47. Letter from McConaughy to Johnson1
I haven’t forgotten the understanding that I would drop you an Official Informal occasionally to give you some of the background and nuances here that would not be reflected in a cable. Bill Sebald returned [Typeset Page 52] to work this morning, so I should have more time to devote to your mission now.
There is a pronounced feeling of satisfaction here with the way you have handled the first week of the negotiations. The Secretary himself is following every development closely. He has drafted some of the telegrams to you himself and ordered last Tuesday that henceforth all messages to you which conveyed anything in the nature of instructions was to be personally approved by him. Mr. Robertson of course is following everything. There is a rule now that even the factual and background messages must be approved either by Mr. Robertson or by me. So we will have a look henceforth even at the DRF intelligence messages before they go out.
I am sure you will want to get the general feel of the reaction here to the tactics you are using regardless of whether it is laudatory or not. The only question at all which has arisen, and it is not a criticism, is as to why you withheld the four names (Mrs. Huizer, Mrs. Bradshaw and the Romanovs) from your first list. I have explained that these names had already been given to the Chinese Communists and that the Communists had denied as to three of them that any exit application had been filed and as to the fourth that she was an American citizen. However there was a feeling that it was a tactical mistake not to press these cases continuously by including them in every list. It has been remarked that we have nothing to lose by putting the names in and perhaps something to gain. This was the reason for the follow up instructions to you suggesting that you add the names by means of a supplementary list. The belief that perhaps harm was done was reinforced by the unfortunate Scripps-Howard article by Denny which stated that the names had been omitted because we knew our case was weak on these four.
[Facsimile Page 2]There has been something of a feeling that you might press harder the point that the great preponderance of the Chinese students in this country maintain their allegiance to the GRC and emphatically repudiate the Communist regime. It is recognized that Wang Ping-nan would be very allergic to this point but it is felt that you do not have to be estopped on that account. We wired you the full text of the Chinese Embassy’s statement which makes this point quite cogently. You may find a peg on which you can hang an additional remark along this line when the representation discussion waxes warm.
The only other even half way critical statement I have heard was relative to your decision not to hold a backgrounder for the American press as you were authorized to do last week. We are all profoundly aware of the difficult position you are in with the American press. We have had echos of your press relations problem back here and we have all been casting about for some means of taking the pressure off you. Part of the Secretary’s press conference of August 2 was an effort in that [Typeset Page 53] direction. Carl McCardle apparently feels that you should have gone ahead and held the backgrounder when you were authorized, especially since it was pretty clear that Wang was talking to the Communist correspondents. He believes that the attitude of American correspondents would have been improved and there would have been no net loss as to the privacy of the conversations, since so much was leaking any way. I believe he still thinks you should hold the backgrounder, as indicated in our follow-up telegram of August 6 which of course was largely a reflection of his view. If you feel you need a Departmental press officer to help you, in addition to Garnish, Carl is ready to give sympathetic consideration to the matter.
The question of leaks is indeed a trying and baffling one. We feel very badly about the New York Times Washington dateline article of August 4 which you rightly complained about in your 334 of August 6. We were particularly pained since we wanted your limited representation proposal to have maximum impact on Wang, which cannot be obtained when there is no element of surprise. McCardle and Suydam say the information did not come from the P area. I did not talk to the correspondents at all. Dana Schmidt was getting around the Department quite actively about that time and it may be conceivable that he may have picked something up although I have no idea how or from whom.
The Denny item which obviously was based in part at least on a leak also mystifies us. It seems that some of it, particularly the information about the number of repatriated Chinese students who received travel funds from the U.S. Government, might have been based [Facsimile Page 3] on U.S. official sources.
We have an additional information problem with the foreign Embassies here which are closest to us, namely the British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand, and to some extent the French. So far we have been telling them in confidence about what has already come out in the papers, but they are pressing for fuller and more timely information. This is something of a dilemma for us, . . . .
Let us know what you need which you are not getting, and any ways in which we can help you. The meetings of this week should be fairly decisive. If you think you will need Martin for a few days longer than planned, let us know. It would be unfortunate and difficult if he should have to miss a few days at the beginning of the War College, but I do not say it would be impossible to arrange, if his presence in Geneva is important to you. All the best to Ed, Ralph and Col. Ekvall. Our feeling toward you and your staff is a mixture of admiration and sympathy. Regards and good wishes.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal.↩