Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

449. Letter 29 from McConaughy to Johnson¹

Letter No. 29

Washington, January 16, 1956

Dear Alex:

We are trying to be more forehanded in getting out the guidance for your meetings. We are now having our preliminary session on Saturday preceding the Thursday meeting. This enables us to get out the first draft of the telegram by Monday morning. If all goes well we can get the Secretary’s approval on Monday and dispatch the telegram before the close of business on that day. I believe you will agree that the extra day’s margin is a good thing. We met with the Secretary last Monday, the 9th for about 45 minutes. He personally approved your instructions after making slight changes. I believe you will be interested in knowing that he continues to follow the talks closely notwithstanding the ever-mounting pressures on him. He gave no indication at the last meeting that he felt any change of tack on our part was needed. So there is no reason to expect any new departure in your guidance in the absence of agreement on the renunciation of force item and satisfactory implementation of the agreed announcement, or some other major move by the Chinese Communists.

I am enclosing a copy of the Shepley article on the Secretary from the January 16 issue of Life Magazine. In view of the flurry this article has caused here we are taking no chances of your not having it. It is possible that it will either be mentioned by Wang or will influence the Chinese Communist tactics in some way. In any event it would be well for you to know what it says. Judge Phleger remarked on Saturday undoubtedly the article would receive close study in Peiping. He felt that it would probably have an influence on Peiping moves although it could not be predicted what the influence would be. It might well have something of a restraining and sobering effect, although the possibility of a different reaction could not be ruled out.

Mr. Robertson, Judge Phleger, Bill Sebald and I all agree that we cannot agree to any deletion of the provision for individual and collective self defense from a renunciation of force declaration. Your instructions as now drafted reflect this position. It seems clear to us that Wang’s strategy is to tie our hands in the Taiwan area by getting us to renounce the right of self defense there. Then, by Chinese Communist reasoning, there would be no occasion for them to exercise any right of self defense in an “international” dispute and they could deal with the Chinese Nationalists as a domestic insurrectionary element the same as they would with an insurrection in Fukien Province.

My reaction to Wang’s request that the talks be opened up, is that it indicates something of a turning point. I take it as a major decision probably growing out of Wang’s reported consultation in Peiping. While it may have been something of a bluff, they had to be prepared for the possibility that we would call the bluff. It could mean that despite our not calling them they are prepared to make a unilateral move, although it may be significant that today, four days after Wang made the threat, there is still no public statement out of Peiping. At the least, Wang’s move would seem to indicate that the Chinese Communists no longer have any real hope of getting what they want out of these talks. They undoubtedly expect to get a relaxation of the trade controls but figure that it will fall in their laps without their having to negotiate for it at Geneva. I dislike our being put in a position of seeming to want secret negotiations and seeming to fear publicity as to what is going on in the talks. It is the supposed secrecy that has led to the misunderstanding of the talks which has hurt us, especially in the Far East. Our public position at a later stage could be harmed by an insistence now on preserving the private nature of the talks. However I concede that no further progress would be possible if we abandon the private nature of the talks. The opposing positions would be instantly frozen. However, it is a question whether any further progress will be made anyhow. The clincher argument for trying to continue the private character of the talks is that the chance of protracting the talks for a while longer is certainly better if neither side goes to the public.

I was sorry to be away on the day of your meeting. I was up at the Naval War College making a speech on “U.S. Security Arrangements in the Far East”.

I hope Wang will not bring up anything on alleged Chinese prisoners in American penitentiaries. We are continuing to make preliminary investigation against that contingency.

Regards to all four of you, commendations from all of us here, and continued good luck to you,

Sincerely,

Walter P. McConaughy

Enclosures:

1. Article from Life Magazine

2. Article from Baltimore Sun

1. Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal.