579. Letter 29 from Johnson to McConaughy1
I returned to Geneva yesterday evening and appreciated receiving your Letters No. 37 and 38 as well as the guidance for tomorrow’s meeting. As far as the new draft is concerned I do not say that I was disappointed as it is largely what I expected and believe it is entirely [Typeset Page 920] defensible. I am just very doubtful that agreement can be reached thereon and made my comments in order that all possible points of view would receive consideration. I particularly appreciated your spelling out the rationalization for the draft and it is much help to me in formulating the arguments in its defense. While I entirely see the Department’s point of view with regard to the self-defense clause, I frankly continue to have some difficulty in convincing myself of its real importance as an issue. To whatever extent any Chinese Communist statement of renunciation of force in the Taiwan area or elsewhere has value, the question of our exercising the right of self-defense against them does not arise. If they violate the declaration and attack I do not see how even the most unfriendly critic could allege that the United States would still be bound by the declaration and forestalled from exercising its right of individual and collective self-defense. However, I agree that in the context of negotiations as they have developed it is difficult to drop the clause, and I felt that now that we were presenting a new draft it would be our only opportunity of doing so and the possibility should at least be considered. Of course the difficulties that we will face if and when agreement is reached on a renunciation declaration are such that there is much to be said for stretching things out along the present line as long as possible. I [Facsimile Page 2] think that the new draft has merit viewed in this light. Of course I do not exclude the possibility of the Chinese Communists realizing this and therefore looking for a way to shift their position and getting a declaration issued, substantially accepting our new draft. However, at the moment, this does not seem likely.
I have carefully studied the second paragraph of the Department’s 1892 with a view to determining whether there was any way at tomorrow’s meeting I could usefully further sound out the situation before deciding whether to present my draft. I have just not been able to think of any way this could be done except that I plan to try to get him to speak first, which I expect he will refuse, and I then plan to make an opening statement which will present the draft. I am entirely sure that he fully understood my hint at the last meeting with respect to the possibility of new draft, and if I am coy about bringing it forward it can only be counterproductive. The only thing I might do would be to restate his positions in a form designed to pave the way for the introduction of my draft and wait for his reaction. However, this has the danger of eliciting responses from him which would make it difficult then to introduce the draft. I have, therefore, decided that if he refuses to speak first (it is actually my turn to speak first tomorrow) I will try to avoid accepting any summary rejection on his part by not getting into too much detailed discussion and urging that he take it home and study it. Anyway, you will know how things have come out before you receive this letter, but I wanted you to know my present thinking.
[Typeset Page 921]I have interpreted your titling of the draft as “the second United States revision of Chinese Communists December 1 counterproposal” as a title that would be used if and when there were a public unilateral release by us of the text. In my opening statement I am therefore, although I find it somewhat awkward, laying the groundwork for that terminology. However, in the piece of paper that I am actually handing him I am sticking to the former form of simply showing the date of the draft and entitling it as previously, “Agreed Announcement of the Ambassadors of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China”, and as he has always laid considerable store upon such niceties, reversing the order of the names from that which appears in your 1892 so that my name appears first.
Thanks for the corrected information from Defense on the list of missing military personnel. It is certainly a complicated situation when one gets down to the details and you can be sure that I will be happy as long as they continue to handle it [Facsimile Page 3] at Panmunjom. We have located the “Prisoner Book” and I am sending it to you by air pouch. Sorry for the delay.
As far as the note from the Chinese Communists to the British on the NNSC is concerned, I have no special light to shed on it from this end. It appears to me to be largely an effort to enlist the interest of Sweden and Switzerland in reducing the NNSC as an additional factor in support of the long-standing Chinese Communist position on a Korean conference. A renewal of this at this time of course also fits in well with the whole Communist Bloc peace strategy, to the extent that they are pursuing that strategy probably inhibits them from taking military action against the offshores.
I am hoping that we will shortly get from INS some of the background data we have asked for on the names given me by Wang, as it will certainly help me in knowing how best to handle the matter better in the future here.
I am very pleased at Holdridge’s arrival. I have talked to Frank Gowen with regard to your thought of their loaning me a man one day a week to keep the record of the meetings in exchange for Osborn doing some work for the Consulate. With the GATT meeting here now winding up, Gowen says that he would be able to carry it out and is agreeable to such an arrangement. I am, therefore, suggesting that Holdridge stay through the meeting next week which will give him a good cross section of the situation here to carry back to Hong Kong with him, and the arrangement with the Consulate will then go into effect with the first meeting in May. I very much feel with such an arrangement some way should be found of sending Helenka back here and I hope that this can be done. This would enable Miss King to get away for her home leave and on her way to her next assignment where she is undoubtedly [Typeset Page 922] needed, while at the same time entirely filling my needs for a secretary at no more cost to the Department than any other arrangement.
Tell Walter to take good care of himself and that I will do my best to sit on the lid while he takes a rest. Regards to all.
Sincerely yours,
American Ambassador
April 19
P.S. Have just returned from meeting which went about as expected. Expect it may be a fairly rough session next time. If they want to keep things going they might present a new draft. Will appreciate all ideas anyone may have.
- Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. Johnson signed the original “Alex.”↩