326. Letter 22 from McConaughy to Johnson1
Your letters 13 and 14 of October 19 and 21 arrived together on October 24. Your No. 14 successfully visualizes the issues as the Chinese Communists probably see them. Your analysis seems to us generally valid. It casts a rather novel and revealing light on various aspects of the renunciation of force question. We would depart from your analysis only in giving more weight to the attraction of the “renunciation of force” item to the PRC which stems from their capability to exploit it for their own purposes by espousing a perverted but rather plausible form of renunciation of force declaration. Admittedly [Typeset Page 450] we have the benefit of hindsight in making this observation. Mr. Robertson commented after reading the letter that your exposition of the probable Chinese Communist reasoning constituted the best possible reinforcement of the argument for pressing vigorously our demand for a bona fide renunciation of force declaration, with specific inclusion of the area of Taiwan.
Presumably Wang’s draft represents only an opening bargaining position, but I personally am skeptical as to how much “give” is built into the draft. I am inclined to think that the PRC would not accept any language clearly at variance with its position that Taiwan is a domestic issue. We find Wang’s draft to be solidly based on the constantly reiterated Chinese Communist position. On analysis it reflects no concession whatever, although it is so cleverly drafted as to give the impression to the superficial observer that it represents a reasonably complete renunciation of force. We fear it would commend itself to a lot of unthinking and partially informed people and therefore may spell trouble for us.
The instructions for the next meeting which we are drafting will point out, in very general terms, the respects in which paragraphs two through five are unacceptable to us. We haven’t yet made up our minds as to when a U.S. draft should be submitted. The thinking is that it should be very soon. Wang has in a sense already stolen the [Facsimile Page 2] ball from us and made a run with it, by getting in his draft ahead of ours. He has to some extent seized the initiative on our own item. We don’t have final agreement yet on the language of our draft, but we should have it soon. The willingness of Wang to debate the renunciation of force item provides a lot of grist for the mill, even though the grinding may be a trying process.
We have given the British Embassy here the text of Wang’s draft. We decided that it would be helpful to have O’Neill’s estimate of Chinese Communist tactics in the light of this document. His comments so far have impressed us as shrewd and perceptive. We have kept the British very fully informed on the discussions regarding the Agreed Announcement. This has tended to let them in on other aspects of the discussion to a somewhat greater extent than would normally be the case.
Enclosed is the full text of the telegram from O’Neill giving the PRC rules and regulations governing visits to the imprisoned Americans, together with O’Neill’s report of his conversation with Chang Han-fu on October 26, when the rules were handed to him. This is as promised in our 1031. In my conversations with Joy here I have encouraged the British to take a somewhat stronger line in opposition to any such rules and regulations as applied to the Americans covered by the Agreed Announcement. The British are somewhat inclined to regard these rules as representing a rather satisfactory advance in the situation. [Typeset Page 451] They tend to overlook or minimize the fact that O’Neill’s contact with the Americans should be governed by the provisions of the Agreed Announcement, not a penal or POW code. Hubert Graves remarked that the rules seemed to him to represent a considerable advance over the rules applied by the Japanese to enemy aliens during World War II. This is the sort of irrelevancy which we regret to hear from the British.
I am also enclosing a copy of O’Neill’s report on the announced release of Harriet Mills and Father Proulx. We are mystified by the delay in the arrival of these two Americans in Hong Kong. We still assume that they will come out shortly.
I discussed with Joy the embarrassment (your 987) that resulted from the failure to get word to you before your Oct. 27 meeting of O’Neill’s conversation with Chang Han-fu, when he received the rules and regulations regarding visits and the word of the impending release of Mills and Proulx. This interview took place on the evening of October 26 (about noon on Oct. 26, Geneva time). This was almost a full day before your meeting and with prompt service you would have had the word in time. O’Neill did get his message out Wednesday night. It was received by the British Foreign Office fairly promptly. It [Facsimile Page 3] reached the British Embassy here, marked Priority, on the evening of the 26th, Washington time. If Joy had been notified by the Embassy duty officer, he would have telephoned me and you would have had the information before your meeting. Unfortunately the duty officer did not see the urgency, and took it upon himself to disregard the priority marking. Joy did not see or hear of the message until the opening of business on Thursday, the 27th, which was too late to do us any good. It seems that the Chinese tried to time their release of this information so as to make it difficult for you to receive the news before the meeting. Their hopes were realized, through a failure in the British Embassy here. I have pointed out to Joy the awkward position in which you were placed as a result. I mentioned particularly the fact that it gave Wang a talking point in support of his contention that these implementation matters should not be discussed in Geneva. The British are taking special measures to insure that a similar slip will not happen again. A special alert will be in effect on Wednesdays, day and night.
Enclosed is what sketchy material we have been able to obtain from Defense on the cases of certain of the missing servicemen, as requested by you. The information we are able to get from Defense on this subject is still inadequate and the handling unsatisfactory. They tell us that they will have to go to central files in another city for some of the needed material and that this material will probably not add anything to what is already known. Monroe has been out of town for some days. He is due to return on the 31st and we may be able to get a little help from him then.
[Typeset Page 452]We have had a lot of difficulty in trying to resolve Ekvall’s status. The Department of the Army and Defense have wanted to use Ekvall’s case as a lever to obtain a permanent additional slot for an Assistant Army Attache in Berne. Any enlargement of the Service Attache staff is strongly opposed by Miss Willis and EUR. Defense feels that at the very least State would pay Ekvall’s per diem and there is some merit in this argument. However they have mentioned their belief that he should get $25.00 per day, which seems out of all proportion. And it would not solve his family problem. We have explored the possibility of assigning either Stanley or Al Harding from DRF to take Ekvall’s place about six weeks hence. This might be possible but we suspect you would prefer to retain Ekvall, with whom you are accustomed to working. It is embarrassing for us to have to depend on the Army for an interpreter in a diplomatic negotiation, especially when we are not able to let the Pentagon in on the direction of the negotiations, as they would like. As of now I am hopeful that we can solve the problem by getting Defense to assign Ekvall to an Army command in [Facsimile Page 4] Heidelberg, Bonn or Paris, with temporary duty in Geneva. This should be acceptable to Defense, but Army G–2 may object.
The courier service to Geneva is almost daily during the Foreign Ministers’ Conference so you will be hearing from us a bit more frequently. I hope you are having an opportunity for some talks with the Secretary and Herman Phleger.
Regards and good luck,
Enclosures:
1. Six communications from British Embassy, Washington, based on reports from British Charge, Peiping.
2. Letter from Lt. Col. Monroe, with attachments regarding certain unaccounted for military personnel.
- Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal.↩