Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

730. Letter 57 from McConaughy to Johnson¹

Letter No. 57

Washington, October 12, 1956

Dear Alex:

The principal event since your last meeting has been the Chinese Communist last-moment refusal to allow Addis, the British Counselor from Peiping, to see Father McCarthy in Ward Road Jail in Shanghai on October 5, after all arrangements had been made and after Addis arrived at the prison. Addis was met with the bland statement from the officials that McCarthy had changed his mind and did not want to see Addis. The officials added that they could not force McCarthy to have the interview. Addis was naturally taken aback, but did what he could by way of remonstrance. The British are of course as aware as we are that McCarthy did not voluntarily change his mind. The Communist claim was either an outright lie, or else they had broken McCarthy. We suspect that they want to demonstrate to the British that they are wasting their time in trying to see the prisoners. The Communist decision may have been made after they allowed Father McCarthy’s letter to O’Neill to be delivered. We are enclosing a copy of the full text of this letter, which shows that Father McCarthy was alert and resolute when he wrote the letter. We have it from other sources that he probably is the most resourceful and durable of the remaining Shanghai prisoners, which makes it all the more unlikely that he would have voluntarily given up the fight. Since this represents a callous and completely indefensible hardening of the Chinese Communist position, Mr. Robertson believes that we should attack Wang very vigorously on it at the October 18 meeting. You will get full instructions on it in your guidance telegram. The British are awaiting guidance from us on how they should react in Peiping. We will counsel a strong reaction there too although our main reliance will be on you at Geneva.

2. [text not declassified] a Chinese mental case at Logansport, Indiana still demands to return to the Communist mainland but according to the foreign student adviser appears to be incompetent to take the initiative to get in touch with the Indian Embassy. Consequently we are considering asking the Immigration Service to deport him. The longer he remains the more chance there is that the Chinese Communists will exploit the case in their propaganda.

3. One of the two Chinese convicts at the U.S. Health Service Hospital at Lexington, Kentucky, who opted for return to the China Mainland has now informed the parole officer that he has changed his mind. He claims that since he was formerly in the Nationalist Army he will be persecuted by the Communists should he go back. We are asking that commutation of sentence proceedings in his case be halted. Fortunately we had not told the Indians or the Chinese Communists of the results of our survey so that if this development can be kept confidential no harm will have been done.

4. Missing U.S. Military Personnel

We have thought a good deal about how we should renew our pressure on the Communists to account for our missing military personnel. This is a subject which the relatives of the missing persons keep very much alive here and numerous letters are written each month by the Department of State, the Department of Defense and USUN in New York in response to pleas from these relatives. Our official replies contain the assurance that the United States Government is leaving no stone unturned to try to obtain the facts from the Communists. We feel very keenly the need to take some action. However, we share the views expressed both by you and by General Guard, the Senior U.S. representative on UNCMAC, that we are unlikely to obtain any satisfactory accounting from the Communists either in Panmunjom or Geneva.

After weighing the pros and cons, we wonder if it would not be preferable for you to reopen the subject at Geneva. Enclosure A contains a summary of our reasons. These were originally prepared for inclusion in a memorandum recommending reintroduction of this subject at Geneva, but we wanted first to get your reaction. A further reason for selecting the Geneva forum, which, for obvious reasons, is mentioned neither in the enclosure nor in Col. Monroe’s memorandum on his talks with the U.S. element of the MAC, is Col. Monroe’s feeling that the personnel presently assigned to UNCMAC or those who might be assigned there in the future, have neither the experience nor the specialized skill required to negotiate effectively on this subject with the Communists.

Our tentative thinking is that you might introduce this item again, using as your springboard the statement by the Communist spokesman in the MAC that they had no responsibility for individuals held outside Korea. You could then proceed on a case by case basis to seek information from Wang. Presumably he would, at least in the beginning, refuse to discuss this issue and try to shift the responsibility back to the MAC. This would not be so easy for him to accomplish this time, in view of the statement made by the Communist spokesman in that body. Even if we fail to obtain any information from the Communists, we might at least succeed in throwing them off balance for a time, particularly if we should decide to exploit the issue publicly.

We should like to have your candid views as to the advantages and disadvantages of reintroducing this subject at this time, and also your estimate of the kind of support you would require from Defense should you undertake this task. Defense’s capabilities to supply the kind of information you would want is, of course, limited. The enclosed copy of a memorandum from General Erskine to the Secretary of Defense indicates what Defense is undertaking to do to supply some of the deficiencies pointed out in Dave’s letter of August 23.

5. Our feeling here based more on our appraisal of the general attitude of the Chinese Communists than the tactical situation in the Geneva talks is that the Communists are probably not moving toward a recess or break-off of the talks at least not until after the elections and the opening of the UNGA. It appears to us they have more to gain by holding on than by breaking off. The latter move seems contrary to their general posture in international affairs. We are concerned at the adverse effects that the continuation of these talks are reported to be having in some parts of the Far East. We are considering asking key posts for up to date reports on this matter.

6. You will be interested in the latest Chinese Communist gambits in the cultural field. A number of American publishers have received orders for American newspapers and magazines. The official Chinese Communist book and periodical agency the Gnozi Shudian has sent letters to a large number of American publishers requesting the contribution or sale at discount of large selections of scientific and technical books for a proposed exhibit in Peiping early in 1957. The Chinese Communists have also announced on the China Mainland that a wide range of American publications including Time and Life can now be subscribed to. Teaching of English is being introduced in the middle schools to the extent that teachers are available.

7. By way of general comment, don’t expect any new tack to be authorized here on either of the two big issues. The emphatic conclusion here is that our position is unassailable on both questions and that any attempt to look for new wording on renunciation otherwise show any “give” would only weaken our position, both from a tactical standpoint and from the standpoint of our public position when the eventual public showdown comes. We are somewhat more skeptical than you apparently are as to the likelihood of a Chinese Communist suspension of the talks or other major move within the next few weeks. The Chinese Communists are exploiting the talks in various ways, as we have seen in connection with the 8th Party Congress, and in their talks with visiting delegations, such as the Malayan Chinese, and the Indonesian delegation headed by Sukarno. Their present tactics seem to envisage a continuation of the talks and further misrepresentation and exploitation of the fact that the talks are private and are continuing. We are making a new study in FE of the whole question of the influence of the talks on Asian attitudes toward Communist China and toward our China policy. As a sidelight on the above, you will want to know that Mr. Robertson thinks that it is preferable for you to refrain from indicating any regret or disappointment at Chinese Communist publication, or threatened publication, of statements on the talks. Naturally, you will not encourage publicity by them, but we do not now like the connotations of deploring publicity or indicating that we fear it or find it distasteful.

8. We were glad to get your letter No. 45 of September 22. We have FE/EX working on your request that Helenka be placed on a daily contractual basis.

Regards and the best to each of you,

Sincerely,

Walter P. McConaughy

Enclosures:

1. Copy of letter from Father McCarthy to Charge at Peiping, dated Sept. 1, 1956.

2. Memorandum on Missing Personnel

3. Gist of a telegram from Foreign Office commenting on O’Neill’s telegram of Oct. 8.

4. Memo from General Erskine to Secretary of Defense dated Oct. 8

P.S. Apologies for the overlap between 5 and 7. You know how rushed we are. I had Ralph work with me on this, and we crossed our signals a bit.

1. Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal.