Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

260. Memorandum of Conversations Between the Secretary General of the Confederation of Bolivian Workers (Juan Lechín) and the Labor Adviser of the Office of Regional American Affairs (Fishburn), Washington, December 6, 7, and 8, 1955¹

Washington, December 6, 7, and 8, 1955

SUBJECT

• Bolivia

Mr. Lechin and I spoke together several times during the course of the 3 days, including two hours over breakfast on December 7. Topics covered included the following:

(1) Mr. Lechin’s first preoccupation is, naturally, the current economic difficulty of Bolivia. This he blames squarely and directly upon the United States for reducing the price of tin just after the MNR administration came into power. He alleges that this was done because of our animosity toward the MNR. Although I tried to tell him that tin prices are determined by world conditions of supply and demand, he replied that the world price of tin has never been below our contract price and he is convinced that for this commodity we set the price. My attempts to combat this thinking were apparently futile.

(2) Mr. Lechin takes the initiative in giving the U.S. government credit for maintaining and keeping the MNR administration in power, with the grant aid which we have given it. He apparently sees no inconsistency between this position and the evaluation of our tin policy (1).

(3) Mr. Lechin argued that the United States should pay more for the raw materials of other nations than it does. I asked him at what point the United States Government or private purchasers should stop in price offers if they once depart from world market prices, to which he gave no answer. On this specific point he stated that we should have paid much more for Bolivian tin and rubber during World War II. I replied that prices were controlled in the United States for domestic producers, that the Bolivian producers obtained at least as much or more than prewar prices for all goods sold in this country and that prices of consumer goods were controlled in this country and for export. His response was that the only time that raw material producers can make good profits is during a war, that the United States should take this into account and pay much more. He said that, for example, instead of paying 30¢ per pound for rubber when the previous price had been 25¢, that we should have paid from $1.20 to $1.50. He added that whereas the Government of Bolivia at that time had indicated to the Bolivians that it had been very smart in getting 30¢ when the price was only 25¢, that it had been really stupid. We were the smart ones because the price might have risen to more than $1.00 per pound so that in getting it for 30¢ we paid less than we should have. I replied that in effect he was asking us, at a time when we controlled prices paid our own producers and were expending our lives fighting the Nazis, to pay the Bolivians more in order that they might enjoy greater profits while we waged war. While he resented this way of putting the matter, he made no substantive response. In this connection we had already agreed that if prices of tin had been increased the benefits would not have gone to the Bolivian workers but would have increased the profits of the three tin families, which he had criticized as being excessive.

(4) I mentioned to him our labor leader exchange program, indicated that it seemed to me to be of some value and stated that I would like to have his judgment of it. He replied that their very cooperation in selecting the individuals to come here indicated their approval of the program. He replied that they would have come to be more careful in selecting the individuals since some of them had not properly utilized the favor and had been spoiled by coming here and enjoying the relatively high compensation while in the United States. However, he indicated quickly that we should not reduce our per diem. I asked if he thought the program should be continued and, if so, how many labor leaders he thought we should be bringing here. He suggested that we should bring here approximately one group of 6 persons every 2 months.

(5) Mr. Lechin indicated that the Bolivian Indians are now being attracted into the economic and social life of the nation. He stated that they are leaving their rural areas and entering the small villages and larger towns. This, of course, increases the national demand for such items as sugar and wheat which are imported and has further aggravated the inflation he declared. I stated that it was clearly desirable to raise the living standards of the Bolivian Indians and that in order to do this it is necessary to bring them into the Bolivian economy. However, I added that at the present time it is the United States that is subsidizing this additional food which is required for them by virtue of their flowing to the cities and asked him to what degree and for how long he thought the United States should directly subsidize the permanent improvement in living standards of other nations. I emphasized the desirability of raising the living standards in the long run and of helping the Bolivian Government in doing so and then repeated the basic question regarding the degree to which this Government should subsidize this by direct financial aid. He said “That is a good question, but let me respond with another.” The United States has been exploiting Bolivia for the past 50 years. Now do you not think it is time for you to compensate us for this exploitation? I asked how we had been exploiting Bolivia for 50 years. He replied, through purchasing tin as a raw material at low prices and selling manufactured goods to us at high prices. I replied that the United States had not bought tin directly from Bolivia until World War II but rather that the tin had been sold to Britain. He replied that, of course, you (we) buy the raw material from Britain and put it into manufactured products and then sell them to us at high prices. This led to my discussing with him the relationship between prices of raw materials and manufactured goods. I pointed out that raw material producers in this country have the same problems and sometimes the same feelings as raw material producers in other countries. This discussion was not conclusive and probably its only value was to show his state of mind on this point.

(6) Mr. Lechin indicated that his position had been anti-imperialist and anti-United States before the U.S. Government granted its economic aid to Bolivia and he emphasized the degree to which this aid has saved the MNR administration. I asked him what would happen if our aid should cease; would he become anti-American again? He replied that this would depend upon the reason for the cessation. If we had a good overwhelming reason, obviously they would accept it graciously. If not, ————; he did not clarify.

(7) Mr. Lechin voluntarily suggested that the MNR administration has reduced the influence of the Communists within the COB from approximately 50%, which it originally had, to a level of 5% today. Within these figures he included both the Communists and the Trotskyists.

(8) We discussed tariffs briefly and he agreed that an adequate solution for Bolivia’s basic economic condition includes reductions in tariffs, which he stated he had already advocated.

(9) At various points he emphasized the fact that the Bolivian people are “more democratic,” “more politically minded,” etc., than any other people. As “proof” he stated that they first read the political section of the newspaper rather than the sports and comics and that they know whom to elect as their friends when they have the opportunity. To further illustrate his point, he stated that the American workers in contrast read the sports and comic sections first and elected President Eisenhower rather than Stevenson. My response to this was that since the American workers long ago achieved the democracy for which the Bolivians are still striving, they can pay attention to sports and comic sections rather than worry constantly about democracy.

(10) I asked Mr. Lechin why he is so interested in the workers’ militia, rather than a regular army. He responded that the workers overthrew the previous regime with their rifles, that they are still intent upon preserving their gains, that they are keeping their rifles well oiled and hidden away and that it would not be possible to take them from them. He also responded that Bolivia had been controlled by a reactionary army throughout most of its history, implying that the army is necessarily anti-worker. In this connection, he added that the United States has learned how to keep an army in a non-political role but that Latin America has not.

(11) He referred at one point to the subhuman living conditions of the Bolivian miners. I asked if he meant the miners in small mines or in all of them. He replied that he meant all miners. I stated that I had visited the Siglo XX tin mine and that while I found living conditions poor, I did not feel that they could be classified as subhuman. He replied that the better living conditions I had seen applied to only 3 or 4,000 out of many more, and that miners could work only 2 or 3 years in the tin mines without injury to their health.

(12) I referred at one point to the transition of the MNR from an anti-capitalist Party before achieving power, and to its present position of accepting some private investment. He replied that neither he nor the MNR had ever been anti-capitalist, and that if I could quote him as ever having been, he would retire from political life. He also emphasized the desire of the Bolivian Government to attract private capital into Bolivia, mentioning McCarthy’s investment² in the oil industry. I indicated that it did not seem likely to me that the Bolivian Government’s policies thus far were such as to attract the private capital of the more responsible character and on the scale needed. He responded that the Bolivian Government did not regard Mr. McCarthy as an adventurer. He added that it was up to the Department of State to help attract private capital to Bolivia. I responded that investors will weigh the risk factor for themselves and that I did not think it likely that the Department would have much success in persuading individuals to invest in other countries. I added that sometimes investors come to us for further information, in which case they might be discouraged if conditions are poor. However, the positive measures needed to induce capital investments are up to the local government.

(13) In our first conversation, Mr. Lechin indicated to me that he had talked with Mr. Reuther³ and Mr. Benedict⁴ of the CIO. I asked if he intended to attend the AFL–CIO Convention and he said he had made no arrangements. [Following this conversation, I informed Mr. Romualdi, Latin American Representative of the AFL, of my conversation with Mr. Lechin. In response to Mr. Romualdi’s question, I suggested that I believed that Mr. Lechin would like to attend the Convention and that I thought the invitation would be useful. Mr. Romualdi then informed me that he would arrange to have Mr. Lechin attend the Convention, which he did.]⁵ Immediately following his attendance at the Thursday morning session of the combined AFL–CIO Convention, I spoke to Lechin as I accidentally encountered him outside the convention hall. Mr. Lechin, I learned, had been introduced to the Convention and I believe he was rather pleased.

(14) On Wednesday morning Mr. Lechin voluntarily referred to a newspaper headline which had come out on the previous afternoon (Tuesday) on the murder of a Negro leader in Texas and remarked what a shame it was. I indicated that I had not had a chance to read the account and that until the facts were known would be reluctant to say anything. In our Thursday meeting following his attendance at the Convention, I stated that more recent accounts indicated that the cause of the Negro’s murder had not yet been determined. I added that present accounts indicated that he had had personal and family difficulties and that, of course, I strongly hoped that the murder had not taken place on account of race. He agreed.

(15) Mr. Lechin stated that he had entered government service poor, and that he would leave it still poorer.

(16) I expressed some skepticism concerning miner control over the tin industry, indicating that worker control through cooperatives in the United States had not worked well, and that naturalization [nationalization] of the mines in Britain and petroleum in Mexico had not worked well. He replied that worker control over Bolivian tin mines is essential, that it has already led to greater self-sacrifice by Bolivian miners and that the Bolivian miners understand the basic problems. I referred to the fact that President Paz had to go to the mines to ask the miners to resume work sometime ago, which he seemed not to remember.

(17) I stated that I presumed that Mr. Lechin had received our offer of a travel grant in this country if he would like to avail himself of this opportunity. He responded that he did not have time for this as he must return to Bolivia.

(18) Our final parting ended with my expressing hope that the mutual cooperation of the two governments would resolve the basic economic problems of Bolivia. He referred to the fact that this was more our problem than theirs, with which I disagreed. However, it was apparent that he maintained his original position.

Comments:

Our conversations were cool but calm on the first two occasions. However, he openly interpreted my questions as indicating a basically unfriendly attitude, to which I simply replied that in view of our short time together I had to ask difficult questions, which I would rather not do, in order to understand the situation. Following his attendance at the Convention he seemed more relaxed. While we did not part on a warm basis we were at least smiling.

. . . . . . .

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 724.00/12–855. Confidential. Drafted by Fishburn.
2. Reference is to the oil concessions in Southern Bolivia, which the Bolivian Government granted to Glen McCarthy, a U.S. citizen of Houston, Texas; documentation pertaining to the McCarthy concession is ibid., 811.05124.
3. Walter Reuther, President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations Division of the American Federation of Labor.
4. Daniel Benedict, Director of Education of the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers.
5. Brackets in the source text.