Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

270. Letter 11 from Johnson to McConaughy¹

Letter No. 11

Geneva, October 6, 1955

Dear Walter:

I have received both your letters No. 16 and No. 17 and found them very interesting and helpful. I know the time these take from your hectic day, but want you to know that from my standpoint it is well worth while.

I was sorry to miss writing you last week, but just could not make it and felt I had thoroughly covered the situation in my telegrams. At the last minute I decided to drive to Prague in the new Oldsmobile I had delivered to me here. Left at 5 a.m. and got to Prague at 9 p.m. clocking exactly 635 miles on the speedometer. I drove back on Monday the same way, but do not think I will repeat as it is pretty strenuous. However, I was very glad I went. Harold Vedeler has just arrived up there as Counselor and we had a good chance to talk things over. Also made a lot of calls including the Acting Foreign Minister, picked up much information, and made arrangements with the Czechs for Vedeler to start on the extensive economic negotiations which I had been hoping to carry out but which could not wait any longer. Also made arrangements for me to keep track of the negotiations here. There will come a time when I should probably go up there for about a week to help out. Found to my surprise the Czech press and radio are reporting my movements in considerable detail.

While I think of it, would you ask Newt to send to me here the FE and UN tear sheets from the Daily Summary that he has been sending to Prague. I will find them very useful here.

As I indicated in my telegram, I felt the renunciation of force statement to be a masterpiece and am anxious to use it. I was sorely tempted to do so at yesterday’s meeting but as I got along all right without it decided to hold off in pursuance of the objective of stringing things out.

As I have also indicated I am still far from happy with the missing military personnel statement although it is an enormous improvement over the first draft you sent me. I hope that I did not ruffle too many feelings in my comments on it, but I wanted to make it absolutely clear that I had no doubt it was just the wrong way to go about things. Frankly, I do not see why we have to let Defense have such a big voice in exactly how I handle the matter here. It does not seem to me that is their business. They should give us the problem and the information and then it should primarily be our decision on how it is handled. It seems to me that too much attention is being paid to the public aspects of my presentation. After all the meetings are closed, there should not be any occasion to make the details of what I say on the subject public, and when publicity is given to the matter it can be handled in way we and Defense desire. It still does not seem to me that a sterile rehash of the Panmunjom approach is the way to go about the matter in this forum. I was, therefore, seeking for some new approach in a maximum effort to achieve some results rather than approaching the matter from the standpoint of building up a public record that looks good on paper to the “give them hell” school of thought. I am sorry, but I wanted to get this off my chest, and having said it will go ahead and do what I am told. It probably does not make too much difference as we are not likely to get anything in any event. Perhaps it might have the good effect of goading them into raising the subject of the 21,000 and this could furnish material for much discussion.

Incidentally, I fully share your concern over the detailed material I have available to support my position on the 450 and hope I am never forced into details.

There is another subject I have never raised in my telegrams on which I would appreciate some word in a telegram if you do not agree with my understanding. It has not yet arisen in our meetings but may well do so. Even accepting our present position on a list of subjects for discussion under item two, I do not interpret this as precluding the raising of other subjects by either side during the course of the talks. We, of course, do not in any way commit ourselves in advance to discuss any subject, but it seems to me that either side can raise any subject it might desire. We might change our mind about old subjects, or something entirely new might come up which it would be desired I raise here. In any event it seems to me consistent with our position that we not close the door to the raising of new subjects.

I believe that the suggestion with regard to giving some restrained publicity to the possibility of travel to the PRC when detained Americans are out to be excellent. You will recall that in my dinner conversations with Wang he showed considerable interest in this and believe that it is a very definite bait for them. I would think it well that anything that is said not be in too black and white terms; i.e., not to say that never will any passport be issued until all Americans are out, but rather somewhat blandly to assume that implementation of the Agreed Announcement will shortly be completed and then passports could in appropriate cases be validated.

Incidentally, I thought the Secretary’s press conference statement on Tuesday was excellent and very helpful. Just as a small note I have got some ribbing from the correspondents here that after all my explanations of the difference between an “Agreed Announcement” and an “Agreement”, the Secretary uses “Agreement” in his statement although I feel his usage was entirely unexceptional.

I am also sorry about all the confusion with the CAS man and Colm. He was a very nice fellow and I hope that CAS does not feel I was ungracious, as it certainly was kind of them to offer to help. As I told you, he stoutly said CAS had no desire to keep him here to gather background although I made it entirely clear to him that he was entirely welcome to do so and I would give him full cooperation.

I do appreciate your successful efforts to get my instructions to me at least the day before the meeting although I know the problem this represents at times. For a time I was receiving them on the morning of the meeting and this makes things pretty tight for me. One of the difficulties with this is the danger that because of decoding difficulties I would miss something. One morning I had to go to a meeting with the knowledge that there was a NIACT for me which they had not yet been able to unscramble as it required servicing by the Department. Fortunately, it did not turn out to be anything of great importance for that particular meeting but it gave me a very uneasy feeling for the time being.

I am very glad that you have established direct contact with the UK Embassy in Washington so as to keep them fully informed on matters of direct concern to them. It seems to me very important that O’Neill and I know very promptly and fully what the other is doing. Give Hubert Graves my very best. It is a comfort to know that he is back.

I think I have rather fully covered the major questions in my telegrams and will not repeat them here. I hope shortly to receive the Department’s study on renunciation of force. The prepared statement gives me an excellent opening but am anxious to have the full background of our thinking.

If and when we ever get around to “embargo”, I wonder whether a simple explanation of the rationale behind our trade controls is going to be the best approach. It seems to me we have a choice between a presentation that assumes they are never in our minds going to qualify for any relaxation, or that there are certain standards which if they met we would consider relaxation. We have also got to be clear as to when we are talking about our total embargo, the CHINCOM level and the Soviet level.

As you know I never did feel that we were going to obtain any quick or mass release of the remaining Americans, and still feel it is going to be a long slow process. If there were no compulsion to keep the talks going, there would be many things we could do which might or might not be successful. However, I do not see how I can go much farther than I have and still keep them going. There is no doubt their asking price for the release of all of the remainder is something on the embargo, but most important of all the Foreign Ministers’ meeting. It is a dirty business on their part, but that is the way they are playing the game. How much less they would settle for remains to be seen. If we are going to keep the talks going, I do not see much choice but to keep postponing as long as possible any final conclusion on their part they are going to get nothing out of them. I think Americans will begin shortly to trickle out but doubt that we are going to get them all any time soon. Perhaps the Secretary can use Molotov during the Foreign Ministers’ Conference here quietly to bring some pressure on them. However, the difficulty is what we are able impliedly to promise or threaten. I do not see we have much ammunition in the way of threats, neither do I see we are able to say much in the way of implied promises. The only real weapon we have is using the pressure of foreign opinion on their performance under the Agreed Announcement and I think the time is approaching that we should do so. I do not think public opinion is too much of a factor. I think we might consider rather fully briefing our Ambassadors in such countries as India, Indonesia, Burma, Moscow, etc. so that they could at suitable opportunities point out to the government leaders there how the CHICOMS are failing to live up to their pledged word and this would filter back to Peiping.

I wonder how we will organize things when the Secretary is here for the Foreign Ministers’ Conference. It will be important that things not operate so as to tend to cut you and Walter out, and hope that you will discuss it with the Secretary before he leaves.

Your praise of my handling of things is most generous and heartening, but I hope you will be equally frank in passing on any criticisms that you feel should be considered. I know that there are many opinions on how to handle something like this and it is only by my sifting out as many of them as possible that I can reach what I hope are sound conclusions.

All the best.

Sincerely,

U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador

P.S. I would appreciate your continuing to pass on anything you pick up on what is happening with respect to the Indian arrangement. I suppose they will get a certain number of approaches from persons hoping to get a free ride home.

1. Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. Johnson signed the original “Alex.”