. I suggested to the President that we should both try, he within his own government and I working with various parties concerned in the United States, to avoid a complete break and to try to bring about a better understanding. He agreed with this point of view.

I took advantage of this opening to tell the President how surprised I had been to read the language criticizing the CSG for its connection with the “imperialists” and “capitalists” ORIT, included in the government oficio released a few days before my arrival in reply to the CSG’s request for personeria juridica. The President expressed surprise at this language also and said that the signer of the oficio had been discharged from his office in the Ministry of Labor.

I suggested to the President that a travel grant for certain Guatemalan labor leaders and organization members to go to the United States might be very worthwhile. He seemed to think this was a good idea. I did not allude to the turndown by his government of the three applicants for travel grants out of the CSG, but suggested that the travel grants issued might be given to members of the CSG as well as the other confederations, mentioning especially the SAMF since I understood that it had taken a turn for the better in its direction. I later mentioned to the Ambassador and to the Labor Attaché that the Embassy might be well advised to act rather quickly on this suggestion, and got the impression that they would do so.

2. Aid from the United States—I told the President that he should be thinking of the day, which might be very soon, when Guatemala would have to make its own way without economic grant assistance from the United States. I pointed out that more and more careful scrutiny was being given to requests for economic aid and that while there was the greatest of sympathy and even affection for Guatemala in the United States, it appeared that Guatemala should soon be able to stand on its own feet. The President agreed with this and said that he always had it in mind, but added that he was hoping to get sufficient aid for FY 58 to enable him to make good on certain highway projects as well as some of the remainder of work to be done at the Roosevelt Hospital. I told the President that Guatemala was being considered for additional aid in FY 58, but that it seemed unlikely that she would receive anything like as much as had been officially requested ($15,000,000). He did not seem particularly surprised at this nor did he comment on it.

3. Belice—The President alluded briefly to the great political problem in Guatemala of obtaining its long dreamed-of territory in Belice. He said that the Foreign Minister was working on a plan but he did not go into any detail. I later discussed this in some detail with the Foreign Minister and it will be covered in a separate report.⁵

4. Honduran Situation—I told the President of my impressions gained in my visit to Honduras⁶ and the absolute necessity that some political stability be restored to that country. I said that there seemed to be moderate optimism on the part of some of my informants there that free elections would be held, but that there was no guarantee of this in sight. He said that the restoration of stability to Honduras was the principal problem in Central America at this time. I told the President that I had taken the occasion of Villeda Morales’⁷ presence in the United States to try to get acquainted with him and that the latter had made a pretty good impression here. I said that he was being given rather careful indoctrination on the dangers inherent in communism and of flirting with those who might be susceptible of communist influence. The President said that he had never thought of Villeda Morales, whom he had come to know quite well since he had lived right across the street from him in Tegucigalpa while he was in exile, as a communist, but that he had always been fearful of his friends and those whom he allowed to influence him. He spoke very highly of Mrs. Villeda Morales. He seemed to be quite interested in my comments on this subject and I went on to suggest that perhaps he, Castillo Armas, could capitalize on his previous friendship with Villeda Morales by helping him and even influencing him in the event he should reach the high office to which he aspired. I pointed out that the United States was adhering strictly to its policy of non-intervention as always, but that the possibility could not be overlooked that Villeda Morales might be elected President. The President seemed to be receptive to this idea and did not indicate that he planned any drastic action to move against Villeda Morales’ chances.

5. Klein–Saks Mission—I did not bring up this subject but the President once referred to the Klein–Saks Advisory Mission in a rather friendly way, adding that he only regretted that he was not in a position to see that more of their recommendations were carried out. I commented on the very high regard in which the Department held the Mission, and the splendid work that it was accomplishing both in Guatemala and in Chile.

6. International Communism—I told the President that the United States was still very much on the alert to the threat of communist penetration in Latin America, but that we were carrying on the discussions in London in good faith in the hope that some understanding might be reached to curtail the threat of a nuclear war. The President expressed his understanding of this and his hope that some agreement might be reached there.

7. Feeling toward other Central American Chiefs of State—President Castillo Armas expressed very friendly feelings for President Lemus of El Salvador and seemed to have rather high hopes for President Luis Somoza of Nicaragua, whom he described as “having gotten off to a good start”. His only reference to President Figueres was one rather ridiculing his constant attempt to meddle in international affairs both within and outside Central America. When I mentioned to Castillo Armas that some Costa Ricans felt that all three of the presidential candidates were satisfactory and that some believed that Orlich would not be beholden to Figueres if he were elected, the President seemed rather surprised about the latter point.

8. Arbenz—I inquired directly of the President about the return of Arbenz to the Americas and he did not seem unduly preoccupied about it. He said that he had known Arbenz nearly all of his adult life and that they had once been roommates in a military barracks. He said Arbenz was moody, introspective, suspicious, and generally unfriendly to most people. He felt that he had been propped up by his communist supporters while acting as president of Guatemala. He said that he was quite certain that he would now be revealed in his true colors and that he constituted no threat to Guatemala or any other country.

9. Forces of Reaction in Guatemala—The President said that his greatest concern was the threat to democracy in Guatemala by the extreme right—the reactionary forces. He said the big land owners and wealthy businessmen had urged that he take much stronger steps in repressing those who had been in any way involved in the previous government and that he had had great difficulty in refusing to go as far as they insisted that he go. He said that these same forces were unwilling to pay proper wages to the workers in many cases and that they seemed to be unaware of the importance of providing the workers and the Indian peasants of Guatemala a chance to improve their standard of living for themselves and future generations. The President insisted that he was still forging ahead in his effort to overcome this feeling on the part of the wealthy but that it was most difficult to accomplish.

1. Source: Department of State, Rubottom Files: Lot 59 D 563, Guatemala. Secret. Drafted by Rubottom on July 8.
2. Rubottom, who became Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs on June 19, visited six countries of Central America June 23–July 5. He was in Guatemala July 2–5.
3. In a letter dated June 26, to Rubottom in Guatemala City, Fishburn discussed relations between the Guatemalan Government and the Consejo Sindical de Guatemala (CSG), a trade union associated with ORIT. Fishburn wrote in part: “It seems to me essential that the Embassy diplomatically indicate to both the Government and Consejo that a clash would harm both organizations and that restraint and patience are necessary for both.” (Department of State, Rubottom Files: Lot 59 D 573, Guatemala)
4. Mario Mencos, Secretary-General of the CSG.
5. Not found in Department of State files.
6. Rubottom was in Honduras July 1–2.
7. Ramón Villeda Morales, leader of the Honduran Liberal Party, was elected President of Honduras by the National Constituent Assembly on November 15.