Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

289. Telegram 872 from Geneva¹

Geneva, October 14, 1955, 8 p.m.

872. From Johnson.

1. At 21st meeting, October 14, Wang Ping-nan opened with prepared comments on my statement on renunciation of force. He stated that to carry on useful and sensible discussion, civil conflicts within either China or the US must be distinguished from international disputes. Former are obviously not within competence of present talks. Issues between Chinese people and Chiang Kai-shek clique cannot be made subjects of these talks. It is inadmissible to introduce question of right of Chinese people to liberate own territory Taiwan in execution of sovereign rights.

2. He continued that in regard to international disputes, People’s Republic of China had from its inception always stood for peaceful settlement and had opposed infringements of territorial integrity by threat or use of force. China’s conduct in international relations had demonstrated that it was faithful to this stand. He drew attention to “universally recognized role” of China in Korean and Indochinese armistices and to “Five Principles,” on the basis of which he stated China had established relations of friendly cooperation with many countries. He stated that at Asian-African Conference China together with others adopted decisions affirming these principles.

3. In regard to Sino-US relations, Wang stated that Premier Chou had repeatedly declared that China did not want war with US and that China and US should sit down and enter into negotiations. This, he stated, was objective of introducing into present talks question of higher level Sino-US negotiations.

4. Wang quoted paragraph 4, article 2, of UN Charter. He referred also to my statement at last meeting that US as member of UN had agreed to refrain from threat or use of force. Wang stated that he welcomed my statement to this effect on behalf of my government, and that he very much desired that this principle should become guiding principle of US in Far East and rest of world. He stated that there was no dispute between China and US regarding the principles guiding United Nations. Question was how these principles could be concretely implemented. In this connection he cited Taiwan situation.

5. He stated that Taiwan was Chinese territory and that this was specifically provided in solemn international agreements in which US had participated. Wang quoted a statement of January 5, 1950 by President Truman to effect that US Government had always stood for good faith in international relations and specifically in Formosa (Taiwan) situation, that in Cairo Declaration of 1943 the US, UK, and China had announced objective of restoring to China territory stolen by Japan from China, such as Formosa, that US was a signatory to Potsdam Declaration which declared that the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out, that the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration were accepted by Japan at time of surrender, and that for four years the US and other powers had accepted the authority of Chinese authorities over Formosa. Wang stated that President Truman had added that US had no predatory designs on Formosa or other Chinese territory and that US desired to avoid courses of action leading to involvement in civil disputes in China.

6. However, Wang stated, the US now occupies Taiwan with its armed forces and has openly declared it would use force to encroach upon Chinese territorial integrity. He declared that this was origin of tension in Taiwan area and that China had never used or threatened force to encroach on territorial integrity of the US. China had repeatedly stated that China and US should respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and settle disputes between each other by negotiations.

7. He said that since I had stated at last meeting that US had agreed to refrain from threat or use of force, it followed that US should withdraw its armed forces from China’s Taiwan. Wang declared that he would like to know whether US was prepared to do so.

8. Wang stated that at last meeting I had failed to mention fact that US had used force against China’s Taiwan, had dodged the question of US withdrawal, and had unreasonably tried to introduce question of renunciation of force against China’s Taiwan. Chinese Government, circumstances permitting, would seek liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means. However, the question falls within framework of China’s sovereignty and internal affairs and cannot be made subject of present talks.

9. Wang closed his prepared comments with statement that question of America’s withdrawal from Taiwan area should be discussed and that he would like to hear my views on this question.

10. In reply I stated that before commenting on his statement I must first bring to his attention my government’s dissatisfaction with his government’s continued delay in implementing agreed announcement with respect to remaining 19 Americans in prison. I stated that so far as my government had been able to ascertain, no American in prison had even been permitted to communicate with or see UK Charge in Peking or any other British diplomatic or consular representative. I stated that there could be no doubt that these Americans desired to return.

11. I continued that futhermore almost five weeks had passed since announcement was issued and that I had hoped he would have some information for me today. However, thus far government has not taken appropriate measures mentioned in agreed announcement which would permit these 19 Americans to exercise expeditiously their right to return. This right was expressly set forth in the agreed announcement.

12. I said that in discussing this question at previous meetings, Wang had continued to mention his government’s request for a list of all Americans in US and had continued to mention supposed time it would take for the many Chinese in the US to return to his country. I said he had also referred to the 47 Americans in his country who had not applied for exit permits. In this connection, I pointed out that agreed scope of our discussions on this point and agreed announcement concerned only persons who desired to return.

13. I stated that I raised these points again in order to indicate to Wang reasons why my government feared his government was evading rather than implementing the provisions of the agreed announcement. I declared that it should be evident that my government was bound to take an increasingly serious view of his government’s failure to implement provisions of agreed announcement with respect to these 19 Americans if this failure should be further protracted.

14. I continued with what I described as my preliminary comments on Wang’s statement at opening of meeting, pointing out that I desired to study his statement carefully and reply in greater detail later.

15. I pointed out that, as I had emphasized at last meeting, my proposal was not couched in terms of charges against Wang’s government, but was made in a most earnest desire of contributing a suggestion constructive to course of talks. I said that Wang’s statement pointed up fact known to both of us that views of Wang’s government and mine differed widely on status of Taiwan and on my government’s relations to Taiwan. I said that there was no use in pretending that these differences did not exist or that they could be easily resolved. I said that my suggestion did not involve third parties or question of justice or injustice of conflicting claims in the area.

16. I stated that immediate and urgent problem we faced was not to reconcile conflicting views but to remove danger that a resort to force in the area might evoke international conflict. I stated that I believed Wang himself had previously recognized that this possibility existed. I said that these questions were grave and complicated and that negotiating their solution would take time and patience.

17. I pointed out that neither of us wanted to negotiate under threat of force and that there was hope of a constructive solution to the basic problems of the area only if threat of force were removed. I stated that the fact that our policies differed need not mean armed conflict. I stated that many countries were abnormally divided and that many governments faced situations which they considered abnormal intrusions into their territory. I pointed out that responsible governments nevertheless had renounced use of force in achievement of what they considered urgent and legitimate objectives of national policy. I stated that my suggestion did not call upon either his government or mine to renounce their objectives, but simply suggested we renounce use of force to implement our policies. I stated that this was to me an eminently reasonable, simple, and straightforward proposal which could provide the basis for constructive solutions to other problems.

18. I concluded by expressing hope that Wang’s government would again consider suggestion we had made and that such reconsideration might lead to progress in the talks.

19. Wang replied that he could not agree to what I had said concerning his government’s continued delay in implementing the agreed announcement. (Wang’s interpreter initially said “continued failure” but corrected this to “continued delay.” Ekvall states that “continued stalling” would have been more accurate English.)

20. Wang said that during discussion of first item of agenda before and after agreement was reached, his side had devoted great efforts to question of returning Americans from China. He said that this did not include only “ordinary” Americans but also Americans who had committed offenses. He stated that his side was still faithfully implementing the agreement on return of civilians. He said that there was therefore no reason to charge that his government had delayed in implementing agreed announcement and that he could not agree to this unjustified charge.

21. Wang continued with comments on my preliminary views on his opening statement. He said that it was wrong that there should be difference of view between China and US on status of Taiwan since status of Taiwan was very clear and precise. He said that Taiwan was indisputably an inalienable part of Chinese territory. He then expressed agreement with me that on this question disputes did exist between our two sides. He expressed agreement also that the Taiwan situation had “led to a grave and explosive situation” and that there was “danger of the situation being enlarged.” He said that this was why it was necessary to call Sino-US conference to discuss situation in Taiwan area.

22. He said that while he agreed discuss this problem, he could not but trace “root causes” leading to present grave situation. He stated that failure find these causes would be similar to patient in whom doctor fails find cause of illness. Wang cited Chinese proverb that doctor should make prescription according to illness of patient. He said that failure to find cause of illness makes cure impossible.

23. Wang stated that his government had always opposed resort to force and has stood for peaceful settlement of problems. He agreed with me that negotiations cannot be conducted under threat of force. He said that if we are to discuss threat of force, we have to ask who is threatening whom. Wang declared that he considered that American armed forces which occupy Taiwan are precisely threat in question.

24. Wang said that I had said that it is necessary to renounce use of force to prevent situation from leading to armed conflict. Wang declared that as he had stated this morning his side welcomed this point of view. However, a mere statement outlining principles does not solve problem. Wang stated that if US were to withdraw its armed forces from area, it would show that US is sincere in this regard. Wang stated that therefore he hoped after consideration of his proposal I would express my views on this point. He concluded by stating that such withdrawal would indicate that present talks can really solve questions and are not mere discussions. He said he hoped this was case.

25. I replied that questions Wang had raised are complicated and that I still did not see why he rejected my suggestion. I stated that I hoped I was right in interpreting Wang’s remarks as not a complete rejection of my proposal. I said that first and simple thing we can do is to say to each other that we would not resort to use of force except defensively. I stated that I agreed that this would not by itself solve basic problems in area, but that it would remove danger of conflict and establish atmosphere in which we can freely negotiate and in which there would be hope of finding solutions to basic problems.

26. Wang replied that we can certainly consider that a mere statement would not remove danger or resolve disputes between China and US in area. Only actual deeds by US will convince people that questions are being resolved. Wang cited example of return of Chinese in US. He said that if merely a statement had been made that they would be able to return without action, the Chinese would not have been able to return. Basic cause underlying failure of Chinese to return from US was existence of restricting order by US Government against them. Only after American Government rescinded restricting orders were basic difficulties involved in return resolved. Wang said that when the US rescinded these orders, his side expressed welcome to this action because those orders were unreasonable and because it was reasonable they should be rescinded.

27. Wang said that same is true in Taiwan area. Cause of tension in area is chiefly because US has used force in area. He stated that his side considered such action inconsistent with UN Charter and that if US would withdraw all its armed forces it would naturally change situation in area. Only by doing so would it convince people of practical significance of American proposal on renunciation of force.

28. I replied that I could not refrain from pointing out that we did not make agreed announcement until we were fully prepared implement it. I agreed to his thesis that mere statements do not solve problems. We did not make the statement that all Chinese were free to depart until they were in fact able to do so. This led me to my point in regard to remaining imprisoned Americans. I stated that only action by his government can permit them to leave. I had hoped and expected that they would be able to leave expeditiously. However, almost five weeks had passed since the announcement. I recalled that he had used many words in our discussion of time Americans would be able to leave, including “very quickly” and other such terms. I said “expeditiously” had finally been decided upon, and yet in five weeks not one of nineteen has been able to leave. I stated that I failed to see how this can be termed expeditiously.

29. Wang replied that he had nothing more to say.

30. I stated that I had a suggestion to make on timing of the talks. I pointed out that we have been meeting at irregular intervals and that both of us had other responsibilities as well. I stated that talks were entering phase of utmost gravity and importance and that I and my government wanted time carefully to consider course of talks here. In light of this, I suggested that we normally meet once a week. I said Friday or any other day would suit me but did not exclude occasional more frequent meetings if we considered desirable.

31. Wang immediately concurred in my suggestion, requesting that meetings take place on Thursdays for time being. We agreed to release customary statement to press.

32. Next meeting Thursday, October 20, 10 am.

Gowen

Note: FE Message Center notified 10/15/55 10:40 a.m. EMB (CWO)

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1455. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.