Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, China

249. Telegram 795 from Geneva¹

Geneva, September 28, 1955, 9 p.m.

795. From Johnson.

1. At 18th meeting lasting one hour 20 minutes today Wang opened with long, prepared statement. He said that after reaching agreement on first item of agenda more than half month had passed. In accordance with suggestion our side he had tabled two subjects for discussion under agenda item two: 1) question of embargo, 2) preparations for Sino-American negotiations at a higher level. However, our side was still “entangling” talks on agenda item one. We had failed present our position on his points and also failed present our concrete views on subjects to be discussed under “practical matters.” This position of ours he considered entirely unsatisfactory.

2. He said I had mentioned at last meeting provision in agreed announcement that our governments would “adopt appropriate measures” to enable persons return their countries. I had also raised question those Americans who had violated laws in China. I had expressed hope his government would act promptly to implement this provision so that we could in our talks enter promptly upon discussion agenda item two. Had I meant to imply by these statements that only when all Americans had been released would we discuss and settle the questions under item two? If this were so, his side could not agree to it. In discussion on return of civilians he had repeatedly stated that cases Americans must be dealt with individually and in accordance with Chinese juridical processes taking into account the seriousness of the individual offenses. Only in a state of improved relations between our two countries could his government make its lenient policy toward the law-breaking Americans more lenient. He had made these statements formally and they were in the record of meeting and only after they had been made was agreement reached on agenda item one. Furthermore, during the discussion I had “demanded” release of all Americans in China within specified time. He had categorically rejected this demand as infringement on China’s sovereignty, this had been formally entered in record of meeting, and only after that had agreement been reached.

3. He said now agreement had been reached and no use to go back over that discussion. His side would faithfully implement agreement. But to use implementation of agreed announcement as excuse to obstruct discussion and settlement of practical matters under agenda item two would not result in any good, but rather do harm. Peoples Republic of China was not going to be brought into submission by whatever threat we might make.

4. Agreement on item one had been reached and at that time he had provided specific information on Americans who would be permitted to leave and on law violators whose cases had been reviewed. Those Americans permitted to depart had personal affairs to attend to and they could leave at their discretion, as some had already left. All 10 who had violated laws and were to have been sent out of the country had left. Since beginning of talks 33 Americans had returned or were going to return as result action his side. Remaining handful Americans who had violated laws would have their cases reviewed in light of agreement and within framework of Chinese juridical procedure. Results of review their cases would be given UK.

5. He continued that there was no justification for entangling talks over question Chinese implementation of agreement. On contrary our side should make active efforts implement agreement. During talks I had given him names 76 Chinese who had applied depart US but not permitted do so. 42 of these had not yet returned. Although our side had said all restrictions removed, nevertheless he knew of no one else who had left US to return to China except Tsien. I had said between July 11 and September 21, 380 Chinese left US, but I had failed submit list of names so PRC had no means making check. I had admitted Chinese students afraid apply INS for permission leave US because feared being rejected. Evidently many Chinese still do not have courage apply to depart because of long period threats and intimidation. PRC had great number of nationals in US and whether they could exercise right to return would be test whether US faithfully implementing agreement. Up to now PRC had not seen any actual outcome from all my statements.

6. He said I was still trying entangle talks on first item and hamper discussion of second item. Frankly, such an approach impaired improvement of Sino-American relations and was bound to have bad effect on lenient way PRC solving problem remaining Americans.

7. He said I had raised detailed questions last meeting on functions of third powers under agreement. These functions were clearly set forth in agreed announcement, but if I wished put forward specific opinions on details of functions, and if opinions reasonable, he would consider them. He suggested that such specific opinions on implementation agreed announcement be reserved for meeting of assistants so as not to interfere with discussion second item in these talks. People in all countries in world unanimously called for discussion second item agenda immediately following agreement on first thereby contributing to easing tensions and improving relations between two countries. He had put forward two subjects for discussion: lifting of embargo was demand voiced by many countries, and preparation for Sino-American negotiations at higher level was desired by people many countries as well as by high officials of US. He hoped we could enter upon discussion these problems without delay and he would be glad to hear any positive views I might put forward on agenda item two.

8. I replied I pleased note his statement he would consider any specific opinion we wished put forward regarding implementation announcement. In previous meetings I had put forward a few simple questions on implementation which carried with them clear implication of suggestions. I did not want any more than he did to spend our time on these subjects and I did not think we need do so. Questions I had previously asked were simple and straightforward and they required only simple and straightforward answers. Unless we were willing to keep each other fully and frankly informed on steps our governments had taken it was going to be very difficult to discuss successfully other matters. I thought these matters too important to be referred to our assistants, but hoped we could quickly complete their discussion between the two of us.

9. I said he had mentioned certain matters regarding our implementation of agreed announcement upon which I wished to comment briefly. He said I had admitted students in US afraid make application to depart. I could not imagine what statement I had made which could be so interpreted and I rejected that implication from any statements I may have made. He stated some students did not have courage now apply depart but I could not see what he referred to, because it was not necessary for them to make application to any government agency to depart. In addition, arrangement with Indian Government in full effect and any student had full right communicate with Embassy GOI if he thought his right depart being interfered with. He had spoken of list I gave him of 76 Chinese against whom restraining orders had been lifted and said 42 of 76 not yet returned. I did not know of any Chinese in US who desired to return who was now prevented from doing so. I had no information whether any of 42 had postponed their departure or had changed their minds. Maybe, as had been said in NCNA broadcast September 20, some these Chinese wanted postpone departure in order complete work or studies in US. Whatever reason, basic fact was Chinese in US free to do what they wished. If there were other aspects our implementation of announcement he wished discuss I would certainly be glad discuss with him.

10. I said one question I had raised previous meeting concerned ability Americans imprisoned to learn of terms agreed announcement. I had understood from him there were arrangements for reading and translating newspapers to persons in prison and that they would thus learn of terms of agreed announcement. I asked simply for confirmation that this had been done. My concern this regard had increased because learned most Americans recently released either did not hear about or received only fragmentary account of terms agreed announcement. One American recently released who had heard of agreed announcement was refused his request see full text. Therefore, framing matter in terms he had suggested this morning, I wished suggest his government confirm to me whether or not in fact each individual American in prison had been fully and specifically informed of terms agreed announcement.

11. I said another question I had raised was simply whether Americans would be permitted to communicate with or otherwise have access to UK Charge, and particularly if he would be able interview them in accordance with terms agreed announcement if my government wanted facts in case investigated. Again framing this question as specific suggestion in accordance his proposal, I wanted specifically ask that this be done. I had hoped at this meeting he would give me specific answers to these two questions which were perfectly simple and straightforward.

12. I said most important of all I wished ask again what steps his government taken to enable remaining 19 imprisoned Americans expeditiously exercise their right return. He had said his government would not be forced into taking action by means of threats. I did not understand why he interpreted my statement on this matter as threat. I had not during these talks ever made any threat and I did not intend to do so. Certain statements had been made in agreed announcement and I was merely asking for information on how they were being implemented. Equally, he could be certain that I would not respond to threats. I had made clear and wanted to repeat, I was not willing trade fate these persons in prison for political concessions on our part. I wanted make entirely clear that any thought on part his government of delaying release these prisoners in order obtain political concessions was doomed to failure.

13. I added that I had never said that only when all Americans were released would I enter into discussion agenda item two; I merely asked how agreed announcement was being implemented. It seemed to me that delay by his government in implementing agreed announcement with respect release these Americans was inevitably entangling these two subjects. There certainly was no intent or desire on my part to entangle them. Nearly three weeks had passed since announcement issued and not one of remaining 19 persons had been released. It was perfectly natural my government’s concern increased with passage of time and no information on this vital point.

14. I said only prompt, full and faithful implementation agreed announcement could dispose of agenda item one. Self evident that words of announcement in themselves dispose of nothing. Only implementation of words in announcement could dispose of problem return of Americans. Until this accomplished I had to continue consider that first item agenda remained our first order of business. I had returned to it and would continue return to it as long as there remained question with respect implementation agreed announcement.

15. I said I had, however, taken note of fact that 10 Americans whose release he informed me of September 10 had arrived Hong Kong and that some of 12 Americans whose exit permits he had promised had also departed. Therefore, in expectation his government would act expeditiously on remaining 19 Americans and thus dispose of agenda item one, and in further effort demonstrate my government’s earnest desire these talks should progress I desired today to discuss with him topics we should discuss under agenda item two.

16. I said he had proposed two subjects one of which my government considered procedural matter which could not be considered practical matter at issue between our two countries. My government desired put forward two subjects: one was “renunciation of use of force for achievement of national objectives” and other was “accounting for US personnel.”

17. Wang asked for repetition subject headings and then asked what we had in mind under second heading.

18. I replied we would get to that when we discussed the topic. I then continued by saying my government considered subject of renunciation force of fundamental importance to our discussions under agenda item two and that this subject should therefore be discussed before subject he termed economic embargo. I suggested we agree to discuss subjects each had raised in following order: (a) accounting for US personnel, (b) renunciation use of force for achievement national objectives, and (c) economic embargo.

19. Wang replied he had made it clear many times his side willing implement faithfully agreement under agenda item one and his side certainly would do things according to agreement. It provided that agreed announcement should be given wide publicity, object of which was to inform everyone about it, and PRC was giving wide publicity in this manner. If I had concrete opinions on agreed announcement, provided they were reasonable, he suggested assistants both sides hold meeting to discuss them. In past US had taken steps detain and obstruct departure Chinese students and these measures had left deep impression on minds of students. Therefore, in future necessary US in fact faithfully implement provisions agreed announcement so that these persons could in fact freely return to homeland.

20. Wang said he had clearly stated many times principles governing handling by his government of cases 19 Americans who had committed crimes. If US Government refused respect Chinese law and insisted on unconditional return these persons this idea doomed failure and would never succeed.

21. Then referring frequently to prepared statement Wang said topic he suggested on preparations for higher level meeting was not procedural matter but most important matter of substance in relations of two countries. He could not agree to removal of subject from agenda. Regarding our proposal on so-called renunciation of force he said his government fully endorsed principle no recourse to force or threat of force in international relations. China did not intend to resort to force against US or any other state. State of tension in Taiwan area was not at all caused by Chinese threat use force against US. Tension on contrary was caused by US use force against Chinese territory of Taiwan. Therefore, in line with the principle of non-recourse to force the point in question was not one to be solved by declaration by Chinese not to use force against its own territory, but rather by removal of US forces from Chinese territory, China had not made withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan a prerequisite for Sino-American conversations on easing tensions in Taiwan area as that would have blocked efforts to have negotiations.

22. He said he did not deny that tense situation in Taiwan area might lead to extremely grave danger of conflict between China and US. It was precisely for this reason he had proposed that our talks should make preparations for convening conference at higher level. Major problem of easing and limiting tension between China and the US should be discussed at higher level. In this conference at higher level both sides should raise questions which could be discussed to ease tensions in Taiwan area.

23. Wang said my second subject of “accounting for US personnel” had been dealt with under agenda item one and, therfore, there was no point in raising again so-called accounting for Americans. Moreover, they had at very beginning of talks given full list of all Americans in China so there was no point at all in having a continuous accounting on Americans in China.

24. I said that I had put forward what he had termed concrete opinions regarding the implementation of the announcement. First suggestion I made was that he should confirm that 19 remaining Americans be given full text agreed announcement in language they understood. Second suggestion was that we be assured arrangements established so 19 could communicate or otherwise have access to UK Charge. Third suggestion was that, if in accordance terms agreed announcement US wanted facts investigated, UK Charge would be permitted interview these Americans who desired return. I hoped at next meeting he could give me definite answers on these suggestions. I believed it could be done quickly and need not involve our assistants. I added if he had any specific questions or suggestions regarding US implementation agreed announcement I certainly would be glad consider them. I hoped his suggestions would be concrete and specific, as mine had been.

25. I said I found it difficult understand his position regarding discussion of higher level meeting. I could not see how higher level meeting in itself was practical matter between our governments. Both our governments had agreed to have the two of us meet here as representatives of our respective governments to discuss “practical matters” as second part our talks. It seemed to me his suggestion meant that we had decided, even before we had discussed these questions, that it was not possible for us to make progress and therefore higher level meeting must be called. I did not see why we needed to be so pessimistic. I had faith and hope when I came, and I hoped he had same, that two of us as Ambassadors representing our governments would be able to make progress these two questions. I still had such hope and would earnestly strive best my ability realize that hope. Question higher level meeting could arise only after our talks here had been concluded. My government not prepared now to discuss or agree to what would happen after our meetings here had been completed. Therefore we did not agree higher level meeting was suitable subject discussion item two.

26. I said I frankly puzzled by his statement on my suggestion we should include renunciation of force as a subject for discussion. I had not made demands on his government and I had framed subject for discussion in just as neutral terms as I could. I simply wanted call attention fact subject framed in somewhat different manner than he implied in his statement. I said I expected have more to say this subject at next meeting. Similarly, I had tried to frame subject of accounting for US personnel in as neutral a manner as I could. What I had in mind was entirely separate from what we had discussed under agenda item one. I would be prepared at our next meeting to discuss it with him in detail.

27. Wang said he agreed to continue discussion these subjects at next meeting. He said this did not mean he agreed to inclusion these two subjects under agenda item two and he thought order for discussion of subjects still open and no definite arrangement made.

28. I agreed and suggested meeting Wednesday, October 5.

29. In discussion over press release Wang suggested statement eliminating all mention implementation agreed announcement and saying simply we discussed agenda item two. When I said it would be more appropriate use same announcement used last time, he countered with suggestion we omit all reference to subjects discussed and simply state that we met and give date next meeting.

30. I stated if we said anything different at all it would arouse a great deal of press speculation which we both wanted to reduce. If we used previous statement, newspapers would not speculate, and it was also a factual statement.

31. Wang objected that if we went on making same statement public would think we were making no progress.

32. I said we had made identical statement after each meeting for 40 days and public saw eventually we had made progress.

33. Wang agreed to use same statement but on condition it would not be precedent for using it again after next meeting.

34. I said we could discuss that at end of next meeting.

Gowen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2855. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.