76. Letter from McConaughy to Johnson1
We have decided to send Douglas Forman, FSO–4, to assist you when Ed Martin leaves. We are awaiting word as to whether you intend to request a short extension of Ed’s stay before we issue Doug’s travel orders. He will be severely missed in CA and it does not seem necessary to send him until about the time that Ed will be leaving.
Doug is well qualified for the assignment. He has been doing most of the leg-work on your messages here and is thoroughly familiar with the issues, both from his service here and his experience in Hong Kong. He is an able and dependable officer and is good in Chinese. Ed and Ralph can tell you more about him.
There has been quite a debate here as to whether USIA should be allowed to give normal “straight” news play to the story of the mistreatment of the eleven airmen. Naturally they would not be allowed to “play it up” while the Geneva talks are going on. Everybody is agreed that we should not do anything to inflame the Chinese Communists needlessly or afford them a pretext for continuing to hold the remaining Americans. The question is whether straight normal news play, without comment or beating of the drums, accurately reflecting the attention received by the story in the American press, would be hurtful. The present instruction is for them to play it down—in effect suppress it temporarily, and we understand Defense is instructing the airmen to keep quiet for the present.
One piece of quite sensitive rumor, which is solely for your private background info. Yesterday we saw the interrogation of one of the eleven released airmen, Benjamin. He reported that he had seen quite a bit of Fecteau for a while in prison. He said Fecteau [Facsimile Page 2] had been able to give him bits and pieces of his story. Fecteau expressed some doubt as to whether the two American pilots of his plane had been killed in the crash. He said the plane landed fairly flat without any lethal impact. He said he regretted to have to admit that he and Downey had left the vicinity of the plane immediately without investigating what happened to the two pilots so he had no real evidence. Personally I am quite skeptical that the pilots are still alive. It is doubtful if the Chinese Communists would have any motive for public announcement that they were dead if this was not the case. In any event it is unlikely the pilots will ever turn up after the [Typeset Page 87] announcement that they were killed. Of course, nothing has been said about this to the next of kin or anyone else outside of a very restricted group.
We are awaiting your reply to our 466 of last night regarding the formula for parallel unilateral declarations. Your report giving the detailed account of the fifth meeting on Thursday has just come in and I have not had a chance to digest it yet. Since the pouch is closing, this letter cannot wait.
Your 418 on Wang’s general negotiating attitude is of special interest. I believe there is a tendency here to read less significance into his conciliatory approach than you may be inclined to do from there. The semblance of reasonableness and willingness to go part way may be recognizable, but when his draft agreement is taken apart there is really nothing in the way of tangible concession at all. There is as yet no assurance that the Chinese Communist position on the Americans is any different from what it was last year. Undoubtedly they would be willing to release the Americans in return for the sort of broad representation arrangement which they are seeking. But a concession on this from us is not to be expected. In the absence of a complete yielding by us on the representation issue, can any substantial “give” by the Communists on the detained Americans really be expected? Maybe so, but there is as yet nothing we can rely on.
There is something of a feeling here that you do not need to show a great measure of tolerance of Wang’s proposals when their terms reflect no assured advance.
The Secretary does not like the idea of a formal agreement with the Chinese Communists. He feels definitely that parallel unilateral declarations are preferable, as indicated in our 466.
We are well aware of the tough row you have to hoe. The questions coming up now are in a different sense more trying than the relatively superficial press problem you had to wrestle with the first week.
[Facsimile Page 3]We are naturally troubled as you are by the dilemma we may soon be faced with if we have an opportunity to spring only part of our people in return for a limited representation arrangement.
Enclosed is the transcript of the Secretary’s August 10 press conference.
Good wishes,
Sincerely,
Director for Chinese Affairs
Enclosure:
Transcript of Secretary’s press conference of August 10, 1955.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. The enclosure is not printed.↩