Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

274. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, October 12, 1956—6:55 p.m.

112. Embdes 154.² .… increasing indications communist penetration left-wing MNR and COB and reported plans to increase militia arms (Weeka October 5³) suggest desirability now to clarify to all concerned bases US policy toward Bolivia. Since increased tension MNR moderate and leftist factions, to which communist agitation is probably contributing factor, could result in governmental change or dilution authority presently constituted government, such action this time seems particularly advisable.

Your discretion therefore take early occasion directly to induce understanding by key individuals in both factions MNR … while US does not take sides in Bolivia’s domestic political affairs it cannot help but take most serious view of indications that communist influence in MNR left-wing and COB is increasing. Impress fact that our Bolivian policy rests on two elements and that any developments implying fundamental changes in or reduced authority of GOB will require evaluation of US policy in terms these elements: To receive US cooperation 1) government must be free from communist domination or influence and 2) it must be willing make determined effort achieve economic stability.

We believe emphasis on latter element fully as important as on first since long run success US policy toward Bolivia requires restoration of economic stability to provide foundation for democratic political stability and to reduce opportunity for fruitful communist agitation.

In these conversations the report that militia leaders and COB have demanded increased arms could be introduced to suggest our very serious concern over increased potential for disorder which such distribution would create, should arms fall into hands communist elements. In talk with Siles advantage could be taken opening afforded his statements communist growth COB and MNR left to suggest arms distribution not be undertaken without prior thorough survey possible communist penetration militia. Inform him also his suggestion assignment special Embassy officer cooperate anti-communist measures⁴ receiving urgent consideration.

At this time we prefer foregoing direct approach to key individuals over Siles’ suggestion you make a press statement to effect US would not support communist-tainted government⁵ since appearance open intervention could result especially in context present MNR left-moderate tension.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.24/10–556. Secret. Drafted by Siracusa, Briggs, and Silberstein and initialed by Bernbaum.
2. Not printed. (Ibid.)
3. Transmitted in despatch 153 from La Paz, this Weeka reported that almost all units of the militia officially requested that their current ammunition supply be augmented significantly, that certain small arms be distributed where the supply was meager, and that regular weekly training periods in the theory and tactics of guerrilla warfare be initiated. (Ibid., 724.00(W)/10–556)
4. Reference is to a suggestion made during a conversation with Siles on October 4, reported in Drew’s memorandum of that date transmitted in despatch 154.
5. Drew reported the following parting remarks in his conversation with Siles: “I reminded him of our long-standing compact that we were “partners’. I said that I not only wanted Bolivia to know that we were his friends and supporters, but that we would never continue our aid program to a Communist-tainted government. He asked me to say that to the press. I said I would think about it.”