Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

307. Letter 14 from Johnson to McConaughy¹

Letter No. 14

Geneva, October 21, 1955

Dear Walter:

I do not know when this letter will reach you but I hope that it may be of some value in contributing to your more long range thinking back there. It is very much in the nature of “thinking aloud” and represents distillation of many “bull sessions” we have had here on the subject.

We have now for several meetings discussed primarily renunciation of force. One of the things about which we have been puzzling is why Wang has been so willing to drop his subjects and at least talk around our subject. One theory, which I set forth in my telegram 924 of today, is that they are willing to see the talks kept going either more or less indefinitely or at least through the Foreign Ministers’ Conference and do not desire to take any steps that would tend to bring matters to a head.

Another theory we have been discussing since I sent my telegram is that they see in this subject possibility of pressing their undoubted desire for the withdrawal of our forces from the Taiwan area within such a framework, whereas they full well realize that its introduction as a subject by them would have been rejected by us as outside the scope of these talks.

This leads me to an attempt to analyze what their thinking may be with respect to our renunciation of force proposal. Despite its surface appearances, I believe the Chinese Communists may well view the proposal as very unequal from their standpoint. They may well feel that it would require them to make substantial political concessions while we are making virtually none.

It would not increase the assurances which they now have from us against military attack contained in our treaty with the GRC, our general obligations under the UN Charter and our public statements. At the same time we would continue to maintain in close proximity to them our present heavy preponderance of air and sea power.

Also, the Chinese Communists may estimate that such a declaration would carry with it for them the following other disadvantages:

a) It would carry with it a tacit acknowledgment of the existence of the GRC far more than any other act they have thus far taken. The PRC is in a much stronger international position than any of the rump Communist governments in other divided countries which for the most part have no status outside the Communist bloc. The tacit recognition that a no force declaration would give to the status quo, and the GRC as a government which claims sovereignty over all of China and is recognized by most free world countries, would greatly weaken the PRC claim as the only government of China and the government entitled to occupy China’s seat in the UN.

b) The renunciation of force declaration by the PRC would virtually eliminate the possibility of its obtaining even the offshore islands in the foreseeable future. PRC estimates that there is a good possibility it could attack those islands without too serious risk of U.S. intervention and without serious political loss. It also estimates that if the U.S. were to intervene to prevent capture of the offshore islands and any considerable hostilities should develop therefrom, the PRC would have considerable political support in Asia as well as elsewhere, while the U.S. would tend to become politically isolated on this issue.

c) The renunciation of force declaration would be interpreted in Taiwan and by the overseas Chinese as an acceptance of the status quo by the PRC and would, therefore, greatly increase the difficulties of PRC subversion of Taiwan and decrease PRC influence among overseas Chinese.

d) Such a bilateral declaration would not bind the GRC or bring about any cessation of GRC harassment of the mainland and shipping destined for the PRC.

The only factors that I perceive that might move them toward making such a declaration are the following:

a) It would contribute to their current diplomatic peace offensive.

b) It would increase pressure on U.S. to agree to a higher level meeting and, in turn, speed up relaxation of trade controls, membership in the UN, etc.

c) If they genuinely fear that the U.S. intends to put Chiang back on the mainland, they would enter into the declaration in the hope that it would tie our hands.

d) They could use such declaration to bring pressure on us to restrain GRC from its harassing tactics.

None of the foregoing points seems very persuasive to me from their standpoint, and I doubt if they outweigh what they consider to be the disadvantages. My estimate of the situation at present is that I see little or no possibility of their entering into such a declaration unless it were accompanied by the withdrawal of our forces from Taiwan or, much less likely, a firm commitment to a Foreign Ministers’ meeting. I would not even be sure that they would enter into it even if both things were done. I am also not sure where Quemoy and Matsu might fit in. I certainly thus far have not perceived any support for the oft repeated thesis that a ceasefire could be obtained in the Formosa Strait if Matsu and Quemoy were turned over to them. However, by stretching things a bit, one might be able to read into Wang’s remarks thus far that they would be willing to agree to renunciation of force declaration in exchange for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan. He has never defined or been specific about this. I am not sure whether he is talking just about the air unit which we have stationed there, which is, I understand, our only tactical unit on the island, or whether he is talking about the whole complex of the MAAG and the Seventh Fleet.

It might be, as indicated in my today’s telegram, that they are willing to keep these talks going indefinitely as an alternative to making decisions on these problems which are even more difficult for them than for us. However, it is too early to come to any firm conclusion on this.

I am not sure where all of this leads us but simply wanted fully to share with you some of our talk on the subject. If the opportunity arises, I hope to talk some of these things through with the Secretary while he is here, but before doing so would appreciate having FE reactions to some of these hypotheses.

Sincerely,

U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador

P.S. In case you haven’t seen it, I thought you would be amused at the enclosed FBIS. You should have somebody get out the original New York Times story to which it refers.

1. Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. Johnson signed the original “Alex.”