Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

467. Despatch From the Ambassador in Colombia (Cabot) to the Department of State¹

No. 38

Bogotá, July 9, 1957.

POLITICAL SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT

Background: The Rojas Regime and Its Fall

Lt. Gen. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla came to power as President of Colombia by bloodless coup d’état of June 13, 1953, sending into exile right-wing Conservative President Laureano Gomez. His accession followed a period of five years of civil violence and guerrilla warfare resulting from intense partisan strife between the two historical parties, Liberal and Conservative, with Liberal guerrillas pitted against Conservative government forces and with the Government becoming increasingly dictatorial and high-handed. Perhaps 100,000 persons had been killed during this period. Promising (1) peace through amnesty and rehabilitation for the guerrillas and (2) restoration of Constitutional government, Rojas was hailed with genuine popular enthusiasm as Colombia’s savior.

While he was largely successful in fulfilling his promise to restore peace, Rojas and his Conservative Government of the Armed Forces gradually moved in the opposite direction as far as his second promise was concerned, becoming increasingly authoritarian: (1) The state of siege, in effect since 1949, was continued; (2) the Congress and popular elections were suspended; (3) the National Constituent Assembly (ANAC) (which had confirmed him as President until the end of Gomez’ term in 1954 and which then “reelected” him until August 7, 1958) was through a series of maneuvers packed with Rojas supporters; (4) the Supreme Court and lower courts were likewise packed; (5) party activity was progressively curtailed to the vanishing point; (6) the press was heavily censored and some papers closed; (7) military were placed in a large number of normally civilian positions; (8) the use of strong-arm tactics on certain occasions shocked the public; (9) an octopus social action organization (SENDAS) was created for largely political purposes; (10) this and other efforts were made to appeal to the masses against the political “oligarchs”, and contrived mass demonstrations were held to “prove” support for the government; (11) various attempts were made to form totalitarian, Peronista-style mass organizations, especially the National Action Movement (MAN), the Third Force, and the New Order, although each successively failed. Rojas justified his restrictive measures and his non-return to Constitutional government on the grounds of the situation of violence (he was never able to stamp out violence completely and some wondered whether he wanted to) and the danger of renewed partisan strife; he maintained that the Armed Forces should remain in power until these two factors were eliminated. On top of these authoritarian trends was a situation of widespread corruption in which Rojas, his own family and members of the Armed Forces and Government were heavily involved, to the discredit of the regime.

Although Rojas originally enjoyed the support or acquiescence of practically all groups except the die-hard supporters of Laureano Gomez, the above factors combined with the worsening economic situation in 1956–57 gradually alienated most significant elements of the main political groups, as well as the public in general. Liberals relatively early joined the Laureanista Conservatives in outright opposition, and eventually the Ospinista Conservatives (originally the Rojas Government’s main political support) joined the Opposition. Only the opportunist Gobiernista Conservatives and splinter “Independent” Liberals remained pro-Rojas. Other elements, such as the powerful Catholic Church and industrial, commercial and intellectual groups also began to show their discontent with the regime. The hitherto bitter rivalry between the parties began to melt in the face of common opposition when Liberal Chief Alberto Lieras and Laureano Gomez signed the Benidorm (Spain) Pact on July 24, 1956, agreeing to bi-partisan opposition with a view to reestablishing constitutional processes and a series of coalition “parity” governments.

Rojas weathered one storm in August and September 1956 by jettisoning the Third Force, reshuffling his Cabinet, calling the ANAC into session and easing up on press controls, but opposition crystalized when on January 26, 1957 he had his Minister of War, General Gabriel Paris, announce that the Armed Forces insisted on his remaining in office for the 1958–62 term. This announcement was followed by a contrived reelection “campaign” (the Opposition being muzzled) and a series of maneuvers which resulted in the complete packing of the ANAC with Rojas supporters in order that that body might “reelect” him, over a year in advance of the term. With this impetus, Liberals, Ospinista and Independent Conservatives and some Laureanista Conservatives signed the March 20 pact, which paralleled the Benidorm Pact, and on April 8 launched the bipartisan presidential “candidacy” of Guillermo Leon Valencia, a Conservative. While it seemed that most opposition elements originally were prepared to tolerate Rojas’ continuation in power until the end of the 1954–58 term, now, with the rigged reelection of Rojas a certainty, Opposition leaders began to plan a movement of civil disobedience for mid-year or thereafter with a view to bringing down the Rojas regime.

Civil disobedience was precipitated prematurely and spontaneously when Guillermo Leon Valencia was placed under house arrest in Cali on May 1. During the ensuing “Jornadas de Mayo”, student protest demonstrations throughout the country were followed by quickly improvised shut-downs of universities, newspapers, shops, factories, businesses and banks, accompanied by Church statements indicating sympathy for the “movement” and criticizing police and Army excesses (including the defilement of churches) in attempting to quell the demonstrators. (Over a hundred demonstrators were killed.) Rojas showed no indications of backing down, even engineering his “reelection” by the ANAC on May 8 at the height of the Jornadas de Mayo. Under this situation, with the Opposition groups led by Lieras and Valencia committed and with Rojas seemingly intransigent, the possibilities for large-scale bloodshed were very real. However, under pressure from his own military leaders, who, while probably mostly still Rojista, were more able to face the facts, Rojas on May 10 turned over to a Military Junta and departed with his family for Spain. Thus the civilian opposition, forming an unusual revolutionary movement of traditional political leaders, industrialists, merchants, bankers, intellectuals, students and tacitly the Church, succeeded without the use of arms in overthrowing the Rojas military dictatorship.

The Rojas regime can be characterized as an opportunity lost. Rojas’ personal traits—a Messiah complex combined with a personal lust for power and wealth and an intolerance of opposition and criticism—were probably as much responsible for this as anything.

The Junta and Its Promise

The five-man Military Junta of Government consists of Major General Gabriel París (former Minister of War) as President of the Junta, Major General Deogracias Fonseca (former Commander of the National Police), Rear Admiral Ruben Piedrahita (former Minister of Public Works), Brigadier General Rafael Navas Pardo (former Commander of the Army), and Brigadier General Luis Ordonez (former Chief of the Intelligence Service), all of whom had served the Rojas regime. They announced from the beginning, however, that theirs was an interim regime pending a return to Constitutional government on August 7, 1958, through elections and other measures taken prior thereto. Freedom of the press, normal political activity, honest administration, and economic and social remedies were also promised. A largely civilian, bi-partisan Cabinet was appointed which met the general approval of the Parties. The ANAC was suspended. Later, the Junta announced the creation of a top-level “Parity Commission on Institutional Readjustment” (just convened) to study Constitutional reform and steps necessary to a return to Constitutional government—consisting of ex-Presidents, top leaders of both Parties, two Cabinet members and an Armed Forces representative. A two-man, bi-partisan National Commission on Criminal Investigation was also formed to investigate corruption and malpractices. A press statute is under study. The Junta seemed to get off to a good start and the political leaders, including Valencia, Lieras, and Alvaro Gomez Hurtado for the Laureanistas, appealed to the people on May 10 to support it.

Many would have liked to see the “movement” pushed beyond May 10 to the point of overthrowing the Armed Forces and establishing civilian government immediately, but the leaders realized this was impossible, as it would have met the resistance of the Armed Forces and probably would have resulted in large-scale bloodshed. Some sort of interim government seemed essential.

Despite the outward appeals for support of the Junta, misgivings have developed in various quarters: (1) There is some fear that certain members of the Junta may be looking for excuses to continue military government; (2) there is disappointment that there has still been no firm statement on an election date or dates; (3) there are misgivings over the reasons for the Junta’s failure to dissolve the discredited ANAC outright; (4) some impatience has been expressed at the fact that no steps have been taken to re-form the Rojas-packed Supreme Court, Council of State and the offices of the Procurator (Attorney) General and Comptroller General; (5) there is some concern that recent warnings to the press may be indications of the possible re-imposition of censorship; (6) there is some belief that study commissions are of little value and may be used as delaying factors; (7) there is considerable criticism of the appointment of military governors where civilians are demanded and the “rewarding” of persons close to Rojas with diplomatic posts; (8) there is some fear that the Junta may be willing to listen to those dissident elements which are now trying to organize in opposition to the bi-partisan coalition. Not everyone entertains all these doubts, but they do exist to a greater or lesser extent in various sectors.

The Frente Nacional

The Frente Nacional (sometimes Frente Civil), as the bi-partisan movement headed by Guillermo Leon Valencia and Alberto Lieras has come to be called, is generally recognized as the principal influence toward a return to Constitutional government and as the organization which will assume power, following elections, in 1958. It is believed to have the support of the great majority of the people. It is supported by practically all Liberals, by what are now known as “Valencista” Conservatives (who include the Ospinistas) and some Laureanista Conservatives, with the actual Laureanista organization still not fully committed despite a recent agreement with the Valencistas to reunite the Party.

The program of the Frente Nacional, as it is beginning to evolve, consists of the following:

(1) Past errors and bitter rivalries between the Parties, which led to partisan strife, violence and guerrilla warfare, and the eventual takeover by the Rojas dictatorship, must be avoided. The idea of bipartisanship must be carried to the lowest levels, where partisan rivalry has traditionally led to violence.

(2) There must be continued bipartisan cooperation in the Frente Nacional to assure the establishment of Constitutional government under the “Second Republic” in 1958, and there should be continued support for the principles of the Benidorm and March 20 Pacts both for this purpose and with the further objective of establishing a series of bipartisan “parity” Governments of National Union, in which both parties will participate equally under alternating Conservative and Liberal Presidents.

(3) The bi-partisan presidential candidate for 1958–62 is Guillermo Leon Valencia.

(4) Elections should be held as soon as they can be organized (perhaps December 1957) for a president (Valencia) who will assume office on August 7, 1958, and for a Congress, departmental assemblies and municipal councils to be convened immediately after their elections. In order to avoid the traditional bitter partisan rivalry and strife incident to elections, the Party leaders have agreed not only to run a single candidate but also to inaugurate a system of “parity lists” for Congressional seats. Under this system there will be an equal number of senators and representatives elected from each department and there will thus be no competition between Liberals and Conservatives for seats, although there may be competition within each Party for seats allotted to it.

(5) The discredited, Rojista ANAC should be dissolved outright as an illegal body.

(6) A new Supreme Court should be appointed and the Constitutional Review function should be returned to the Court as a whole rather than to a chamber of the Court named by the President. Likewise a new Council of State, Procurator (Attorney) General and Comptroller General should be appointed. These changes should probably await the convening of Congress, on which they Constitutionally depend for appointment or ratification.

(7) The Parity Commission should play an important role in bringing about a return to Constitutional government.

(8) The Investigating Commission should be permitted to operate with adequate powers and freedom to investigate malpractices and corruption in all quarters, and there should be no impunity in this regard.

The leaders of the Frente Nacional have slightly different views of the Junta and its good faith, although all express confidence in the Junta in their public statements. Privately, Valencia has told us that he has little confidence in the Junta’s intrinsic good faith, believing that the Junta will fulfill its promises only if the Frente Nacional holds together and remains strong, but that the Junta will go back on these promises and try to retain power for the military if the Frente Nacional shows signs of weakness and dissent. Lieras, on the other hand, while agreeing that the members of the Junta are not all of one mind, that one or two may be balking and that all seem to be reluctant to take positive action, does not believe that the Junta as a body is attempting to retain power for the military or planning to go back on its promises, since, in his view, the Junta realizes that this is out of the question under existing circumstances. Both agree, however, that it is essential for the Frente Nacional to remain strong and united and to keep a constant pressure on the Junta to take positive measures toward as rapid a return to Constitutional government as possible. Their strength, they believe, lies in their popular support (increasing daily through a joint, nation-wide tour) and the implied threat of the same formula used during the Jornadas de Mayo to overthrow the Rojas regime.

Problems and Danger Signs

While the outlook is hopeful that the Junta will in fact fulfill its promises and that the Frente Nacional through continued bipartisanship will be able to achieve a return to Constitutional government, there are a number of very real problems and some growing danger signs:

(1) It is doubtless difficult for many military leaders to reconcile themselves to a relinquishment of power to civilian government, to relegate themselves to their former role and to run the risk of losing newly-won prerogatives. Many view with little relish the prospect of sweeping investigations into corruption and malpractices, and resent free criticism in the press.

(2) There is no doubt that many military are still essentially Rojista, and there are reports that some are even plotting the return of Rojas, probably in conjunction with civilian dissident elements. Rojas has maintained his name in the political picture by his recent statements asserting the legitimacy of the ANAC as the only body with a legal base, maintaining that May 10 was not a victory over the “Binomio” (partnership) of the People and Armed Forces, and warning the Junta to preserve the prerogatives of the Armed Forces.

(3) Laureanista reluctance to join the Frente Nacional (they have abstained, for instance, from the Parity Commission) is a disuniting factor. The Laureanistas still seem unable to forgive the Ospinistas for originally supporting the Rojas coup.

(4) Bipartisanship, difficult enough to weld against a common adversary, will be harder to maintain once “normality” is assured, although to date the idea seems as strong as ever.

(5) There are reports that ex-Minister of Government Lucio Pabon Nunez (the “eminence grise” of the Rojas regime and a staunch believer in the corporate state) and Gilberto Alzate Avendaño (right-wing Conservative authoritarian who tried to make a deal with Rojas just before his fall) are, jointly or separately, attempting to organize disgruntled Rojista Conservatives, including government office holders, and perhaps the splinter “Independent” Liberals and even some Laureanistas into a movement to oppose the Frente Nacional, and that this may well have some military support. While Valencia tells us he would be happy to have an Opposition candidate, Lieras is afraid that such a dissident movement might provide the pretext for postponing the elections.

(6) Violence continues in three principal forms: (a) Pajaros (Conservative gunmen hired under the Rojas regime) continue to cause disorders both for revenge and political motives; (b) organized guerrillas, mostly Liberals, while largely quiescent, are reluctant to turn in their arms until political normality is reestablished; (c) outright bandits continue to operate in certain areas. (Party leaders and the civilian members of the Cabinet are attempting to achieve a cessation of violence, and have held conversations with guerrilla leaders).

(7) The rising cost of living and food shortages may cause exploitable discontent.

Despite these complicating factors, which can be by no means discounted, there still seems to be reasonable hope that the Frente Nacional with its considerable momentum and popular support, combined with a sympathetic Cabinet and a Junta which probably feels itself unable to buck the inevitable, will be able to achieve the restoration of Constitutional civilian government in 1958.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 721.00/7–1557. Confidential. In a cover sheet dated July 15, Richard A. Poole, Second Secretary of the Embassy, stated that this paper was prepared by the Embassy staff for Ambassador Cabot on his arrival.