191. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Holland) to the Ambassador in Argentina (Nufer)1
Dear Al: The road ahead on U.S.-Argentine relations looks rather dark to me just now. Our accomplishments, past and prospective, as regards solutions of problems between the two countries, were brought about largely through more cordial relations with Peron himself. If he concludes that our attitude toward him is becoming less friendly, then he may refuse to go along with us on any further progressive steps and may even cancel out some that he has already taken. U.S. public opinion is so aroused against him just now, that it is going to be difficult for us to keep up the friendly gestures that, it seems to me, are necessary in order to keep him disposed to working with us.
If, because of the present state of public opinion in the U.S. we have to cool off in our relations with Peron, then we get, first, a [Page 375] state of concern in his mind, then one of resentment and, finally, a resumption of the unfriendly and uncooperative actions that created so much trouble for us a few years ago.
If we assume that the foregoing analysis is basically sound, then the first step toward avoiding the difficulties ahead of us is to bring about an improvement in U.S. public opinion toward Peron, an improvement that will permit us to continue the kind of friendly gestures that seem to have been so effective heretofore.
We are not going to get a more favorable public opinion unless the press adopts a more favorable attitude. The press is not going to do that unless the La Prensa problem2 is solved. That brings us up against the question of whether we could engineer a solution of that problem.
It is conceivable that Peron would be willing to give La Prensa back to Gainza Paz3 if the latter would agree that he would not openly attack Peron. It seems to me, that an agreement to support Peron would be unnecessary. A commitment not to attack him might do the trick. Rumors have reached me at this end that Gainza Paz might be willing to make such an agreement. I want to emphasize that these are only rumors, are entitled to little or no credence, and have nothing to do with the suggestions set out in this letter.
If the objective of a return of La Prensa in exchange for a commitment to desist from attacking the government is worth a try, then the question becomes how to make the try. I have thought of an approach through “cut outs” direct to Gainza Paz. Better than that, it seems to me, would be an approach to United Press whose huge financial interest in their service contract with La Prensa would logically lead them to make every effort to persuade Gainza Paz to accept whatever conditions might be necessary to get back his paper. It seems to me, however, that the first approach should be made to Peron himself. If Gainza Paz and UP should agree to such a settlement and Peron should thereafter refuse it, we could safely predict an intensification of the present strong press attacks on Peron. On the other hand, if the first approach is to Peron and he rejects the proposal, the situation in the United States grows no worse than it is now.
If the first approach is to Peron, how can it best be made. I think Ambassador Paz would be glad to come home to discuss it with the President. However, we would have no assurance that he would present the idea either accurately or persuasively. Much [Page 376] better, it seems to me, would be for you to bring it up with Peron, if possible, in a personal conversation with no witnesses.
You could point out:
- 1.
- Our profound satisfaction at the improvement in relationships; the progress on a number of problems which we have been able to achieve; our very keen interest in continuing the present trend which is sure to bring benefits to both countries.
- 2.
- The recent church fight has given the U.S. press new ammunition to use in their ancient fight which is really provoked by the expropriation of La Prensa. These renewed and intensified press attacks are destroying the favorable public opinion which we have successfully been building up during the past few years. They are going to make it hard for our government to continue its policy of open, cordial cooperation with the government of Argentina. They caused us very real difficulties in the last Congress and we expect those problems to be even greater in the next Congress.
- 3.
- The President has successfully survived the June 16 revolution; his position seems strong, and this may be the best time for him to make a dramatic gesture which would have a strong impact on public opinion and, perhaps, on opinion in Argentina as well. Such a gesture, if made now, could not be interpreted as a sign of weakness.
- 4.
- It might well be that Gainza Paz, as a condition to return of his paper, would agree to abstain from attacks on the government. If the paper were returned the major factor behind the intense, long-term U.S. press attack on Peron would be removed.
I would be most grateful if you would meditate on the foregoing and let me have your views. If we decide to do something, it may well be that we can weave Lucero’s visit into the pattern in a constructive way. Needless to say, I would much prefer to abandon this project if it involves excessive risks to the U.S. On the other hand, I am deeply concerned by the risks to us that seem inherent in the present situation.
With warmest regards and best wishes, I am
Sincerely,
P.S. If by great fortune we were able to work out the La Prensa problem we could then consider the possibility of an attack on the church problem.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.35/9–655. Secret; Eyes Only.↩
- In April 1951 Perón closed the Argentine newspaper La Prensa. Relevant documentation on this matter is in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. ii, pp. 1079 ff.↩
- Alberto Gainza Paz, editor and publisher of La Prensa.↩
- Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature.↩
- This postscript was handwritten by Holland.↩