586. Letter 30 from Johnson to McConaughy1
I received your letter No. 39 when I returned yesterday evening and this morning the guidance for tomorrow’s meeting came in. I greatly appreciate the many thoughts incorporated into the guidance which are of great help to me in formulating my presentation which I will have to play entirely by ear tomorrow. I realized after I had sent my 1799 that I may well have erroneously given the impression that I did not intend to vigorously push our draft, as I had not made it clear the last paragraph referred only to a contingent position. Therefore, I think that the comments in paragraph 2 of your 1912 are very well taken and are actually entirely in accordance with my own intent.
Thanks very much for the Defense instructions to MAC on the missing servicemen. I was particularly happy to see that MAC would be asked to refer their proposed statement to Washington which will give you a chance to frame it in more effective terms and keep it consistent with what has been done here.
I can well see the difficulty we are in with regard to the COCOM and CHINCOM position, and entirely agree the Chinese Communists will probably realize the situation. I have not seen anything recently in the press on the progress of the Foreign Aid Bill and wonder what the outlook actually is.
With respect to Holdridge, in my letter No. 29 which you will now have received, I said that I had been able to work out an arrangement with Gowen for the loan of a reporting officer from the Consulate General and was therefore willing to release Holdridge. He is planning to leave here on Friday for Hong Kong. I put the necessity of having a second officer to keep the record in the essential category, and a knowledge [Facsimile Page 2] of Chinese on his part in the desirable category. The arrangement which I suggested with regard to Stanley not having worked out, I find it hard to justify keeping Holdridge sitting here from week to week with nothing really substantive to do between meetings and, therefore, acquiesced to his departure and the arrangement with the Consulate General. It is not the best arrangement from my standpoint, but I can get along. In this connection, it seems to me that the Department ought really to be doing something about training a Chinese interpreter. As you well know, just a [Typeset Page 935] knowledge of the language, no matter how good, is not enough. I do not know what we would do if Ekvall were not available, and looking to the future we certainly cannot depend on his always being available. In any event, it is anomalous for us as the Department of State to have to depend on Defense in this regard. Good as he is with the language, I know that Stanley felt he would not be up to doing the type of interpreting required in these meetings. However, I should think that he or someone with comparable facility in the language could with intensive training become qualified in this field. Of course, it is not too attractive a field for an FSO but it seems to me that it is a problem that the Department will have to resolve.
Incidentally, I noted in Prague just before I left that the Czech May Day slogans which have just come out, this year dropped any mention of support for Chinese Communist liberation of Formosa. I think that this would be particularly significant if the same pattern is followed elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc and suggest that it would be of interest to have DRF make a check into it.
We have received Part II of the White Paper on prisoners, giving a summary of the experiences of individual Americans. Although my comments were not asked for I cannot refrain from saying that it by no means seems to me to be up to the standard of the White Paper itself. To me at least, it simply does not make as effective and convincing a case as the facts justify. My own feeling is that this appendix will be most effective on supporting the White Paper if it sticks to a plain, cold recital of facts avoiding color words and simply letting the facts speak for themselves. I also feel that there is simply too much carelessly and poorly written English in it to be issued as a public document by the Department.
Just as a few examples of what I have in mind: the last paragraph on page 2 under Bersohn, the last sentence [Facsimile Page 3] beginning at the bottom of the page seems to me to be open to misinterpretation by non-Americans and simply not as effective as quoting some statement of Bersohn’s following his return. On page 7 under Buol, the statement is made that, “in August 1951 he was removed to a private home and placed in confinement alone with a Communist-provided companion”. In the first place, as a matter of English, if he had a companion he was not alone. However, the use of the word “companion” in the sentence without any explanation does not, it seems to me, make any point. It is only when one gets to the end of the section that it is stated that his “companion” was subjecting him to propaganda. On page 8 under Cline, the statement is made that “according to medical reports” he died from being denied needed medicine. The question immediately arises as to whose medical reports? If they are independent reports, we certainly should say so. On page 9 under Dillon, the statement is made “he kept [Typeset Page 936] the document until March 27, 1951 when he was searched . . .” and at the bottom of the section it states his expulsion from China began March 25, 1951. On page 12 under Ford, it seems to me that the logical place for the last sentence is up above following the detailing of his torture. On page 14 under Giffin, the first sentence is a masterpiece of confused writing. As a detail, it also seems to me that where American-sounding names of non-Americans are mentioned, their nationality should be specified. Otherwise, the question immediately arises as to why their accounts are not included in this compilation. On page 17 under Greene, the statement is made, not even in quotes, “his judge decided that since he was only a small cog in the American spy wheel . . .”. Standing the way it does this can certainly be easily distorted and twisted into an admission by us that he was a “cog in the American spy wheel”. On page 20 under Kanady, a sentence reads, “after four and a half years of imprisonment he was deported from China in a state of shocking physical and mental damage”. This is just poor writing. On page 39 under Rigney, it seems to me that a sentence such as “any visible manifestations of religious devotion were promptly suppressed by cellmates with whom he was undergoing ‘re-education’”, is entirely lacking in “punch”. I do not know what the actual facts were but a straightforward statement such as “when he kneeled to pray he was cuffed and spat on by his cellmates”, would be much more effective. It seems to me the next following sentence would be much clearer simply stated as “although his treatment subsequently improved, at the time of his release he still weighted only 100 pounds, compared with 180 pounds at the time he entered prison”. Also, it seems to me to be much more effective to relate the nine times he “confessed” directly to the account of the torture he underwent. For example, to say that “during one period of interrogation he was denied sleep for 11 successive days and nights” is not very effective stated in that way [Facsimile Page 4] and standing by itself. It would be much more effective to say that he was interrogated without any respite for 11 days and nights and that each time he collapsed from fatigue he was beaten into wakefulness until, utterly physically and mentally broken, he signed a “confession”. It also seems to me absurd to end the Rigney story with the statement that he became a “model worker in the production of match boxes”. The whole account, as many of the other accounts, shifts back and forth between chronological and subject approach in a very confusing manner. Certainly in reading it one is not left with any clear picture of exactly what happened and, as told, the story simply does not have the impact the facts justify. I feel that this is a common fault of most of the accounts.
I have viewed this from the standpoint of our foreign audiences in particular who are the ones that need convincing. I feel that for this purpose the stories can be told much more effectively than they have been. It seems to me that by far the most effective telling would be [Typeset Page 937] to have someone simply take the facts as they are known to us and set them down in chronological order in short, simple and factual sentences. I have gratuitiously given my opinion very bluntly and without any knowledge of whose feelings may be involved. However, I am sure that is what you would want and will treat whatever I have said accordingly. I urge that you have someone else sit down with the basic material to see whether something better cannot be produced.
I wonder whether consideration has also been given to the possible reactions of some of the individuals involved where their experiences have been obtained from private interviews and have not thus far been published. I raise the question with respect to the exact content of what is said with respect to them in this publication as well as with respect to giving any detailed account of their experiences. I assume this has been considered, and only mention it to make sure it is not overlooked, as the Communists would be able to make much of even a single adverse reaction which became public or a public denial of a fact by an individual concerned.
With kindest regards.
Sincerely yours,
American Ambassador
- Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. Printed from a copy that Johnson signed “Alex.”↩