Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

407. Telegram From the Ambassador in Chile (Lyon) to the Department of State¹

Santiago, April 9, 1957—7 p.m.

565. Department telegram 493.² Called on Acting Foreign Minister (Minister Defense) today and conveyed to him gist Department’s 487³ emphasizing US good will this matter. Foreign Minister expressed appreciation and said he would convey our ideas to Ministers and President with view formulating long-range plans. I suggested that Carter of Klein–Saks mission who is due back here end this week should be very helpful this connection.

I then explained our inability comply with Chilean Army’s request to transfer certain MAP equipment from Antofagasta to Santiago area explaining points 1 and 2 set forth paragraph 2 Department’s 493.

Also said we prepared supply on reimbursable basis anti-riot equipment. Likewise pointed out location unit for training purposes decision GOC but in my opinion no change should be made for at least several months.

Acting Foreign Minister received this information extremely well stating he entirely understood our position and would inform Commandant Army and instruct him make no changes.

He added he had no doubt of government’s eventual success in overcoming present difficulties and defeating Communist plans. In answer my remark that armored equipment not necessary this end he said presence of such equipment here would cause Communist collapse.

I asked whether government had been considering means for dealing basic discontent, i.e., poverty of masses of people. Foreign Minister said government’s entire anti-inflation plan aimed stabilizing Chilean currency was for benefit of people.

I urged, as I have frequently in the past not only on Acting Foreign Minister but on other high Chilean officials, that adequate explanation of this be got across to people which to date government has failed miserably to do.

Acting Foreign Minister said government planning radio campaign this end.

Embassy recognizes problems use MAP units could create and in view progressive normalcy Santiago urgency transfer has abated. However, no question in minds Embassy … that Communists played very important part last week’s disorders and while they may have hoped overthrow Ibáñez regime as GOC now claims, find it hard believe Communists really considered they possessed potential to do this although PSP may have thought it could.

Lyon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 725.5–MSP/4–957. Secret; Priority.
2. Supra.
3. See footnote 4, Document 404.