276. Memorandum From the Operations Coordinator of the Office of the Under Secretary of State (Richards) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Holland)1
For your information, there is quoted below an excerpt from my preliminary and informal notes on the OCB meeting of November 21:
“Airlift for Bolivia
“The joint USOM–ISIS [USIS?] telegram No. 151, dated November 20, from the Embassy at La Paz transmitting the request of the President of Bolivia for an emergency airlift of food from Arica, Chile, to La Paz and Cochabamba, Bolivia, was considered by the Board.2 Mr. Spencer King of ARA reviewed the problem briefly for the Board and stated that the proposed airlift was intended to support the U.S.-sponsored stabilization program to be inaugurated [Page 577] on December 1. It was pointed out that there was not a serious shortage of food but a psychological impact was desired to support the stabilization program. It was felt by the Embassy that the airlift would reinforce confidence in the Bolivian Government. Mr. Gray reported that to move the quantity of foodstuffs suggested would require 12 or 13 C–54’s and would cost $200,000. He stated that Defense had no money for this purpose but would consider the proposal sympathetically if reimbursed and if told that the project had high priority from a political or psychological point of view. It was generally agreed that neither of these two conditions could be met. Mr. MacArthur thereupon suggested that a much smaller airlift might be provided by U.S. planes in the area. Mr. Hollister remarked that the purpose of the airlift seemed to be to bolster the Bolivian Government, therefore he questioned the wisdom of the airlift being provided by the U.S. It would be better if the Bolivians themselves provide the airlift and thus get the credit. Mr. King reported on the number of Bolivian aircraft available and doubt was expressed as to whether these were adequate for the job. It was agreed that the working group should take another look at the problem; come up with specific recommendations based on the discussion at the OCB meeting; and clear instructions to the Embassy at La Paz with the various principals attending the OCB meeting.”3
- Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant’s Files: Lot 58 D 749, Bolivia. Secret.↩
- On November 17, Siles requested the airlift, and on November 20, Drew telegraphed the Department asking for consideration of the proposal. (Ibid., Central Files, 824.03/11–2056)↩
- Telegram 146 to La Paz, November 23, reported that the Department believed the proposed U.S. airlift was not necessary to develop support for the stabilization program. It also instructed the Embassy to inform Siles that a possibility existed that such an airlift would be “counter-productive in that it might be interpreted as indication supply situation much worse than it actually is,” and that a Bolivian effort via rail or its own aircraft would derive maximum benefits. (Ibid.) On November 26 Drew informed Siles of the decision and reported that the Bolivian President expressed appreciation of the consideration given his proposal and understanding of the reasons why it was not then feasible. (Ibid., 824.03/11–2656)↩