Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

310. Telegram Tedul 8 to Paris¹

Washington, October 24, 1955, 7:24 p.m.

Tedul 8. From Robertson.

1. We have been considering in what way Johnson might bring about three week recess in talks to prevent Wang and Chinese Communists from exploiting increased status and prestige which would result from continuation Johnson-Wang conversations simultaneously with Foreign Ministers Conference.

2. If release of Americans were sole objective of talks, we would favor very forceful presentation our case at this point, including public statement, and insistence on three-week recess as method of exerting pressure on Communists and demonstrating we do not propose continue talking indefinitely with representative of government which failing to live up to its express commitments. However, this tactic would make it very difficult for us to resume talks if Communists failed to act within three-week period. To do so would be interpreted as weakness by Communists and would certainly be criticized in US. Alternative would be indefinite recess at least until such time as Communists decided release some Americans. Results this tactic probably would not be consonant with one of major objectives, namely, keeping talks going.

3. It would be possible, however, for Johnson to present recess proposal in manner giving least impression of pressure and with due regard for Chinese Communist considerations of face. He would point out to Wang that Wang himself had emphasized need for time to carry out judicial processes required in release of Americans and that we were therefore proposing three-weeks’ recess for this purpose. He would seek Wang’s concurrence in recess and would not insist if Wang objected. It is problematical whether Wang would agree and whether, if he did, any Americans would in consequence be released, but this tactic would avoid risks to major objective of talks which are inherent in that proposed in paragraph 2.

4. A third alternative would be to have Johnson make forceful statement expressing US dissatisfaction at Chinese Communist non-performance and informing Wang that if no action on Americans had taken place by following meeting we would be compelled to consider making public statement. This type of threat once used by Wang on us and implications would not be lost on him. It involves some risk, but has advantage of giving Chinese Communists chance to act before any public exchange of recriminations had occurred.

5. We have also considered whether time has not arrived to take harder line in our conversations with Wang even if this would cause a deterioration in tone of talks. Public and Congressional opinion hardening here in face continued inaction on release of Americans by Chinese Communists.

6. Would appreciate early reply so Johnson can be instructed prior to October 27 meeting.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–2455. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated Priority to Geneva for Johnson as telegram 981. Drafted by Clough; cleared in draft by Robertson and Sebald and in S/S.