Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

54. Memorandum of Conversation, Koo and Robertson¹

Washington, August 9, 1955

SUBJECT

• Negotiations with Chinese Communists

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Embassy
• Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary—FE
• Walter P. McConaughy, Director—CA

Ambassador Koo said he had noted the remarks of the Secretary in his press conference of August 2. The Chinese Government was uneasy over the apparent possibility of a high level meeting with the Chinese Communists. The Ambassador was instructed by his Government to state that it would look with strong disfavor on any meeting between the American Government and the Chinese Communists at the Foreign Minister level. He said he would be very gratified if he could be given a confirmation that no such meeting is in prospect.

Mr. Robertson said that there was no change whatever in the American position on this. The situation was the same as when the Secretary held his press conference. There was no likelihood of such a meeting then, and there was none now.

Ambassador Koo expressed his gratification at the receipt of this information. He said his Government was also gratified to have received through the American Embassy in Taipei, a summary of the Secretary’s instructions to Ambassador Johnson for the talks at Geneva. He said that his Government felt the instructions were not objectionable “as far as they go”.

Mr. Robertson said that Ambassador Johnson’s authorization went no further than the instructions summarized for the information of the Chinese Government. The limitations on the discussions were clearly set forth in the instructions, and there were no instructions beyond those which had been paraphrased in the Chinese Foreign Office.

Ambassador Koo said that his Government was interested in learning of the latest developments in the talks at Geneva.

Mr. Robertson said there had been no tangible progress so far on the question of the release of the American civilians. The main purpose of the talks was to get our people out. Wang Ping-nan was trying to make an issue of alleged interference with the travel to the mainland of Chinese students in this country. These allegations as to restrictions on Chinese in this country were balderdash. It was only propaganda, since the Chinese students actually are free to move about in this country and to leave the U.S. if they wish. We do not want any Communist sympathizers here as permanent residents. They are more than welcome to go to the mainland if they want to.

Ambassador Koo mentioned the Chinese Embassy statement of last week which pointed out that the great majority of Chinese students in this country have been assisted and protected by the Chinese Government and its Embassy and Consulates in this country and that the students are loyal to their Government and still look to if for representation of their interests. They give their allegiance to the Chinese Government and not to the Chinese Communists. It is presumptuous deception for the Chinese Communists to pretend that Chinese in this country should look to the Communist regime for protection and representation.

Mr. Robertson said we had noted the Chinese Embassy statement and had sent it to Ambassador Johnson. He considered it a very good statement. He remarked that we know that the Chinese in this country, with very few exceptions, maintain their fidelity to the Chinese Government. We are aware that the Chinese Government has helped many of them with scholarships, travel arrangements and so on, and that practically all of them came to this country on Chinese Nationalist passports. Mr. Robertson remarked that there is no such thing as an exit visa in this country and Wang Ping-nan’s allegations at Geneva that “exit visas” had been denied was nonsense.

Ambassador Koo said that he hoped the American Government would never admit even tacitly any degree of Communist jurisdiction over the general body of Chinese students and other nationals in this country.

Mr. Robertson said the Ambassador need have no fear on this score. The Communists would not be allowed to establish any contact except with those who of their own volition stated that they wanted to go back to the mainland.

Mr. Robertson mentioned that those few students who wanted to go back might have some difficulty in paying for their passage. The United States Government did not propose to pay their way back to Communist territory. However, we were not standing in the way. Anyone who wants to go to a Communist country can go—the sooner the better.

Ambassador Koo mentioned that Mr. Robertson had informed Minister Tan on July 29 that some third party such as India or Great Britain might be designated to assist the Chinese students who want to return to the mainland.

Mr. Robertson said some Embassy might conceivably be the medium for handling travel funds and making other arrangements for the return of those who expressed a wish to go back.

Ambassador Koo remarked that this arrangement would imply no official representation of Chinese Communist interests in this country, since the Embassy role would be that of a travel expediter.

Ambassador Koo reverted to the subject of a possible conference with Communist China at the Foreign Minister level. He said that his Government would appreciate a more definite statement or formal assurance that no such meeting was contemplated. The Secretary’s statement of last week was most welcome and President Eisenhower had said that he associated himself with the statement of the Secretary of State. But any doubt on this score would adversely affect the psychology of the problem on Taiwan.

Mr. Robertson said the President and the Secretary had stated most emphatically that this Government would not discuss, on any level, matters affecting the rights of the Government of the Republic of China. He felt there could be no objection to bilateral talks aimed at securing the freedom of our nationals who are held. If there should be any international conference on Far Eastern subjects where matters involving the rights of the GRC were to be discussed, “your Government would have to be there”, or give its concurrence. Nothing could be decided “without your presence or your concurrence”.

Ambassador Koo said his Government would appreciate a more formal assurance on the lack of any intention of Secretary Dulles to meet with Chou En-lai. He wondered if his Government could obtain a memorandum on the subject.

Mr. Robertson said he did not think there was any question of a memorandum. Both the President and the Secretary of State have stated their position to the American people and to the world. He felt this was as explicit and as binding as anyone could wish.

Ambassador Koo said it was true that very satisfactory statements had been made, but they were rather informal.

Mr. Robertson observed that they were categorical and were on the record. He did not see how they could have more force or more effect. He offered to send the Ambassador a copy of the press conference.

The Ambassador said he already had the record of the press conference. He needed something more formal.

Mr. Robertson said he felt that what had been said could not be more official. A public affirmation of our position before all the world was better than a classified communication. It put the whole world on notice what our position was.

Ambassador Koo said his Government did find much assurance in the statements of Mr. Robertson himself, the Secretary, the President and the American Charge in Taipei. They had all made it clear that there would be no talks involving the essential interests of the Chinese Government without its presence or concurrence.

Mr. Robertson said he could reaffirm that no matter would be taken up with the Chinese Communists which involved the rights of the Republic of China without the presence or concurrence of the GRC.

Ambassador Koo asked if that would still be the U.S. position if talks with the Peiping regime at the Foreign Minister level should ever be held.

Mr. Robertson said yes, that was correct, in the unlikely event that such talks should sometime be held. He remarked that discussions at that level were no closer now than they had been when the Secretary was asked about this subject at his press conference.

NOTE: Separate Memoranda of Conversation have been prepared on the following subjects which were discussed in the same conversation: Chinese Representation in the U.N. and Registration with the U.N. of Mutual Defense Treaty of December 2, 1954 and Exchange of Notes of December 10.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–955. Confidential. Drafted by McConaughy on August 12.