Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

406. Telegram 1272 from Geneva¹

Geneva, December 9, 1955, 5 p.m.

1272. From Johnson.

1. Particularly in light Wang’s clear acknowledgement at last meeting international character our dispute in Taiwan area I still believe that as political document Wang’s December 1 draft would have approximately same effect as any more closely drawn document in deterring CHICOM attack against Taiwan or offshore islands. However, believe I can and should thoroughly test Wang’s position during next few meetings by presentation and discussion draft contained Mytel 1271.

2. With respect Deptel 1353 as defensive reaction in compliance treaty with GRC mentioned second sentence para 1 would presumably follow initiation use force by CHICOMS against GRC, do not perceive how CHICOMS could use to justify such initiation use force. In short do not perceive how Wang’s draft in any way ties our hands defensively.

3. Seems to me important point is that so long as any declaration carries express or implied commitment seek peaceful settlement CHICOMS might claim US failure seek such settlement vitiated declaration and untied their hands. Wang’s statement at yesterday’s meeting carried this implication clearer than at any previous meeting. This is one reason I believe it desirable substitute “and” for “without” in second para draft as again suggested preceding tel.

4. Another important point is that so long as any declaration incorporates word “threat” CHICOMS are going attempt establish position that by renouncing “threat” we are obliged remove “threat” presence our forces on Taiwan. Of course they will also continue maintain similar position with respect “force”. That is, by stationing forces on Taiwan U.S. has used “force” against PRC territory. However, seems me this can be much more readily handled than point in para 3 above.

5. With respect first sentence para 4 Deptel 1353 I do not see that there is necessarily clear choice between declaration some kind and “continued participation in negotiations along present lines”. [garble—Granted] CHICOMS appear desire continue present negotiations for at least time being, do not see how we can assume they will indefinitely maintain this desire if they do not feel they are obtaining any substantial return. One practical difficulty is that present trend these talks is to reach point in near future at which there will be nothing left to negotiate about.

6. Of course similar question also arises as soon as any declaration might be issued as suggested in paras 4 and 5 Mytel 1241.

7. I thoroughly understand general principles set forth para 3 Deptel 1353 and will state as appropriate. However problem arises with respect practical application. If for example, does Department consider that any discussion presence our forces in Taiwan area is admissible within scope those general principles or that it would be useful subject? Of course I would not enter into any commitments discuss additional subjects without specific Department approval but background guidance in this general field would be very helpful.

8. With respect para 5 Deptel 1353 I question strength such public position particularly abroad and whether there would be general acceptance rationale especially next to last sentence.

Gowen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–955. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.