264. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Bolivia 1

268. Joint State–Defense–ICA message. You are authorized discuss with President Siles proposed program (paragraph 39d Bolivia 1290d paper2) strengthen Bolivian Army. You may state US prepared at this time assist Bolivia obtain small arms and training or President’s escort battalion approximately 550 men. FYI only recommendations your despatch 413 February 73 broader program under [Page 541] consideration here. However action herein contemplated authorized in paragraph 39d and considered within scope your recommendations. Since we have no military assistance agreement with Bolivia … in order avoid 1) possible accusation US intervention and 2) criticism by other LA countries which likewise do not have agreements and have requested but not received grant aid (End FYI) we suggest Bolivia buy under Section 106 Mutual Security Act4 list equipment we would propose for this battalion approximate cost $119,915 and request (also under 106) training Army’s ZI and Canal Zone schools about $157,440 for key personnel this battalion and 4 US mobile training teams provide training in Bolivia. Requests for equipment and for training would be made separate notes. Since we recognize Bolivia in present situation should not be encouraged devote foreign exchange military purposes, US for its part in developing grant economic program would take into account any increases required by effect purchase this equipment on Bolivia’s dollar foreign exchange position. FYI only we desire avoid commitment requiring US match dollar for dollar foreign exchange [if] Bolivia utilizes purchase military equipment we suggest. Since US supporting Bolivia FY 1957 extent some $28 million and considering Bolivia has unilaterally spent $185,000 for F–51 and C–47 military aircraft recently we believe Bolivia should be willing accept general assurance US will provide if necessary adequate dollar support compensate military expenditures this program. End FYI.

If GOB concurs, Army Mission would assist implementation program.

We recognize proposed program might be politically infeasible Siles accept or he may desire different type assistance or timing. We are prepared consider any proposal Siles may have which would achieve our general objective strengthen Bolivian Army as opposed militia. Considering our relations other LA countries we consider best method financing that outlined above.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 724.5/2–757. Secret. Repeated to Panama for CINCARIB. Drafted by Sayre and William T. Briggs and initialed by Bernbaum.
  2. Reference is to the Operations Coordinating Board’s “Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Bolivia and Recommended Action,” December 21, 1955. (Ibid., OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Latin America 1953–58) Paragraph 39 reads in part: “While no increase in the size of the armed forces need be sought at this time, it is in the U.S. interest that their morale and effectiveness be improved and that the confidence of the government and the people in those forces be restored. The Bolivian Government has given the armed forces the mission of aiding in the economic development of the country. By assisting the armed forces to perform this constructive role, the U.S. will help them regain the confidence of the government and the people. At the same time our assistance should be designed to enhance the prestige and to increase the effectiveness of the armed forces in their internal security role and to promote political stability based ultimately upon constitutional processes.” Paragraph 39–d recommended provision of “end item grant aid in the form of individual weapons to one battalion-sized unit (the President Escort Regiment.)”
  3. There is no despatch of February 7 numbered 413. Despatch 412 of March 6, however, is the report and recommendations of the country team with reference to the OCB analysis of internal security in Bolivia. (Ibid., Central Files, 724.5/3–656)
  4. Reference is to P.L. 665; for text, see 68 Stat. 832.