514. Letter 33 from McConaughy to Johnson1
I will be going to the airport shortly after noon today to see the Secretary and WSR off for Karachi. We did not anticipate any special administrative problem in handling the correspondence with you while they are away, although if a crisis should develop with time a crucial [Typeset Page 832] factor in connection with some important decision, obviously we will have something of an added problem.
We met with the Secretary yesterday afternoon. No particular decision was made except to hold firm on the position we have clearly staked out. We believe it is a good and eminently defensible position. If Wang should precipitate a break, we believe we can more than hold our own in a public exchange. The Secretary feels that we may be able to do something with the Chinese prisoners question which could be helpful to our cause, at least from a public information standpoint later on. We have already sent you a copy of the letter dated Feb. 28 to the Attorney General requesting a survey. We are not quite as inclined as you apparently are to discount entirely the possible utility of [Facsimile Page 2] seeking to arrange the voluntary deportation of some Chinese aliens in prison.
While it is probably an academic question, the Secretary did express the view that if Wang should request a recess of the talks during the next few weeks, we should raise no objection. It was the consensus that we should not propose any recess for the period of the Secretary’s absence from Washington. No new tack of any sort is planned for you to take during this period, but it was felt that it would be a mistake for us to propose a recess. We understand your distaste for having to repeat ad nauseam the same old things, but it seems necessary under the circumstances. While it is naturally repellent and frustrating, we doubt whether it is harmful from the tactical standpoint in the given situation.
Everyone agrees with your surmise that the Secretary may be presented with some sort of package proposal when he gets to Delhi. All the signs point this way. We anticipate that the Indians and the Chinese Communists may have sought to enlist at least the moral support of several of the SEATO powers for some sort of scheme which would involve the off-shore islands and a higher level meeting. The Secretary anticipates that the pressure on the off-shore islands question is going to be greatly stepped up in connection with the campaign for a higher level meeting. He expects to have a very full and frank review of this whole problem with the Generalissimo in Taipei on March 16. [Facsimile Page 3] The disposition here is to adhere to the position already stated on the higher level conference question. In this connection the letter which Senator George wrote to the Secretary last October was recalled yesterday. This is an important statement which is still believed to accurately represent the position of the majority of Congress in both parties. I don’t believe you were ever sent a copy of this letter. It is now enclosed. Moreover we are very mindful of our pledge to the GRC not to discuss matters involving its rights, claims or essential interests without its presence or concurrence. We find it difficult to visualize Chou En-lai sitting down at the same conference table with George Yeh and the Secretary. (You [Typeset Page 833] will be interested in the enclosed article by Chalmers Roberts which appeared in today’s Washington Post.)
Your good letters Nos. 22 and 23 of February 19 and 22 came together on February 27. They have been read with great interest by the usual inner circle. I am sorry that I was so guarded in my reference to the off-shore islands in my letter No. 30 of February 13, that you missed my meaning. Of course I had something more in mind than the obvious truism that the off-shore islands are in the Taiwan area and would be included in our renunciation of force draft. What I was trying to get over was an intimation that Public Law No. 4 would be more likely to come into the picture in the event of Communist action limited to the off-shores after a renunciation of force declaration.
[Facsimile Page 4]Enclosed is a copy of Ralph Clough’s conversation with Munsiff of the Indian Embassy on February 28. What Clough said is now somewhat outdated, since we have subsequently decided to send copies of the Agreed Announcement by registered mail, with return receipt requested, to each of the Chinese named by Wang at Geneva whom we can identify and locate. We will be prepared to exhibit to the Indians as appropriate and desirable the signature of the Chinese on the return receipt. But we will be careful not to let the Indians see the U.S. address of the individuals concerned. It will be a matter of principle with us to protect these Chinese from possible Communist pressure, by not divulging their whereabouts.
Also enclosed is a copy of a telegram from Mort Rosse, the American Asiatic Underwriters’ representative here, to their representative in Hong Kong regarding the Charles Miner case. It now looks as if Miner may be able to get out fairly soon after a payment of an additional $6,000 of extortion money. We anticipate that Treasury will probably license this added sum. We have informed the British Embassy and they will ask O’Neill to hold off on any additional representation in Miner’s behalf for the time being in view of the more favorable prospect.
It looks as if we may be heading for a turning point of some kind in the talks. Our intuition to this effect is confirmed by your 1574 of March 1, which unfortunately was not distributed in the Department until after we met with the Secretary yesterday afternoon. But it has been called to his attention since then.
[Facsimile Page 5]I hope the flying weather between Geneva and Prague is better than it has been. Good luck, and be assured that we are all with you.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. The enclosures are not printed.↩