262. Despatch 7 from Geneva1
SUBJECT
- Dispute over Interpretation of Word “Invite” in Paragraph (2) of “Agreed Announcement”
In view of the fact that the Chinese Communists chose to make an issue, both in the meetings in Geneva and in their propaganda, of the interpretation of Paragraph (2) of the Agreed Announcement of September 10, 1955, and the possibility that the point may have some importance in the future, I have thought it advisable to review the negotiations and subsequent developments related to the wording of that paragraph.
The point in question was the interpretation of the first sentence in Paragraph 2 of the Agreed Announcement, which reads as follows:
(U.S. Section)
“2. The Government of the Republic of India will be invited to assist in the return to the People’s Republic of China of those Chinese who desire to do so as follows:”
[Typeset Page 348](PRC Section)
“2. The Government of the United Kingdom will be invited to assist in the return to the United States of those Americans who desire to do so as follows:”
Enclosure No. 1 shows the wording of this sentence proposed by each side during the course of the negotiations.
It is readily apparent from a perusal of these successive proposals that each side clung consistently to its point of view throughout the negotiations, at least up to the time that the final wording was agreed upon. The Chinese side sought a wording which either stated or implied that the PRC would entrust India with the function of assisting the return of Chinese from the United States, to which the United States would agree. In like manner, the United States would entrust to the U.K. the function of assisting the return of Americans from China, to which the PRC would agree. We consistently opposed this wording, proposing instead a statement to the effect that [Facsimile Page 2] the United States would authorize India to act in the United States, while the PRC would authorize the U.K. to act there. Nothing was said in the United States texts or in my statements to Wang concerning the action to be taken by the PRC with respect to India or the U.S. with respect to the U.K.
These apparently irreconcilable positions were held to tenaciously by both sides until the crucial 12th meeting of August 31. It was at this meeting that the compromise wording was agreed on, whereby we agreed to drop the word authorize as well as the specific mention that the action would be taken by the U.S. and the PRC and Wang agreed to drop the words entrusted and agrees. The compromise word agreed on was invited—“India (or the U.K.) will be invited . . .”, without specifying except by implication who was to do the inviting. Wang retained in his Chinese text the word wei t’o, which he had formerly translated entrust, but which, he explained, also meant to invite.
It seemed to me and to my advisers at the time that this was an agreement on wording rather than a full meeting of minds on substance. Each side could interpret the new, somewhat ambiguous wording in its own way and neither was compelled to retreat from its basic position. Each side was left free to approach both the U.K. and India and describe these actions in terms appropriate to its own interpretation of Paragraph 2.
I feel sure that in accepting the compromise wording, Wang was not under any illusion that we had abandoned our position. The fact that he chose to retain a Chinese word in his text which means entrust and only very imperfectly translates the English word invite clearly suggests that he had accepted the idea that each side would interpret Paragraph 2 in its own way.
Thus, it appeared, following the August 31 meeting, that once the Agreed Announcement was issued each party would take the action [Typeset Page 349] it considered necessary to enable the third countries to assume their functions. It would not be necessary to debate, either in the meetings or publicly, who was inviting whom.
The first indication that Wang was going to make an issue of the interpretation of Paragraph 2 came in the 15th meeting on September 14, the first one following the issuance of the Agreed Announcement. At that meeting I informed Wang that the United States had invited the Government of India to undertake the functions set forth in the Agreed Announcement and asked him what action his government had taken with respect to the United Kingdom. He was apparently caught unprepared by our prompt action with respect to India, as he did not say that the PRC had extended an invitation to India. The best he could do was to propose that the U.S. and the PRC deliver to the U.K. and the GOI, respectively, official texts of the Agreed Announcement, which would “complete the official [Facsimile Page 3] procedures regarding invitation of third powers”. He also complained that some press accounts were distorting the meaning of the Announcement by alleging that the U.S. was to invite the GOI and the PRC the U.K.
Before the next meeting (the 16th on September 20) it became obvious that the PRC was prepared to argue vigorously for its interpretation of Paragraph 2. A commentary, entitled “Forbid the Misinterpretation of an Agreement” appeared in the Jen Min Jih Pao on September 16, which alleged that the USIS was distorting the Agreed Announcement by stating that it was the U.S. which should invite India and the PRC which should invite the U.K. The commentary rejected this interpretation, declaring that the “attempt” by the USIS to “juggle the facts to hoodwink world opinion” was “not a very smart trick”.
On the same day, September 16, Wang, acting under instructions from his government, sent me a letter (my despatch No. 5, September 21, 1955) in which he referred to my statement on September 14 that the U.S. had formally invited India and declared that this statement would be interpreted and understood by the PRC as meaning that the U.S. agreed to India’s assuming the functions entrusted to it by the PRC. At the same time he asked me to inform him whether the U.S. had formally “entrusted the United Kingdom”, adding that when this had been done, the PRC would notify the U.K. of its agreement.
At the 16th meeting, on September 20, Wang sought persistently, but unsuccessfully, to get me to agree to his interpretation. Finally, he accepted my statement that the U.S. had requested the U.K. to assume the functions set forth in the Agreed Announcement choosing to interpret it as a formal invitation and said that the PRC would notify the U.K. of its agreement. He also stated at this meeting, for the first time, that the PRC had formally invited the GOI. Although it must have been clear to Wang after this meeting that the difference of interpretation of Paragraph 2 [Typeset Page 350] remained as sharp as ever, he and his government apparently decided to make the best of it, for the issue has not been raised again.
A possible explanation of the PRC’s decision to make an issue of the interpretation of Paragraph 2 is that both Wang and his government thought the U.S. was interested only in getting a satisfactory wording in the published Announcement and would tacitly accede in the execution of the Announcement to the position maintained by the PRC. Some support is lent this hypothesis by the following statement in Wang’s letter:
“It must be pointed out that our side has taken into account the difficult position in diplomatic relations in which the U.S. Government finds [itself,] and has acceded to your proposed text on the entrusting of third powers in its present form in the Agreed Announcement. However, on the concrete [Facsimile Page 4] content with regard to the Chinese Government’s entrusting the Indian Government and the U.S. Government entrusting the U.K. Government, both sides cannot have any other interpretation.”
If Wang and his government did actually believe that the U.S. was interested primarily in words rather than substance, it would have been natural for the PRC to react with surprise and indignation when it discovered its belief ill-founded.
It is hard to believe that Wang himself, at least, held any such opinion. He had listened at length to our reasons for insisting that the U.S. Government authorize the GOI to act in the U.S. In agreeing on the somewhat ambiguous wording of Paragraph 2 using the word invited we were careful to give Wang no cause to infer that we had yielded to his view of what actually should be done with respect to the third countries.
The most likely explanation of what happened, in my opinion, is that Wang, possibly not appreciating the clear implication of the English text, failed to inform his government accurately of the situation. The fact that he had retained in the Chinese text the word wei t’o (to entrust) as a translation of the verb to invite may have misled Peiping into believing that we had, in substance, accepted their position. Wang may have failed to take sufficiently into account the fact that the Chinese text would be read only in China, while the rest of the world would interpret the Agreed Announcement according to the English text. In the meeting on September 20 Wang certainly gave every appearance of a man who had been caught off base and was trying desperately to retrieve his error.
Possibly the key to the incident lies in the timing of the actions taken by the two sides. It happened that I was able to inform Wang on September 14 that we had invited the GOI to assume its functions in the U.S., but was unable to tell him at that time what we had done with respect to the U.K. The PRC Government may have assumed that we were attempting to force it to invite the U.K. for the purpose either of [Typeset Page 351] compelling it to accept our interpretation of Paragraph 2 or as a pretext to delay going on to Item 2 of the Agenda.
The Jen Min Jih Pao commentary suggests that something of this sort was in the minds of responsible persons in Peiping, for it alleges that the USIS interpretation “gives the impression that the U.S. Government is unwilling to act according to the agreement by commissioning a third country [i.e., the U.K.] to assist, but would like to make China responsible for this matter”. The same commentary goes on to warn that “should the U.S. fail to commission the Government of the U.K., the execution of the agreement would be hampered”.
[Facsimile Page 5]It may be that had I been able on September 14 to inform Wang of our action regarding the U.K., the issue would never have attained the proportions that it did, for that would have removed from their minds the unfounded suspicion that we did not propose to act at all with respect to the U.K.
Whatever may be the true reason for the Chinese acting the way they did, one thing is certain—in accepting our compromise wording for Paragraph 2 of the Agreed Announcement Wang burned his fingers, and he will be much more cautious in the future.
American Ambassador