Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

487. Circular Airgram From the Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions ¹

CA–8730

Washington , April 22, 1957 .

SUBJECT

• Peru–Ecuador Boundary Problem

Reference is made to Embassy Rio de Janeiro’s telegram no. 1067 of April 5, 1957,² concurred in by Embassies Lima and Quito, recommending that the Guarantor Powers tell Ecuador politely but firmly that all of the boundary markers placed and accepted by both governments are binding, that the Guarantors are prepared to examine the arguments of the disputants concerning the unmarked sectors, and that they will cooperate with whatever surveys may be required to complete the demarcation of the border.

Reference is also made to Rio de Janeiro’s telegram no. 1106 of April 15, 1957,³ stating that the current US policy on the boundary problem has been given ample trial and has not produced results. This telegram was in response to the Department’s apprehension over the nature and scope of the above recommended change from the existing policy which was established by CA–3603 of November 7, 1955.⁴

The course of action proposed by our Embassy at Rio de Janeiro would be marked change from present US policy, and the following comments are submitted by the Department as a basis for comment by the various Embassies concerned in working out a satisfactory solution to the problem.

Attitude of the Guarantors

The proposal by the Embassy at Rio de Janeiro would require on the part of the Guarantors a degree of firmness that has thus far, at any rate, been out of the question.

Prior to the adoption by the Guarantors of their resolution in May 1956, requesting the authorization of Peru and Ecuador for an aerial survey, the role of the Guarantors was substantially limited to intermittent placatory efforts simply to keep the exacerbated issue between Peru and Ecuador from erupting in armed hostilities. There was little or no serious thought by the Guarantors of doing anything which might risk irritating further either or both sides, as would be required by intervention actively to seek a precise settlement of the boundary in the disputed zone. It seemed that, for internal political reasons, no Ecuadoran Government could accept a definitive settlement short of access to the Maranon River. Also for internal political reasons, no Peruvian Government could meet Ecuador’s aspirations.

When, therefore, the Department decided in mid-1955 that something should be done to break the impasse, the border crisis of September 1955 was seized upon as an opportunity to pressure the other Guarantors into giving active consideration to the problem. It was only after Ecuador in effect forced Brazil to convene the Guarantors that we were able to make progress. The Guarantor resolution of May, 1956 calling for an aerial survey was achieved only through the application of pressure on Chile and Argentina who were reluctant to act. The former’s fear of Peruvian reprisal on the Tacna-Arica boundary was stronger than her tendency to favor Ecuador. Argentina wanted to avoid trouble and went along with the majority.

So far as the Department is aware, the basic attitudes of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile toward the boundary problem remain intact. If this is so, the possibility of inducing them to take comparatively drastic action at this time would seem to be remote.

Results of US Policy to Date

The present US position, which was prepared with the personal participation of representatives from the three US Embassies directly concerned, is based on the following premises:

1) The fundamental problem is that of improving relations between Peru and Ecuador, the issue of demarcating the border being an essential aspect of this problem. 2) Neither the improvement of relations nor the demarcation of the border can be achieved by coercion. 3) The best prospects for success lie in carrying out a survey to determine the geographical facts involved and getting the two parties actively to seek possible formulae for a solution. 4) Rapid and spectacular results cannot be expected.

With the above as the underlying basis for its policy, the US set certain intermediate objectives. Key among these were: 1) to encourage an exchange of Ambassadors between Peru and Ecuador; 2) to induce the Guarantors to take the initiative in proposing a geographic survey; 3) to stimulate the disputants to suggest and discuss with each other possible formulae for breaking the impasse; and 4) to obtain Ecuadoran and Peruvian acceptance of the aerial survey proposal.

Objectives 1 and 2 have been accomplished, and the difficulties overcome in getting the Guarantors to pass the survey resolution should not be minimized. With regard to 3 and 4, the Department believes that substantial progress has also been made. While Peru has refused to agree to a survey to date, both the Peruvian and Ecuadoran representatives in Washington have assured the Department that they would continue actively to seek some formula which might make an aerial survey acceptable to both parties, and there have even been indications that the Peruvians have attempted to hold direct conversations in Quito. While the Department certainly does not maintain that the present policy has achieved any startling success, it does believe that, looking at this exceedingly complex problem in perspective, some solid progress has been made. It also believes, as outlined at the end of this instruction, that there are prospects for further progress.

Embassy Rio’s Proposals

The following are further observations on the procedure proposed by our Embassy at Rio de Janeiro, a procedure which, incidentally, was carefully considered prior to the adoption of the policy outlined in CA–3603 of November 7, 1955.

1) Rio’s proposal is based on the premise that the markers already placed are binding upon Ecuador. Ecuador maintains that markers placed in the south between the Quebrada San Francisco and the unmarked area are not binding for any or all of the following reasons: They were placed in error of the true geographical facts; Dias de Aguiar⁵ exceeded his authority in including this area in his award; and these markers were not fully and duly ratified by the Government of Ecuador. This matter has been carefully considered in the Department, and it is not in a position to give an opinion as to the legal status of the markers already placed,⁶ It believes that judicial procedures, or mutual agreement, as distinguished from a finding by the four Guarantors, or any one or more of them, would be required to arrive at a definitive determination of this matter.

2) Embassy Rio de Janeiro’s recommendation appears to be based upon a possible misconception of the role of the Guarantor Powers under the Rio Protocol. Article VII provides that “any doubt or disagreement which may arise in the execution of this protocol shall be settled by the parties concerned, with the assistance of the representatives of the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, in the shortest possible time.” The Department considers that the basic responsibility for finding a solution, or method of solution, rests with the Governments of Peru and Ecuador, and that it is the Guarantors’ responsibility to take actions which will assist toward that end.

3) The Department doubts that the procedure proposed by the Embassy would be acceptable to the other Guarantor Powers. Probably none of them—and particularly not Chile—would wish to bring the required pressure upon Ecuador, since such action might seriously jeopardize their present relationships with that country. Were the Guarantors even to discuss the proposed policy change, knowledge of the fact would probably come to Ecuador’s attention. This would not only adversely affect Ecuador’s friendship with all of the Guarantors (especially with the US as initiator of the proposal) but also might impair the Guarantors’ ability to serve any further useful function in the event that the proposed policy failed.

4) Even should the other Guarantors agree to the procedure, the Department considers it probable that Ecuador would adamantly refuse to yield. Whereas the Guarantor resolution proposing an aerial survey, although it coincided with Ecuador’s desires, was logically impartial and capable of being explained to Peru on logical grounds, the action proposed in the reference telegram would involve the Guarantors’ taking sides. Rather than facilitating Ecuadoran acquiescence, this might exacerbate nationalist feeling and make it dangerous for the Ecuadoran Government to relinquish its position.

The Department continues to be of the opinion that action to force either Peru or Ecuador into a settlement of the boundary would probably be unsuccessful in its immediate purpose and would certainly fail to achieve the real objective of improving relations between the two countries. It is not the Department’s policy to let this dispute drag any longer than necessary, but the Department does seriously question the wisdom of trying to force a “solution” which promises to exacerbate feelings without settling anything.

In numerous conversations with representatives of the Peruvian Embassy, the Department has repeatedly emphasized that the Guarantors’ support of the survey proposal does not signify bias in favor of Ecuador’s position. Now that Ecuador has more openly revealed its true objective to be a revision of the Rio Protocol to obtain access to the Marañon River, Peru is understandably even more reluctant to agree to the survey proposal. This Ecuadoran objective, however, has been known for years to both the Peruvians and the Department. It does not affect the basic logic of the survey proposal, but it does point up the necessity of Peru’s obtaining assurances that the survey will not just result in demands for a revision of the Protocol.

Present Course of Action

In the Department’s opinion a geographic survey of the zone defined by Article VIII B(l) of the Protocol within a context of mutual agreement still represents the most promising step toward eventual solution. It does feel, however, that a new element could profitably be added to the survey proposal. It should include some mutually acceptable and binding agreement assuring that the survey will be followed by whatever action might be required—such as direct negotiation, or failing resolution of the matter within a specified period, judicial review, or arbitration—to bring about a final demarcation of the border.

The Department believes that only the introduction of such a second step will now offer any reasonable prospect of Peru’s accepting the survey proposal. To this end, the Department is encouraging the Peruvian representatives in Washington in their efforts to devise a formula which would permit both Peru and Ecuador to accept the survey. It is hoped that Peru will become convinced that, regardless of the geographic facts disclosed by an aerial survey, it probably has nothing to lose by submitting the question of final demarcation to judicial review or arbitration. It is doubtful that the terms of the Rio Protocol and the Dias de Aguiar Award would justify any decision which would put Ecuador on the Marañon River. Thus, the risk for Peru in accepting an aerial survey, coupled with a binding agreement on subsequent action, might not appear excessive, assuming Peru sincerely desires to terminate the dispute.

Presented with a formula of this type, Ecuador might well accept it in spite of the second step involved. It would incorporate the survey proposal which it strongly favors and would appear to give Ecuador the substance of its position. However, in accepting it, Ecuador would then have maneuvered itself into a position where it would have to agree to proceed with a binding settlement of the dispute based on the results of the geographic survey. Having agreed beforehand to the procedure with the concurrence of the Guarantor Powers, Ecuador would not be able to insist blindly upon a revision of the Protocol nor could it effectively appeal for international sympathy as a victim of pressure from the Guarantors.

Action Requested

The Department heartily agrees that there should be exploited every opportunity for constructive action to settle the boundary issue and improve relations between Peru and Ecuador, and it is hoped that the above discussion will induce further comments by our Embassies. Arrangements are being made for Maurice M. Bernbaum, Director of the Office of South American Affairs, to visit Rio de Janeiro on or about May 13 for a discussion of the various phases of the problem with Ambassador Briggs. It would be very helpful to have comments of the other Embassies on this instruction available in Rio de Janeiro at that time.

The Department considered the possibility of authorizing Ambassador Achilles and Ambassador Ravndal to travel to Rio de Janeiro for consultation, but this plan was discarded because of a lack of funds and because such a meeting might give rise to undesirable speculation about its purpose.

Mr. Bernbaum will be travelling to Rio de Janeiro with General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Chairman, Inter-American Defense Board, who will be en route to Buenos Aires. If funds permit, Mr. Bernbaum may return to Washington by commercial airlines via Lima and Quito, and under such circumstances he will notify the Embassies at Lima and Quito in advance of his arrival.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 622.233/4–2257. Confidential. Drafted by Bernbaum and Sandy M. Pringle of the Office of South American Affairs (OSA) and approved by Rubottom. Sent to Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Quito, and Lima.

   In a memorandum to Rubottom, dated April 19, Terry B. Sanders summarized Briggs’ recommendations regarding the boundary dispute. Sanders stated in part, “Our reservations concerning Ambassador Briggs’ recommendations are based on the fact that we are not prepared to say all of the markers already placed are legally binding on Ecuador, that we feel the action proposed by him may not be within the proper function of the Guarantors, that we doubt whether his proposed policy would be acceptable to the other Guarantors, and that we do not believe it could successfully be imposed upon Ecuador.” (Ibid., 622.233/4–1957)

2. Supra .
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 622.233/4–1557)
4. In CA–3603, the Department stated that it was convinced that constructive action toward a final delimitation of the boundary would be taken only with the assistance of the Guarantors and that a forced settlement would fail to achieve the objective of improving relations between the two countries. (Ibid., 622.233/11–755)
5. Captain Braz Días de Aguiar of Brazil proposed a boundary between Peru and Ecuador which was accepted by the two countries as part of the Rio Protocol of 1942.
6. because of appreciation that only in a litigation would all possible evidence and positions of both sides be fully developed. [Footnote in the source text.]