Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

659. Letter from Osborn to Clough¹

Geneva, June 14, 1956

Dear Ralph:

The failure of the Chicom statement to hit implementation may be a reflection of Peiping’s tactical dilemma. Wang’s line of counterattack on the prisoner release was planned on the assumption that the prisoner move is a US plot to repeat the Korea screening operation. Wang wouldn’t want to compromise this line by assuming a different position in public; yet he is aware of the many vulnerabilities of this line, and of how foolish he would look if our move on prisoners turns out not to be a plot. Accordingly Peiping may have felt it wiser to say nothing more on implementation until some initial results of the screening are in.

If no results are in by June 21, we ourselves have a choice to make. Should we really try to reassure Wang that the operation is “straight”, or should we let Wang continue to entangle himself in his ridiculous line of last meeting? So long as we don’t know what the prisoners’ choice is going to be, the last course would be safer as well as easier.

What Wang might do on implementation, if his dilemma is not resoved by June 21 by the appearance of the initial results of the screening, is to shift increasing emphasis to the “obstructed” students. We can of course counter this by our old standbys:—no representations from Indians, Chinese steadily returning Wang’s country (including Dr S.D. Liao, who was on Wang’s February 6 list, and who is now back in China). Might it not so be a good idea to start dropping a few low-keyed remarks about Chicom pressures on students’ families in China? We could do so without violating the confidence of Victor Chou et al, as we now have the Chinese news reports on the registration of student families. The Chicoms are vulnerable on this point and it might not hurt for them to know it.

On renunciation, I have no new thoughts—a lack which no doubt distresses you—but still feel that it would be in keeping with Wang’s tactics if he were to submit a new draft soon. He likes to keep the initiative, both in the talks and publicly, and Peiping is probably fully aware, now that we have publicly confessed our deadlock, that both the initiative and the public advantage will now accrue to whichever side first makes a strong and apparently “reasonable” effort to break the deadlock.

As you know, our estimate here of Wang’s tactics is that he has been trying so determinedly to elicit our specific objections to his May 11 draft precisely in order that he may proceed to “meet” them in a new proposal.

A possibility that occurs to me is that Wang may seize upon the Department’s press release—faute de mieux—as providing the specific objections he has been seeking.

If I were Wang, I think I could work up a prepared statement for next meeting or the one after making the following points:

1. US statement charged PRC side had rejected own draft of December 1. This not so. PRC side still willing agree on that draft.

2. US can either accept December 1 draft as is, or it can insist on amendments. If it insists on amendments, they must not be one-sided. If US insists on ICSD, PRC will be entitled to insist on “mutual respect”. If US insists on Taiwan reference, FMC entitled insist on FMC, preferably with time limit agreeable both sides, if necessary without time limit.

3. How there can be any objection to words which PRC proposes to add is not understandable unless US is determined either to violate principle of “mutual respect” by freezing up status quo while postponing indefinitely the practical step of a FMC, which necessary to resolve Taiwan area dispute.

Of course, an alternative to Wang’s making this pitch in a meeting would be for Peiping to make them in a public statement, but for tactical reasons it would be more likely for them to be made in the meetings, before taking the position to the public.

This is, of course, entirely speculative, and we’ll see what actually happens.

I’m enclosing Wang’s latest list. Did not feel these lists now warrant telegraphic handling. If I’m wrong, please tell me.

Regards to all.

Sincerely,

David L Osborn

Enclosure

List Presented by Wang²

Geneva, June 8, 1956

Mr. [text not declassified]

Mr. [text not declassified] went to the United States in 1948 and studied medicine at the Pennsylvania University, Philadelphia. He was already on his way home in September 1951 but was intercepted at Hawaii by the U.S. Immigration Service and escorted back to the United States. He is still unable to return.

Mr. [text not declassified]

Mr. [text not declassified] went to the U.S. in 1949 and studied microbiology at the University of California. He had planned to return the next year but his successive applications for departure were turned down and is still unable to return.

Mr. [text not declassified]

Mr. [text not declassified] went to the U.S. in 1949 and studied civil engineering at the Purdue University, Indiana, where he received a master’s degree in 1950. In 1951 Mr. [text not declassified] entered the Columbia University in New York for post-graduate study. He is still being obstructed from having his departure for home.

Mr. [text not declassified] and wife Mrs. [text not declassified]

Mr. and Mrs. [text not declassified] went to the U.S. in 1946 and 1948 respectively. Mr. [text not declassified] was a post-graduate at the University of Chicago where he received a doctor’s degree in Physics in 1952 and is now engaged at an Observatory. Mrs. [text not declassified] also received a doctor’s degree in Mathematics at the University of Chicago. Their return is being obstructed by the U.S. Immigration Service and last year the U.S. Government even prevented Mr. [text not declassified] from attending a gathering of the International Astronomical Union in Ireland where he had been invited to present his thesis.

1. Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official–Informal. Osborn signed the original “Dave.”
2. No classification marking. The Chinese text of the list is also enclosed but not printed.