Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

676. Telegram 22 from Geneva¹

Geneva, July 10, 1956, 5 p.m.

22. From Johnson.

1. I opened 53rd today with following prepared statement:

A. You and I have disagreed about many things during course our discussion on renunciation use force. However, there is no question but that we do agree both your country and mine are dissatisfied with and concerned about certain aspects of existing situation in Taiwan area. Although we approach matter from greatly differing premises I believe we are agreed it would be in our mutual self-interest peacefully resolve our disputes.

B. Yet you have rejected, at past meetings, steps I have proposed to this end. If you accept peaceful resolution our difference as being something equally desirable for both of us, I cannot understand why you reject steps necessary realize this principle.

C. I have proposed as first step two of us declare unequivocally on behalf our governments we are not rpt not going to go to war over any our disputes. Surely you agree this step essential to truly peaceful negotiations. What is alternative? To declare we are going to war over our disputes? Or that we may do so, if our desires are not met within specific period of time? Could any negotiations be peaceful if held in shadow such pronouncement?

D. I have proposed that two of us make it clear declaration cannot be distorted into abandonment by either side its inherent right pursue its policies by peaceful means. Is it not rpt not to our mutual advantage have it perfectly clear that declaration is not designed prevent either our countries from defending itself if attacked?

E. I have also proposed declaration be made expressly applicable to Taiwan area as well as elsewhere. Again, I find it hard undersand how this could be regarded as “one sided” provision. Is it not rpt not desire your country as it is of mine, make possible peaceful resolution our differences? If your government does share desire my government in this regard, it is difficult for me understand how it persists in its attempt to haggle and bargain over Taiwan area reference? Since Taiwan area reference clearly to our mutual advantage, how can your government continue establish preconditions for its inclusion?

F. None of proposals I have made are unilateral or designed serve interests of one side more than other. All them are designed solely make possible realization of desire my government and people, that differences our two countries should not lead to war, but should be settled peacefully. Your government professes share this desire. If it really has this desire, it should no longer persist in establishing preconditions for its realization. It should be willing for two of us to reach agreement on declaration based upon your own draft December 1, with necessary and reasonable revisions thereof contained my draft April 19. I hope you have also considered remarks I made in this regard at last meeting and this morning we can at least move in this direction.

2. Wang replied from prepared statement he had carefully listened remarks I made this morning but failed detect any new elements. In statement this morning I had merely repeated old tune of arguments he had long before repeatedly refuted. I had again referred to April 19 draft. This draft as he had clearly stated in previous meetings, their side could not (repeat not) accept. He did not (repeat not) consider it would contribute to progress talks to advance these old arguments even going so far as to put forward draft which had been rejected.

3. Wang said he would like remind me once again our discussions on second item now been going on nearly ten months. Out of desire resolve outstanding issues their side had shown great patience in talks. Had repeatedly exerted tremendous efforts for making agreed announcement on renunciation force originally proposed by my side. Draft which they last put forward May 11 after stating determination both sides settle disputes Taiwan area through peaceful negotiations without resorting threat use force against each other added that two sides should within two months of issuance declaration seek ascertain practical feasible means including holding FMC between China–US. In spite fact this draft obviously took view US into account and therefore entirely acceptable my side nevertheless continued under various pretexts refuse reach agreement speedily on that draft.

4. Wang said at previous meetings well as last meeting my side repeatedly made allegation their proposed draft ambiguous and that their side approached this question from standpoint making declaration for sake declaration. My side even turned facts upside down asserting their side threatening US in Taiwan area. It simply because US occupying China’s territory Taiwan by force which created tension Taiwan area. My side still continued its activities Taiwan area aggravating existing tension and threatening security his country. Hence, their side firmly held any announcement renouncing force must be capable leading relaxation and elimination that tension rather than perpetuating status quo US occupation Taiwan. This position their side so clear as to preclude ambiguity.

5. Wang said on other hand aim US these talks always been attempt secure announcement solely advantageous US so as to enable US maintain present state occupation Taiwan while continuing interference his country’s liberation Taiwan. Failing obtain such announcement US would then continue drag out talks indefinitely in order obtain same object of freezing status quo Taiwan area.

6. Wang would like frankly point out their side could not agree to make announcement which in favor one side alone nor could their side allow talks be used as tool by one party to achieve unilateral aims. Their side maintained any joint declaration must be advantageous both sides. In same way continuance talks possible only under condition it advantageous both sides.

7. Wang said with reference statement I made this morning, if US truly desirous reaching agreement on proposed announcement renouncing force and willing move this direction he would hope I able seriously consider their May 11 draft and put forth concrete opinion about it.

8. I replied I completely unable follow his statement this morning that draft I put forward April 19 solely advantageous my side. As had said this morning thought we agreed it would be to mutual advantage both our countries peacefully resolve disputes.

9. I said Wang put forward his December 1 draft presumably with thought it at least acceptable his own side. To say now that my April 19 draft which incorporated all his draft of December 1 solely advantageous my side something I not able follow. April 19 draft simply stated very clearly unequivocally we not going war over disputes including those Taiwan area. It also fully incorporated last paragraph his December 1 draft. In other words it clear unequivocal statement of renunciation force I had always maintained and still did that this was first task before us. As said this morning only alternative I saw was to say we were going war settle disputes or we might do so unless desires met within certain period time.

10. I said certainly if purpose my government not to seek peaceful settlement or, as he termed it, intent drag out talks I would never have made proposal last October nor would I have gone to lengths I had in incorporating his draft in our proposals. I had every hope and expectation based on previous discussions that he would find April 19 draft acceptable. Never thought he would discard degree agreement that draft indicated had been reached and, by introducing other elements in his May 11 draft, really accomplish purpose of dragging out talks and preventing agreement.

11. I said April 19 draft could not be interpreted by any reasonable person as in any way sacrificing Wang’s position. I was still disappointed he persisted in seeing purposes and difficulties that simply not there. Still hopeful he would find that draft acceptable and if he did not that he would put forward reasonable suggestions to meet both points view. Could not so consider his May 11 draft.

12. Wang replied in talking about peaceful settlement disputes, fact their side participated these talks had precisely shown desire for such settlement. However this purpose could not be fulfilled by mere lip service, or mere profession of desire while in actual deeds we continued pursuing other purposes. Since we began discussions on renunciation force they had so far not detected any sign of correspondence between professed desire of US for peaceful settlement and our actual deeds. Accordingly although US continued speak about peaceful settlement disputes renunciation force this remained mere lip service and was hard to believe.

13. Wang said with desire to push forward talks and reach agreement on announcement their side had since beginning talks this question proposed three drafts—October 27, December 1, May 11. Every time he put forward draft it was in hope we able reach agreement on it. However none these drafts been accepted. Therefore when I said we already had agreement in certain respects, it not correct. Although each his drafts took into consideration point view my side and capable reading agreement I persisted in turning down these drafts and prevented us from reaching agreement. It true my April 19 draft made some revisions in his previous draft however revisions had actually caused change of nature of draft and that why it not acceptable them.

14. Wang said remarks I had made this morning showed we would not be able make further progress in talks advancing talks and making announcement. He did not see any indication I would change my previous views. We had to recognize after prolonged discussion this question points view both sides been made very clear.

15. Wang said views both sides on making renunciation force declaration not likely come closer. Hence at next meeting unless I came forth with new constructive proposal, he would suggest talks should then take up other subject under second item, that is question of trade embargo.

16. I replied what he was saying, then, in other words was his side rejected unconditional clear-cut statement renouncing force.

17. I said Wang had said my April 19 changed nature his December 1 draft. He himself had said when we discussing his December 1 draft that it covered dispute Taiwan area as well as elsewhere. If it did not, had no meaning whatsoever. My April 19 draft simply made this clear, as well as taking into full account his views with regard location clause on self-defense. If he considered it changed nature his December 1 draft that simply meant his December 1 draft never was renunciation force and never intended to be.

18. I said my government still sought such renunciation force as first step. I was discouraged at continued evasion by his government on one pretext or another of making such renunciation force. Nevertheless I still hopeful it would adopt this generally accepted principle international conduct and thus as I said at last meeting open road for peaceful resolution differences. If it persisted in refusing do so and persisted in maintaining its threat initiate use force Taiwan area, it hard be optimistic over peaceful settlement our disputes. Neither my government nor any other self-respecting government could negotiate under such conditions. I hoped he could reconsider this prior next meeting. Believed issues too important for two of us despair of reaching understanding.

19. Wang agreed with thesis that once we begin discussing certain problem we should try settle problem. On question of making announcement, during past ten months their side made repeated effort and fact that no agreement been reached not (repeat not) their responsibility.

20. Wang said if US actually desired and not (repeat not) merely giving lip service to renunciation force in settlement disputes should do so by actual actions. He had always hoped we would put forth new constructive proposals based on spirit mutual advantage both sides. If we talk about refusing make announcement, it US which refused joining in making announcement advantage both sides.

21. Wang said he had nothing more on this question this morning. He proposed we meet next July 24.

22. I indicated I had not (repeat not) agreed to ending meeting although had nothing more on subject renunciation force this morning. I simply wanted say I pleased note Fathers Phillips Clifford after completing prison sentences in full had been permitted leave and arrived Hong Kong July 7.

23. I said disappointed now his authorities apparently still attempting interfere and prevent Indian Embassy from carrying out functions with respect Chinese prisoners US which I had outlined at previous meetings. Found this difficult understand if he still interested in return these people.

24. Wang could not (repeat not) accept my statement their side interfering with Indian Embassy in carrying out functions. If Indian Embassy had difficulty carrying out functions in US so simply because US Government failed cooperate effectively in carrying outfits functions.

25. Wang said he was not (repeat not) going to say anything more on this this morning and suggested that the next meeting be held Tuesday July 24. I indicated I was agreeable to meeting that week but would prefer Thursday July 26 as Tuesday would be inconvenient. Wang agreed.

Gowen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–1056. Confidential; Limit Distribution.